In What Really Went Wrong, Fawaz Gerges analyses the Middle East’s politics from the Cold War to the present and argues that Western interventionist policy (with particular flashpoints in Iran, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon) destabilised the region and steered it towards authoritarianism. Gerges’s deft combination of postcolonial critique and historical and political analysis makes this book an important contribution to Middle Eastern Studies, writes Mazlum Özkan, though he contends that religious tendencies in the region would have grown even if the USA and other Western powers hadn’t intervened.
Watch a YouTube video with Fawaz Gerges about the book, Why is the Middle East at war?: US Intervention explained and read an excerpt from the introduction to the book.
In What Really Went Wrong, Fawaz Gerges, delves into the geopolitical dynamics and interventions by Western powers that have shaped the Middle East. Gerges’s book is in dialogue with Bernard Lewis’s What Went Wrong? (2003), critiquing Lewis’s thesis that the decline of the Islamic world is largely due to internal failures. Lewis argues that the Islamic world’s inability to modernise – particularly in military, economic, and political spheres – left it vulnerable to Western domination. Gerges challenges this view by arguing that Western interventions were not merely responses to existing weaknesses, but were themselves significant contributors to the region’s instability and the failure of democratic movements. His book provides a detailed and critical perspective on the region’s history, from the Cold War era to contemporary conflicts, covering significant figures such as Mohammad Mossadegh and Gamal Abdel Nasser. He extends his analysis to Latin America for comparative insights on US intervention in foreign politics.
Gerges [argues] that Western interventions were not merely responses to existing weaknesses, but were themselves significant contributors to the region’s instability and the failure of democratic movements.
Gerges describes the book as “a radically reconstructed postcolonial history of the Middle East”, writing that:
“There has been a prevailing and long-standing Western view that this region is chronically chaotic and its people are inherently violent. This distorted perspective undermines the humanity of the people of the Middle East, who, like everyone else, yearn for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms like independence, economic development, and peace” (247).
He argues that Western interventions – primarily by the US, UK, and France – have systematically hindered democratic movements, instead establishing authoritarian regimes that serve strategic interests
He argues that Western interventions – primarily by the US, UK, and France – have systematically hindered democratic movements, instead establishing authoritarian regimes that serve strategic interests, with the Shah of Iran as a prime example. Mossadegh and Nasser emerged with goals of independence and modernisation, but these aims were often labelled as covert communism by Western powers. The freedom and patriotic desires of these leaders were deliberately mischaracterised to justify Western interventions. Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Mark Curtis’s Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam, and Ervand Abrahamian’s The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations are among the detailed analyses of how Western powers manipulated perceptions to legitimise their interference in the Middle East.
The book opens with the CIA-backed coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and the 1956 Suez Crisis involving Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Gerges argues that Western efforts to control the Middle East’s strategic resources led to these interventions. For instance, Mossadegh’s nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry threatened Western economic interests, resulting in his overthrow. Similarly, Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal prompted military intervention by Britain, France, and Israel. Britain viewed the Suez Canal as vital for maintaining its global trade routes and securing Middle Eastern oil, critical for its post-colonial influence. Losing the canal to Nasser threatened British interests. France, already battling anti-colonial uprisings in North Africa, saw Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism as a catalyst for further revolts. Israel, facing blockades and perceiving Nasser as a growing military threat, also joined the action. This convergence of interests led Britain, France, and Israel to intervene militarily against Egypt.
Gerges states that the US ‘inherit[ed] the colonial mantle from its European allies, setting up an informal empire through a network of allies such as the Shah of Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia’ (19).
Gerges states that the US “inherit[ed] the colonial mantle from its European allies, setting up an informal empire through a network of allies such as the Shah of Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia” (19). Despite Mossadegh’s royal lineage and Nasser’s middle-class background, both leaders sought to liberate their countries from colonial rule. Initially, they sought US support to oppose British dominance, aiming to nationalize vital resources like Iranian oil and the Suez Canal. However, they soon realised that the US had become a new imperial power, leading to a complex and hostile relationship shaped by Cold War dynamics and American geopolitical strategies. Gerges details these American interventions through a vivid, cinematic narrative.
One of the book’s strengths is its postcolonial perspective, which challenges the Western-centric view of the Middle East. Gerges effectively argues that Western interventions have not only stifled democratic movements but also fuelled the chaos and authoritarianism that plague the region today. For example, US support for authoritarian leaders like the Shah of Iran stemmed from a Cold War-era paranoia that conflated nationalism with communism. This conflation was driven by the pervasive fear of communism, which was heightened by McCarthyism – a domestic movement that fuelled widespread paranoia and led American leaders to perceive communist influence behind many nationalist movements abroad. The Dulles brothers, key architects of US foreign policy, believed that Mossadegh posed a serious danger of aligning with the Soviet Union, given Iran’s oil wealth and strategic location. Kinzer notes that the fear Iran could become a “second China” led them to support British plans to overthrow Mossadegh and replace him with a reliably pro-Western leader.
Gerges draws parallels between US interventions in the Middle East and Latin America, comparing the 1954 CIA-backed overthrow of Guatemala’s President Jacobo Árbenz with Middle Eastern interventions in countries like Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.
Interestingly, Gerges draws parallels between US interventions in the Middle East and Latin America, comparing the 1954 CIA-backed overthrow of Guatemala’s President Jacobo Árbenz with Middle Eastern interventions in countries like Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. This comparative approach highlights the wide reach of US interventionism during the Cold War and how the US sought to crush nationalist movements perceived as threats to Western interests, as David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas have explored in a broad sense and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer have examined in the Guatemalan context.
In the post-9/11 era, US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the ongoing support for Israel in its conflict with Palestine, serve as further examples of how Western policies continue to destabilise the region.
Gerges asserts that Western interventions have had long-term repercussions in the Middle East, contributing to the rise of political Islam and ongoing regional instability. In the post-9/11 era, US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the ongoing support for Israel in its conflict with Palestine, serve as further examples of how Western policies continue to destabilise the region. But while he argues that these interventions have exacerbated instability, political Islam arguably would have emerged as a counter-narrative to hegemonic ideas even without Western interference. For instance, Ali Shariati’s fusion of Marxist and Islamic rhetoric significantly shaped the Iranian Revolution, offers a counter-narrative to Western hegemony. This illustrates how local intellectual currents and socio-political dynamics drove the development of political Islam independently of Western influence.
Moreover, movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, founded by Hassan al-Banna, demonstrate that political Islam was deeply rooted in the region’s indigenous concerns. These movements responded not only to internal corruption, but also to the effects of colonialism. They were more than just reactions to Western actions – they were expressions of a desire to establish governance grounded in Islamic principles, resonating with the cultural and social fabric of the region. The rise of political Islam in countries like Türkiye, Iran, and Egypt also reflects a broader, natural evolution within these societies, driven by a mix of religious, cultural, and socio-political factors. This suggests that even without Western interference, political Islam would have emerged as a significant force, offering an alternative to both Western ideologies and local secularism. These ideas challenged the West’s ideological hegemony material power.
Gerges goes so far as to suggest that without external meddling, democratic sentiments might have flourished in post-Mossadegh Iran, leading to a secular democratic society. But Western ideas often fail to resonate in the Middle East
American interventions undoubtedly increased instability in the region and toppled democratically elected leaders. But arguably, religious tendencies in the region would have grown even if figures like Mossadegh had remained in power or Nasser had been left unchallenged. Gerges goes so far as to suggest that without external meddling, democratic sentiments might have flourished in post-Mossadegh Iran, leading to a secular democratic society. But Western ideas often fail to resonate in the Middle East, where imposing such ideas can feel like trying to wear someone else’s clothes – they simply don’t fit. These ideas might have been (and might still be) adapted, integrated, and made more suitable for the region, potentially leading to solutions. However, without such adaptation, the secular approach prevalent in Europe would likely struggle to take root in the Middle East, even in the absence of American interventions.
Scholars like Edward Said, Rashid Khalidi, Noam Chomsky, Juan Cole and Ervand Abrahamian have contributed to our understanding of Western interventions, the rise of political Islam, and regional instability in the Middle East. Gerges’s work offers a distinctive contribution by synthesising these elements into a cohesive and comprehensive narrative. His book connects historical events to contemporary geopolitical dynamics, providing insights that deepen our understanding of the ongoing impact of these interventions, as we see in Palestine today. His ability to weave together postcolonial critique, historical analysis, and modern political developments makes this book an important and valuable resource in Middle Eastern studies.
- This review first appeared at LSE Review of Books.
- Image: 1953 Iranian coup d’état – Pulling down statues of the Reza Shah by William Arthur Cram via The Guardian on Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.
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- Note: This article gives the views of the reviewer, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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