Following Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from bodies like the World Health Organization and the UN Human Rights Council, the role of international institutions in constraining powerful nations is being increasingly debated. Responding to a recent USAPP blog post, Benjamin Daßler, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild and Andreas Kruck argue that in order to maintain the Liberal International Order, states which are vital to addressing global problems should have more power to avoid institutional outcomes that they do not find desirable. 

To increase the resilience of the Liberal International Order (LIO) to challenges from a Trump-led US and other dissatisfied powers, we proposed a strategy of ‘liberal restraint’ in a recent contribution to this blog. To counter the LIO’s overreach that has provoked a growing backlash from disaffected states and societies in recent decades, we argued that major powers should be given greater leeway in international institutions to exercise sovereign control over their own policies.

In their thoughtful response, our colleagues Ben Christian, Johanna Speyer, and Lisbeth Zimmermann challenged our takes on the threats to and reform of the LIO, as they “disagree with both [our] diagnosis of the problem and [our] proposed solutions.” We very much appreciate their engagement with our argument, not least because it contributes to the debate on institutional reform – a debate which our blog post sought to stimulate and which we believe is necessary to safeguard the LIO at a time of fundamental challenge. Their response has also challenged us to clarify agreements and disagreements, to sharpen our diagnosis and proposed solutions, and to move towards a more nuanced debate about the difficult trade-offs that challenge the LIO and its underpinning institutions.

We agree with Ben Christian and his co-authors that in a world where power is distributed unequally, international orders must balance the interests of the powerful and the inclusion of the weak. We argue that a promising way to mitigate this dilemma at the core of the LIO – and thus to ensure its future resilience – is to limit the ability of multilateral international organizations to intrude on what states do. While this would arguably entail some negative implications for international institutions’ ability to solve problems, we believe that a more moderate LIO is still more desirable (also) for weaker states than no order or an alternative, illiberal order.

Powerful states’ control over international institutions varies, and it has shrunk over time 

Ben Christian and his co-authors challenge our analysis as they claim that “we generally do not see that great powers like the US are overly constrained by international institutions”, citing their power and privileges in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Bank. In their assessment, “the list of international institutions that objectively work against the interests of powerful states – or that constrain ‘their sovereign control over their own policies’ – is very short to non-existent.”

We agree with the assessment that the LIO and some of its key institutions have institutionalized inequalities favoring established powers. However, we disagree with the notion that powerful states are largely unconstrained by international institutions. The rules of (many) international institutions do also empower weaker states, and their increasing independence and intrusiveness constrain even their powerful member states. International institutions’ authority has increased over recent decades as shown by the expansion of pooled decision-making through majority voting and the delegation of power to independent secretariats and courts. The authority and intrusiveness of international institutions is visible in the examples of the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose supranational dispute settlement body claims to authoritatively adjudicate international trade conflicts, the World Health Organization (WHO) (which Donald Trump has since announced that the US will be leaving), which can independently declare Public Health Emergencies of International Concern and initiate health recommendations also against members’ interests, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which imposes potentially significant constraints and costs on non-members as their nationals can be indicted for alleged crimes on member states’ territories.

To be sure, international institutions’ authority and their intrusiveness regarding great powers varies significantly. The UNSC, IMF, and World Bank – as stressed by Ben Christian and his co-authors – grant important privileges to great powers. Yet, tellingly, it is precisely these institutions that, despite their notable flaws and existing criticism, seem relatively resilient to fundamental contestation, which would challenge their continued relevance. By contrast, those which have engaged in most liberal expansionism, such as the WTO, the WHO, and the ICC are among those suffering from the most radical contestation. The UNSC is obviously far from perfect because of its design, but also due to the veto power it grants to its most powerful members, it has remained an essential forum for great power communication, coordination, and (limited) cooperation in times of aggravated power rivalries.

Just as Ben Christian and his co-authors do, we recognize and are concerned about “‘closures’ of various kinds, both formal and informal – for example, through the establishment of new exclusive forums and clubs such as the G7.” Yet, in our view, shifts to informal, more exclusive forums are often a reaction to multilateral institutions’ excessively encroaching on great powers’ sovereignty. Retrenching the liberal intrusion of multilateral international organizations might thus help to mitigate the shift to (often) more exclusive, less accountable informal forums.

Enhancing powerful states’ ‘negative power’ to avoid, not their ‘positive power’ to achieve 

Our colleagues suggest that we advocate for a reformed international order with global institutions that “give more power to already powerful states”, “work even more in the interest of powerful states”, or “only work in powerful states’ interests.” While we disagree with this reading of our contribution, we are grateful for it, as it pushed us to underline a key distinction at the core of our argument.

We do not call for reforms that maximize the ‘positive power’ of the US and other great powers to achieve desired outcomes in international institutions at the suffering of weaker states. Rather, we suggest granting states that are vital for addressing global problems more negative power to avoid fundamentally undesired policies and outcomes. Their ‘ability to prevent’ can be strengthened through weighted voting or veto rights. Their ability to evade undesired institutional outcomes can be increased through flexibility clauses and opt-outs. Our plea is thus not to give the US the power to achieve whatever it wants in international institutions, but to grant key member states – including but not limited to the US – more power to prevent what they do not want at all.

Less intrusion to incentivize broad inclusion 

Following our emphasis on ‘negative power’, our recipe for incentivizing continued participation – by the US and by other states – is less liberal intrusion, rather than less inclusion. Limiting the intrusiveness of international institutions and enhancing the opportunities for member states to avoid undesired policies might in fact mitigate the dilemma Ben Christian and his co-authors identify: “an international order for a state-based system […] will only be effective if great powers take part but also needs to have an inclusive vision so as to attain legitimacy.”

Granting blocking power and opt-outs facilitate – rather than constrain – the inclusion of great powers and other states. The sovereignty costs decrease for all and veto rights provide a safeguard for the weak against exploitation by the powerful. There are also good reasons to believe that greater opportunities to block undesired rules before they are put in place increase – rather than decrease – compliance with the agreed rules after they are made, because states can prevent the establishment of unacceptable rules in the first place. Enhancing the negative power more generally could thus render the LIO more robust rather than undermine it.

‘Re-embedding liberalism’ to mitigate global reservations against the LIO 

The need for a more restrained Liberal International Order (LIO) extends beyond appeasing the US. It also reflects widespread concerns from emerging and developing states in the Global South, who are often the most skeptical about international order(s) and international institutions limiting their sovereignty. These states frequently seek greater inclusion in global governance institutions without sacrificing their ability to shape domestic policies. The discourse surrounding ‘digital sovereignty’ among BRICS countries exemplifies this tension. They advocate for increased representation in global digital governance structures while simultaneously asserting their right to regulate digital spaces within their borders.

We may regret this, but at present we do not see a global case for cosmopolitanism, as non-Western rising powers and sovereignty-minded domestic groups in Western societies demand more national sovereignty. In this context, returning states the power to block or opt-out of undesired international policies could alleviate both rising powers’ dissatisfaction with the current LIO and domestic reservations of moderate critics against the liberal overreach of international institutions, though it would not – and should not – mean giving in to radical “nationalist and nativist agendas.”

Rather than “an (unacknowledged) undermining of the basic normative underpinnings on which most global governance arrangements are based,” a LIO that grants states more ‘negative power’ could lead back to an “embedded liberalism.” This vision of liberalism, which tries to reconcile international cooperation with national sovereignty, could alleviate some of the pressing legitimacy challenges the contemporary LIO is facing and ensure continued broad participation. A ‘re-embedded’ liberal order could thereby also provide weaker states an attractive – and more desirable – alternative to emerging ordering projects by China and Russia that promise more sovereignty but combine it with illiberal ends.

Certainly, our proposal of ‘liberal restraint’ is not a panacea. It is not clear that more ‘negative power’ can keep the US committed to multilateralism if the country radicalizes further under Trump. Limited liberal intervention and the lowest-common-denominator agreements it might entail would also likely limit international institutions’ ability to quickly address the pressing global problems of our time, including climate change and humanitarian and heath crises. Navigating the trade-off between inclusiveness and efficiency will require nuanced assessments and sometimes painful choices. But while the sketched reforms constrain quick responses to pressing problems, in times of geopolitical rivalries and domestic backlash, liberal restraint’ offers a pragmatic approach to sustain participation in, and the relevance of, the liberal international order’s inclusive and liberal institutions.

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