Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a large global military presence. In his new book, ‘Why America Can’t Retrench (And How It Might)’, Peter Harris examines what is preventing the US from ending its global military primacy. He writes that the US government and politics are hardwired to pursue this primacy: a massive Department of Defense employing millions who were recruited to run the world in America’s best interests and a political culture which punishes any suggestion of withdrawal or retrenchment.
Listen to Dr Peter Harris’ latest interview with The Ballpark podcast on Why America Can’t Retrench
Outside of its own borders, the United States has around 200,000 troops deployed across the world, and maintains nearly 800 military bases, at an annual cost of $100-200 billion. But despite this unmatched global defense commitment and its cost, the US is unable to retrench—at least not in a programmatic sense. Its military forces have been forward deployed around the world for the entire post-1945 era, and there is no sign of them coming home in large numbers. If anything, policymakers in Washington, DC are looking for ways to bolster the size of the US military presence in Europe, the Middle East, and Indo-Pacific, even if there is some disagreement over which theatre should take priority.
Why US retrenchment is impossible
The problem isn’t that retrenchment and restraint are bad ideas. On the contrary, there is a compelling case that the United States should “do less” militarily. Not only are leaders in Washington having to contend with ballooning debt and stretched budgets at home, but America’s friends abroad are now more than capable of defending themselves against external attacks. In fact, allied nations are often better placed to deter would-be aggressors than an overextended, far-off superpower such as the United States.
No, what makes retrenchment impossible today is that America’s government and politics are hardwired to pursue the exact opposite set of policies: a grand strategy of “military primacy.” This is entirely by design. During the World War II and Cold War eras, international demands forced Americans to “go abroad” to fight fascism and contain communism. But because the United States was unused to such expansive foreign policies, its leaders recognized (and ordinary voters accepted) that massive domestic reforms would be necessary to support an indefinite and globe-spanning military presence.
An expanded presidency, a gigantic peacetime military, an army of defense bureaucrats, a panoply of intelligence agencies, secretive decision-making processes, higher taxes and unprecedented levels of public spending, a sprawling arms industry, and narratives about US power and purpose that emphasized military superiority—Washington embraced all these changes and more during the 1940s, 1950s, and beyond. By the end of the Cold War, the federal government bore only a superficial resemblance to how it had been at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The United States military has a country
Today, the US state remains primarily a set of institutions that is ordered toward the end of military primacy. To be sure, the federal government does more than just warfighting when assessed in terms of spending priorities. The largest items in the federal budget are entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. But the government’s role in delivering these programs is not labor intensive, and really boils down to the writing of checks. The agency responsible for delivering Social Security, for example, only employs around 60,000 people (out of a US population of over 330 million).
The Department of Defense, on the other hand, employs nearly three million people (including the National Guard and reserve forces). It is the largest employer in the United States. Taken together, the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Veterans Affairs account for almost 60 percent of the federal government’s civilian workers. In short, this is what the federal government’s manpower is used to do: fight wars, prepare for future wars, and care for those who fought past wars.
This is not the case in other countries. In Britain, for example, the National Health Service (NHS) employs about six times as many people as the Ministry of Defence (around 1.7 million employees in England alone, versus 250,000 total civilians and military personnel). Then there are the police, teachers, civil servants, and other frontline bureaucrats that make up Britain’s enormous public sector. In the United States, most of these workers are employed by state and local agencies or else by private sector. But in Britain, they are on the payroll of central government departments.
“150708-A-PP104-160” by U.S. Department of Defense Current Photos is United States government work
The upshot is that the British state is engaged in far more activities than its US counterpart. Moreover, Whitehall is mostly inward-looking, with most public-sector workers tasked with administering some element of domestic public policy. This is just not the case in Washington, where most public servants have their gazes fixed on the outside world.
Retrenchment is almost impossible to consider and almost impossible to achieve
Viewed in this light, it makes eminent sense why the United States cannot easily downsize its overseas commitments. The federal government is staffed with legions of personnel who are dedicated to the projection of military power abroad. Nobody in Washington today was recruited into public service for the purpose of reducing America’s role in the world, whereas literally millions were recruited for the purpose of running the world in America’s best interests. Turning this ship of state around wouldn’t just be difficult; it would be radical to the point of being unimaginable.
Consider a hypothetical scenario where a British political party adopted a manifesto commitment to privatize the NHS and the education sector, won a General Election, and then implemented the proposed reforms in full. For British readers, this will be difficult if not impossible to imagine—not only because such a party would never win a parliamentary majority, but because ministers would struggle to deliver such a program in practical terms even if the electorate gave its backing to the reforms. Liquidating the NHS and state schools would be tantamount to destroying the UK government as we know it.
The same is true for military retrenchment in America. Not only is it electoral folly to propose wide-ranging retrenchment, but it would be nigh on impossible for an elected leader to follow through with such a promise. It would be like asking the federal government to dissolve itself. As President Trump confided in 2017 when announcing a surge of troops to Afghanistan (despite having promised to end the war when campaigning for the presidency), “all my life I’ve heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office.” In other words: presidents of the United States can’t do as they please but must do what the role demands of them. Invariably, this means defending and extending America’s position as a global military power.
Why America is unfit for peace
In the final analysis, this is why the United States can’t retrench: because its government and politics has been designed to make “pulling back” or “doing less” hard choices to make, whereas “leaning forward” and “staying the course” are easy defaults. To be sure, it is possible to implement discrete instances of retrenchment—America’s eventual exit from Afghanistan under President Biden being a recent case in point—but these are few and far between and are always highly controversial at home because they leave leaders vulnerable to charges of weakness, naiveté, and appeasement.
Do Americans today benefit from a government that is built for war and unfit for peace? Probably not. But that is the state they’re in. For the United States to change its approach to foreign policy—and its handling of domestic policy, too, for that matter—then it will have to change its political system first. This is a debate that can’t come soon enough.
Listen to The Ballpark podcast on Why America Can’t Retrench with Dr Peter Harris
As part of our regular podcast, The Ballpark, in September 2024 the Phelan US Centre spoke to Peter Harris his book, Why America Can’t Retrench (And How It Might) which looks at the US’ dominant role in the world, how it got there and the factors preventing global restraint. They discuss the idea of America’s ‘primacist’ approach to international affairs and the role of domestic politics and systems in preventing a change to America’s role in the world.
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This episode of The Ballpark was produced by Chris Gilson and Anderson Tan.
- This article is based on Peter Harris’ new book, ‘Why America Can’t Retrench (And How It Might)’.
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- Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor the London School of Economics.
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