Ukraine: Russia’s War and the Future of the Global Order, edited by Michael Cox explores the causes and nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine, triggered by the 2022 invasion, and its impacts on the global world order. According to Clémence Pellissier, the nuanced contributions in this volume work together to unpick the war’s dual role as a catalyst for geopolitical change and a means of revealing pre-existing international dynamics.

Ukraine: Russia’s War and the Future of the Global Order. Michael Cox. LSE Press. 2023.

“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means”. The West had forgotten this Clausewitzian reality. Russia’s surprise invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was difficult to predict, not fitting into the dominant paradigm and narrative: Why, when the West considers high-intensity warfare an outdated institution, did Vladimir Putin opt for a military invasion? Michael Cox’s edited volume, Ukraine: Russia’s War and the Future of the Global Order explores the war’s dual role as a catalyst for geopolitical change and a means of revealing pre-existing international dynamics.  

Together, the chapters develop a comprehensive approach to understanding the war, placing it in the context of stakes regarding identity, geopolitics and economics. Adopting a slightly different approach from the rest of the literature in this area, the aim here is to understand each actor (Russia, Ukraine, the West, China), rather than proposing a global geopolitical reading or an analysis centred on just one of these (generally Russia or Ukraine). This enables an understanding both ruptures and continuity with the contemporary realities of international relations. 

Ukraine’s remarkable resilience is evident not only on the battlefield but also in its society.

Putin: Historian of an existential struggle 

As stressed by Düben, Putin casts the war as an existential battle to restore “Greater Russia,” with Ukraine central to this narrative (linked to the concept of “novorossiya” or “new Russia”, 62 and 75). Coker shows how, drawing from historical and eschatological ideas (linked to the key question of Russian identity, 7 et seq.), Putin frames the invasion as a continuation of the Great Patriotic War (World War II), aiming to “denazify” Ukraine (24). This rhetoric aligns with a Schimttian notion of politics of enemy: “to belong to the Russian nation you must identify as ethnically and culturally Russian, as well as speak Russian” (95). Knott explains how survival results in identification and eradication of the “other,” both externally (against Ukraine, 103 et seq.) and internally (targeting minorities like Muslims and Crimean Tatars, 98 et seq. and 100 et seq.).   

Despite Putin’s rhetoric, the Russian population is not monolithic in its support. Lankina’s chapter reminds us that the socioeconomic structure, largely unchanged since the Tsarist era (35 et seq.), remains deeply stratified (40-41). It has created a small, highly educated, urban elite, versus an economically and culturally underprivileged majority, mostly living in rural areas. The latter are more receptive to Putin’s narrative and social contract (50-51).  

Ukraine: The delicate quest for a politico-national identity  

The war has also accelerated Ukraine’s quest for national identity (119 and 167-168), uniting its people in a “civic” rather than ethnic sense (142-143: “Ukrainian identity is (…) civic and political rather than ethnic”). Yekelchyk shows how this is linked to Ukraine’s delicate accession to independence since the fall of the Soviet Union (123). Previously divided elites and populations now appear to align under a shared goal of democratic independence (130 et seq.), with President Zelensky embodying this reconciliation (114). The conflict has bridged linguistic and ethnic divides, fostering national cohesion.   

This war initially revealed significant divides within Europe, particularly between Eastern and Western nations regarding Russia […] However, Spohr shows the conflict ultimately prompted greater unity

Ukraine’s remarkable resilience is evident not only on the battlefield but also in its society (148). The country has displayed a strong recovery and adaptability, which, according to Krawchenko is paving the way for potential European integration (164). Lokot emphasises how public opinion and media have played a critical role, with Russian efforts to control information (152 et seq.) and telecommunications infrastructure intensifying the struggle (150 et seq.). Despite these challenges, Ukraine’s resistance has highlighted the effectiveness of its civic unity and institutional fortitude.   

The West: Between unity and rupture  

This war initially revealed significant divides within Europe, particularly between Eastern and Western nations regarding Russia (278 et seq.). However, Spohr shows the conflict ultimately prompted greater unity, exemplified by Germany’s shift (294 et seq.) from a pacifist stance to a more assertive “Ostpolitik”, or East-politics (303). The war also highlighted Europe’s energy dependency on Russia, forcing policy shifts toward renewable energy and diversification of supply chains (214 et seq.). The end of the “security illusion” (361-362) has led to greater unity and clarification.  

The US response to the war reflects a major geopolitical recalibration, as explored by Harris, Marinova, and Griciu. While the Obama administration took a cautious approach in 2014 (258-259), President Biden has embraced an assertive stance (263 et seq.), using the conflict to weaken Russia and send a message to global rivals like China (270). Yet, domestic political divisions persist, with figures like Donald Trump advocating for an isolationist approach (267).  

However, the war in Ukraine is also amplifying several fault lines, not least political ones. This is the case in the US, where Trump is clearly defending American interests first (25/258). The same divide can be observed within the European Union. Hungary, for example, is reluctant to vote in favour of European sanctions (234-235).  

China has also maintained, and even expanded, its economic and political relations with Russia.

This new political divide is amplified by the crises generated by the war on the continent. Firstly, refugees: Europe’s reception of Ukrainian refugees has been generally large and unanimous, but this is reinforcing a problematic double standard (compared, for example, with the welcome reserved for Afghans), (193 and 198). As the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organise Crime adds, the war in Ukraine has also amplified and encouraged the proliferation of criminal networks, particularly in the fields of drug trafficking (230 et seq.) and sexual exploitation (236 et seq.). This combination of war, crime and forced migration has had the effect of considerably tightening border controls (188), particularly using technology (196 et seq.). In their chapter, Georgiou and Troszyński show how this current reinforcement of borders is both a physical and a “symbolic” barrier, keeping Westerners in an us/them dynamic (194). 

A recalibrating world order? 

Alden explains how the launch of the invasion did not trigger any real condemnation. The Global South has largely refrained from condemning Russia, with many countries abstaining from UN resolutions (359). This stance reflects a return to the doctrine of non-alignment (368 et seq.) and scepticism toward Western double standards in international law (361). For many Global South states, the West’s current defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity rings hollow given its history of military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. In other words, the countries of the Global South are refusing to play what they see as a sort of game whose rules have been established by the West, and which, when it comes to international relations, merely defends the West’s interests (373). 

This question of geopolitical interests also helps us understand China’s position. Cox addresses this specific issue by going back over China’s abstention from the vote at the United Nations of the resolution ES-11/1 (335 et seq.). More broadly, he shows that China has also maintained, and even expanded, its economic and political relations with Russia. More to the point, politics has here taken precedence over economics. By choosing to rally behind Russia, China has accepted the risk of calling into question its economic relations with the West (341). This gamble can be explained by an assertive geopolitical will, particularly in the context of a struggle for influence with the United States in the Indo-Pacific (347). 

Contrary to appearances (and rhetoric), the war in Ukraine is not strictly a European war. Unforeseen by many players, it has forced them to reposition themselves and/or assert their position in international relations. In this sense, the book enables a broad audience to grasp the dual aspect of this war as both a catalysing and revealing force.  

• This article originally appeared at the LSE Review of Books blog.
• Subscribe to LSE USAPP’s email newsletter to receive a weekly article roundup.
• Image: Alim Yakubov on Shutterstock.
• Please read our comments policy before commenting.
• Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor the London School of Economics.
• Shortened URL for this post: https://wp.me/p3I2YF-eK2