Donald Trump’s second presidential administration has created new challenges for the UK and its Special Relationship with the US. Richard Rose charts the history of the UK-US Special Relationship from its beginnings after World War II to the US’ pivot away from the UK and Europe in favor of engagement with Asia and confrontation with China. He writes that UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, must now navigate a relationship in which the US no longer sees the UK as a major partner that is worthy of special treatment in defense spending and tariffs.
The optimist can interpret Donald Trump’s return to the White House as a swing in America’s mood, which may be followed by a Democrat taking over when America’s oldest president leaves office by 2029. The argument of my new book, European Security From Ukraine to Washington is that the Make America Great Again movement is part of a long-term structural shift. The UK’s relationship with the United States is becoming at best cordial, but nothing special compared to that of other medium-sized powers. At worst, it is not even transactional, as America’s world role makes the White House give priority to problems and countries on other continents.
The changing UK-US Special Relationship
The social base of the special relationship reflects the long-shared history between the US and UK, dating back to British settlement of what is now the US. By the time immigrants arrived from continental Europe, they were expected to assimilate into an Anglo-American culture.
Since the 1950s immigration to the US has changed in kind. The absolute number of European immigrants, including British, has declined, while immigrants from other continents have multiplied. Since 1970 almost half of legal immigrants have come from Spanish-speaking countries and one-third from Asian countries. Since 2010 Asia has replaced Latin America as the principal source of legal immigrants. Today Europe accounts for barely eight percent of legal immigrants.
Most Americans of British origin no longer identify as Anglo-Americans. When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president, two-thirds of the Electoral College votes he needed to win came from the 13 original colonies; the three Pacific Coast states had only one-eighth of the votes. In 2024 the Electoral College votes of sunbelt states swamped those of New England.
The origins and growth of the Special Relationship
The special relationship that Britain depends on for its national security was forged immediately after 1945 when Harry Truman was president and British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and Prime Minister Clement Attlee made British foreign policy. Having served in the War Cabinet, they knew that American support was vital, both militarily and economically. The Soviet Union had replaced Nazi Germany as the biggest military threat to the UK and that continental Europeans were unreliable allies at best.
When the British government could no longer support Greece and Turkey against Soviet incursions, in 1947 President Truman declared it was in America’s national interest to guarantee their security. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 made America’s armed force the chief military shield for the United Kingdom and Europe. This was not done because of ethnic links but because the White House and Congress saw NATO as in America’s national interest. Most of the 13 Senators that voted against Nato came from states that voted for Donald Trump in 2024.
The globalization of insecurity over the following 75 years has been parallelled by American presidents defining national security in global terms. Since 1950 America has sent troops to fight five wars from Korea to Iraq, some successfully and some not. On the UK side, arguably the most important decision was Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s refusal to send British troops to fight alongside American forces in the Vietnam War. Maintaining an effective and efficient armed force has been a low priority for successive UK prime ministers but high for American presidents.
“Trump Street, London” (CC BY-NC 2.0) by duncan cumming
Challenges for Keir Starmer and beyond
Downing Street now faces the twin threats of delinkage and linkage. As far as Ukraine is concerned, Sir Keir Starmer is in the picture on the BBC but rarely in the picture in the Oval Office. President Trump and Congress are focusing on Britain and other NATO member states to end what is seen as free riding on American military expenditure and pay their fair share. Trump has suggested this could be as high as five percent of GDP. To show willing before meeting Trump in Washington, on February 25th, Starmer announced an increase in defense expenditure to 2.5 percent of GDP in two years and an increase to three percent by 2034.
America’s weakening ties with Europe have been complemented by what President Obama has described as a pivot to the Pacific. It began more than half a century ago with the rapprochement of China engineered by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. This has evolved into the White House seeing China as its major trading partner and subsequently as an economic and military threat to be dealt with by high tariffs.
Britain has benefited from expanding trade too. Since Brexit the United States is now the biggest single market for the UK, taking over 21 percent of British exports. However, European Union member states are collectively Britain’s biggest market, taking just over 41 percent of Britain’s exports. The form and scale of any tariffs the Trump Administration is likely to impose on Britain is not the high priority in Washington that it is Downing Street. The UK will be negotiating from a disadvantaged position. If Trump is involved, it is uncertain what he would want or give in exchange. A state visit with King Charles could turn frosty or worse. The best that UK Ambassador to the US, Peter Mandelson, can do is to mobilize American interests to lobby for exemptions from a general tariff that would hurt American as well as British firms. An all-round trade deal will be unlikely so long as the UK rejects the import of genetically modified agricultural products produced in states with 98 senators.
Global instabilities will undoubtedly introduce new instabilities in Anglo-American relations. However, the structural conditions that have already eroded the reliance that Winston Churchill and Tony Blair had in a special relationship will still be there, and if anything, stronger. The prime minister may decide that keeping the pantomime alive will win applause in Britain. However, it will not boost the Treasury receipts that Rachel Reeves will be looking for to meet the increased defense spending needed to keep Britain a partner in President Donald Trump’s American First foreign policy.
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