Much to the consternation of many in the international community, former President Trump’s term in the White House was characterized by the US’ withdrawal from major international agreements, and there are fears that a re-elected Trump could further undermine international organizations like NATO and the IMF. Benjamin Daßler, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild and Andreas Kruck argue that no matter who wins this week’s elections, to continue to have the support of powerful nations like the US, international institutions need to be reformed to give these nations greater freedom to pursue their own international policies.

With the US presidential election nearly here, the possibility of Donald Trump’s return to the White House has ignited widespread concerns in Western capitals. Advocates of a “liberal” and “rules-based” international order worry that a second Trump presidency could deliver a catastrophic blow to the web of multilateral institutions that has governed international relations since the end of the Second World War. Would Trump 2.0 signal the end of the so called Liberal International Order (LIO) – the open and rules-based way the international order currently operates. Is there any way to prevent its collapse?

Based on our research into the contestation of international institutions by major powers, we argue that while apocalyptic visions that the LIO would be doomed in case of Trump’s victory may be exaggerated, so are the hopes that under Kamala Harris the US would be a champion of multilateralism. In either case, we suggest that there is a clear path for supporters of the LIO to safeguard multilateralism and the international institutions that underpin it: liberal restraint.

The stakes: The liberal international order in crisis

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 challenged the LIO from within. His administration undermined or withdrew from key multilateral institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the World Health Organization (WHO). His public criticism of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), his trade wars, and his “America First” foreign policy further damaged trust in the US as a champion of global multilateralism.

Should Trump win again, many international observers expect him to continue, if not exacerbate, this trajectory, potentially by withdrawing the US from key treaties and organizations entirely as Project 2025 outlines. The paralysis of or potentially severe damage to institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the WTO, and NATO could then become a reality. This has left many observers asking: Can the international order survive another Trump presidency?

The perils of liberal overreach

While these concerns are legitimate, they overlook a deeper problem: the current LIO has overreached in many ways. Its ambitions and the authority granted to multilateral institutions have expanded without sufficiently accounting for the diverse interests of the most powerful actors. This has left even the US constrained by rules and agreements that do not always serve its national interests and triggered the urge to “take back control”. For instance, in 2018, under President Trump the United States withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council, citing bias against Israel and the inclusion of human rights abusers as members. One reason for this alleged bias was the Council’s expanded mandate and membership criteria established through reforms that intended to make the institution more inclusive. However, this stripped the US of its “negative” power to avoid undesired institutional policies that conflicted with US interests and values. The US felt negatively affected by an institution it viewed as failing to uphold its intended purpose. Being unable to prevent undesired policies, under Trump, the US decided to withdraw.

The LIO’s virtue – its inclusive, liberal, and rules-based character – has also become its major weakness as the order’s ambitions and authority have overgrown. Multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN), the WTO, and the IMF were designed to facilitate international cooperation, but their effectiveness still depends on the consent and participation of the world’s most powerful states. When those states feel overly constrained by institutions, they are more likely to challenge or abandon them. In short, liberalism’s own excessive ambition has triggered a backlash, and if these institutions are to survive, they must adapt.

The case for liberal restraint

The path forward, therefore, is not simply to place all hopes in a Democratic victory this week or to start mustering global anti-Trump coalitions. Rather, irrespective of the outcome of the Presidential elections, advocates of the LIO should embrace a strategy of liberal restraint. This means tempering some of the more ambitious goals of global governance and allowing for greater flexibility, more breathing space, and larger wiggle room for powerful states like the US to exert sovereign control over their own policies in the context of international institutional cooperation.

There is significant evidence that even the most vocal critics of the Liberal International Order, including the first Trump Administration but also China and other non-Western powers such as India or South Africa, are not opposed to international institutions per se, but rather to excessive limitations placed by these institutions on their sovereign room for manoeuvre. Important but increasingly dissatisfied powers are more likely to stay within international institutions and refrain from undermining them, when they enjoy ‘negative’ power within them. This ability to veto or opt out of certain institutional policies contributes to keeping these states within the LIO and taming their attacks on its institutions. Conversely, where powerful states feel trapped by rigid and intrusive structures, they are more likely to disengage or actively undermine the LIO.

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As states’ power to avoid undesired international decisions has actually decreased in many institutions over the past decades, countervailing reforms are necessary to ensure the future of the LIO. First, powerful states should be granted greater veto power or flexibility within institutions, allowing them to avoid policies that conflict with their core national interests. These privileges will allow key member states to avoid undesired outcomes within institution and at the same time increase the benefits of membership. The UN Security Council is an instructive example. Despite its flaws, the Council remains a critical forum for great power engagement precisely because it offers veto power to its most powerful members, including the US, China, and Russia. This ensures that these states remain engaged in the system, even if they do not always agree with the policies being discussed. Second, mechanisms should be put in place to disincentivize non-cooperation, such as withdrawing from international agreements or institutions. One way to achieve this is by linking institutional privileges – such as trade benefits or security guarantees – more explicitly to continued membership in and compliance with the rules of multilateral institutions. 

Making multilateralism (more) resilient

Critics may argue that such reforms would render international institutions ineffective and illegitimate. It is true that the suggested reforms involve painful compromises on liberal ambitions. Yet, it is also clear that if multilateral organizations are to function in an era of rising nationalism and geopolitical competition, they must be recognized by their most powerful members as serving their interests – or at least providing them the opportunity to avoid policies they fundamentally oppose. While this might mean that compromises will take longer and some much-needed decisions might not be taken, multilateral institutions can be preserved as vital forums for negotiation, compromise, and cooperation in the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Irrespective of whether Trump or Harris becomes US President this January, the fundamental dynamics challenging the LIO will likely persist. The tectonic shifts in global politics – the rise of China, Russia’s revisionism, de-globalization, and increasing nationalism in many Western democracies – mean that it is unlikely that a future US administration can and will act as an unequivocal champion of multilateralism. Advocates of the LIO – for example, in European capitals but also in the bureaucracies of international institutions – should therefore promote reforms of international institutions to keep their most important members on board. By embracing a strategy of liberal restraint, they can help the LIO weather the storm and ensure that multilateralism remains a cornerstone of global politics in the decades to come.

Note: For more information, see the authors’ contributions in the Review of International Organizations, Global Studies Quarterly (co-authored with Bernhard Zangl), Global Constitutionalism (co-authored with Raphaela Hobbach) and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis (co-authored with Vytautas Jankauskas), and in book “A Hegemonic Transition? Reconfigurations of Global Economic and Security Orders in the Age of Trump” (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, edited by Florian Böller and Werner Welf).

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