Since his first 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump has embraced populism – an approach to politics which pits ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ against one another. Rubrick Biegon looks at how the relationship between populism and ‘anti-populism’ – as represented by the Kamala Harris and Tim Walz Democratic presidential ticket – is playing out in the 2024 election. He writes that the Harris team’s cultivation of ‘positivity’ and calling Trumpism ‘weird’ are reactive appeals to Americans who want to see a return to the pre-Trump normalcy of American politics and campaigning. 

• This article is part of ‘The 2024 Elections’ series curated by Peter Finn (Kingston University). Ahead of the 2024 election, this series is exploring US elections at the state and national level. If you are interested in contributing to the series, contact Peter Finn (p.finn@kingston.ac.uk)

The Trump era in American politics has spurred intense debates over populism. As a concept and phenomenon, populism is fluid and ambiguous, yet it seems essential to what’s happening now. Trump’s selection of Ohio Senator J. D. Vance as his running mate was widely viewed as a doubling-down on populism, even as Vance was derided as a ‘faux populist’ by critics. With both the Trump and Harris campaigns foregrounding appeals to the working class, ‘populism’ is often seen as the dividing line between the candidates’ duelling pro-worker stances.

Populist victories can create a backlash, often in the form of a politics that is consciously anti-populist even when it is not presented as such. While populism has been much discussed in media and academic circles over the past decade or so, the response to populism has received comparatively little attention. This may be because many analysts and commentators view anti-populism as natural – the sensible or expected corrective to populist deviation. However, it is worth considering how the competing ‘sides’ of the populist antagonism interact with one another. A sharper appreciation of the interplay between populism and anti-populism not only sheds light on strategies of electoral mobilisation in the US context, it helps illuminate the highly-emotive dimensions of the 2024 contest.

Populism and anti-populism

Populism is not so much a coherent ideology or policy programme than a speaking style that organises politics around the core antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’. Despite his four years in power, this has been a persistent feature of Donald Trump’s post-White House manoeuvrings. As in previous election cycles, Trump continues to frame his ‘movement’ as oppositional, anti-elitist, and anti-establishment. The emotional appeal he cultivates with his supporters requires rhetorical continuity patterned on these divisions. Although Trumpian populism may have evolved since 2016, this emotional connection helps explain why the former President is steadfast in his approach even as many observers argue he would benefit electorally from a ‘softened tone’. That Trump does not (or cannot) pivot away from this deeply polarising style only adds to the sense of foreboding among his opponents.

There is a growing body of scholarly literature examining the opposing relationship of populism and anti-populism, much of which centres on recent developments in Europe. As my co-author Soraya Hamdaoui and I discuss in our recent work, the insights from this literature can be applied the United States, where the area of foreign policy provides fertile ground for the Biden administration to try and counter the impact of Trumpian populism.

Because ‘populism’ is such a contested term, anti-populism can also be difficult to define. It is generally understood in two ways: as an inversion of the logic or core antagonism of populism (in which elites are set against ‘the people’); or as opposition to leaders (or movements) labelled ‘populist’. The latter understanding is more common and is closely related to the belief that populists undermine institutions, threaten pluralism, and unsettle civil harmony.

“An person walks by a COACH! sign at the” (CC BY 2.0) by Lorie Shaull

Anti-populists view populism as immature, fraudulent, and even menacing. In their view, populism leads to incompetence and illiberalism and is highly disruptive of the ‘natural’ order of things. In the case of Trump, his shock victory in 2016 and subsequent presidency were internalised as a kind of trauma by many in the establishment (and by many ordinary Americans, as well). Trump’s putative populism became a way of pinpointing the origins of this trauma. In response, anti-populism, which is wrapped up in the emotions generated by the populist ‘threat’, pushes to (re)normalise the situation to return the country and its people to what it was before.

In Biden’s foreign policy, for example, this contributed to an effort to restore the pre-Trump consensus and recommit the US to its traditional leadership role, which took precedent over reforming policy in a lasting or meaningful way. There was some attempt to defuse populism via accommodation, as with Biden’s framing of a foreign policy for the middle class. But the principal tropes were normalcy and order, which could be achieved, it was thought, by returning to bipartisan internationalism, revitalising diplomacy and, where possible, rejoining international institutions.

Will anti-populism boost Kamal Harris’ appeal? 

When campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2020, Harris adopted a classic populist slogan: ‘for the people’. One of the early favourites to win the nomination, she dropped out of the race in 2019 before the primaries began. Harris was added to the Democrats’ 2020 presidential ticket to offset Biden’s age and strengthen his appeal amongst certain key factions of the Democrats’ diverse electoral coalition. Biden’s anti-populism was interwoven with his rhetorical concerns with competency, civility, and the smooth functioning of liberal democracy. His inaugural address called for unity and implored Americans to end their ‘uncivil war’.

Since Harris replaced Biden as the Democratic candidate, the party and its operatives have sought to recraft her image for the particularities of the contest with a resurgent Trump. Predictably, the messaging that emerged from the Democratic convention in Chicago in August was mixed. The ‘Trump’s-a-scab’ line, wielded by Shawn Fain, president of the United Auto Workers (UAW) union, can be seen as populist. More common were themes of unity and hope. The vibes were positive by design, with the Harris-Walz ticket leaning into ‘joy’ to draw contrast with the always-dour Trump. Calls for unity are standard fare in American politics, of course, and are not anti-populist as much as non-populist. How, then, is anti-populism functioning within the 2024 contest?

The Harris team’s cultivation of ‘positivity’ evokes a return to tradition in American campaigning. More than an attempt to run as the incumbent, it is predicated on a belief that Americans yearn for a restoration of ‘normalcy’ in their politics. The positive vibes are complemented by the critique of the ‘weirdness’ of Trump and his MAGA movement, which helped elevate Tim Walz to the VP slot. This has echoes of more explicit forms of anti-populism. The proliferation of this line of attack suggests that Democrats see it as more effective than other arguments, including, perhaps, the oft-repeated position that Trump is an existential threat to liberal democracy (though this too remains part of the Democratic messaging). Anti-populism frames populists as anomalous. Populists can only be ‘beyond the pale’ if their eccentricities are unprecedented – or interpreted in such a manner. Yet Trump’s brand of nativist, right-wing ‘anti-elitism’ has a long history in the United States and is now firmly embedded as an animating force within the Republican Party.

The emotive dimensions of populism have been thoroughly analysed, but we cannot say the same for anti-populism, which plays off emotions and feelings as much as other kinds of political expression. Although Democrats would certainly argue that Trump is abnormal in his approach to politics, this framing speaks to the deeply felt anxieties associated with his staying-power. Calling Trump(ism) ‘weird’ is representative of a mobilisation strategy designed to remind voters of Trump’s often-erratic rhetoric, style, and behaviour. But it is also a callback to the calm and comfort that Democratic (and other) voters felt (or remember feeling) before Trump upended the political scene. In this sense, even as Harris is offering centre-left progressivism on policy, the mood is nostalgic, and the strategy is as reactive as it is forward-looking. 

• This article is based on the paper ‘Anti-populism and the Trump trauma in US foreign policy’, in International Affairs.
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• Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor the London School of Economics. 
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