The UK’s foreign policy, national security and economy remains vulnerable to the Trump administration’s turn away from its traditional European allies. But, Gustav Meibauer and Gesine Weber argue that International Relations theory offers the UK a useful toolkit for the situation it faces. It is possible for a smaller state through a mixture of alignment, resistance, and adaptation to manage an unpredictable hegemon like Donald Trump.

The first months of the second Trump administration have demonstrated that the coming years will be challenging for the United States’ traditional allies. A return to increasingly erratic “America First” unilateralism, including pressure on NATO allies to dramatically increase defence spending, transactional rather than principled alliances, open scepticism about multilateral institutions, and even interference in domestic politics on the side of far-right movements all paint a troubling picture. The risk that the United States might abandon its European allies, either with regard to deterrence and security guarantees or with regard to concrete military support in case of an attack against European allies, has perhaps never been higher.

This situation is particularly challenging for the UK as its foreign policy has historically rested on two pillars: a deeply embedded transatlanticism via the “special relationship” with the United States and a pragmatic multilateralism as part of Europe and in particular the European Union. For the UK this risks significant exposure: Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent relies on deep US-UK technological cooperation; its intelligence capabilities are embedded in the Five Eyes alliance; its economy remains intertwined with transatlantic markets.

The UK’s position highlights a classic dilemma in international relations: how smaller or less powerful states navigate alliances with an unpredictable or overbearing hegemon.

Complicating matters further, Brexit has left the UK without the institutional fallback of the European Union. While diplomatic relations with Brussels have improved Britain remains outside key EU defence and foreign policy frameworks. In a world where regional blocs are increasingly important for political and economic leverage, the UK risks strategic loneliness.

The situation calls for an uncomfortable adaptation in terms of strategy on the side of the UK Government. International relations (IR) theory can help with this endeavour. The UK’s position highlights a classic dilemma in international relations: how smaller or less powerful states navigate alliances with an unpredictable or overbearing hegemon. Scholarship on small state strategy offers a wide array of insights on uncertain environments and great power management, and outlines several strategies of smaller partners in an alliance to address situations of coercion or the risk of abandonment. IR can therefore highlight potential options for a UK strategy in the era of Trump.

Managing a potentially dangerous hegemon requires more than blind loyalty or blunt opposition; it involves a calibrated mix of alignment, resistance, and adaptation.

IR theory for small-state strategies

While traditionally focused primarily on great powers, more recently IR scholarship has emphasized that small states—despite their material limitations—possess considerable strategic agency. Managing a potentially dangerous hegemon requires more than blind loyalty or blunt opposition; it involves a calibrated mix of alignment, resistance, and adaptation. For the UK, traditionally viewed as a “special partner” to the US and with residual aspirations to great power status but increasingly conscious of its diminished global standing post-Brexit, this literature offers a toolkit for crafting a more resilient and self-aware foreign policy.

While perhaps politically sensitive, it is definitionally appropriate to consider the UK a “small state” or “junior partner” in the transatlantic alliance because relevant literature refers to small states as “the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own”.. Within NATO, this is illustrated by the US’ overwhelming military capabilities compared to European allies, including the UK, and its strategic and political lead over decades.

This literature identifies several strategic options available to small states, each offering different ways to manage the risks of great power dominance. Balancing remains a foundational concept. Hard balancing—such as military build-up or formal alliances—is exemplified by the Baltic states, which have significantly strengthened their defense postures within NATO in response to Russian aggression; this approach can either aim at balancing power or balancing threat. Soft balancing, meanwhile, relies more on diplomatic coalitions and institutional manoeuvring; for instance, ASEAN countries often coordinate to collectively push back against China’s assertiveness without direct confrontation. Balancing for autonomy—pursuing diversified ties to avoid overreliance on any one power—can be seen in Finland and Sweden’s longstanding efforts (prior to NATO membership) to cultivate broad security partnerships alongside EU membership.

Today, fully evading the erratic gaze of a complicated hegemon might be more difficult than ever, even if there might be hope that the UK can avoid conflict simply by relying on the Trump administration’s notoriously short attention span.

Bandwagoning represents the opposite approach: aligning closely with the hegemon in hopes of gaining favour or protection, as seen in Australia’s historically tight alignment with US policies in the Indo-Pacific, even at some cost to its relationships with China. Hedging and leash-slipping fall in between; Singapore, for example, maintains deep security ties with the US while also engaging China economically, keeping its options open in a competitive regional environment. Hiding, neutrality or shelter-seeking—where states retreat into defensive postures, seek cover under international institutions, or otherwise hope to “stay out of trouble”—are historically often adopted, including in combination, by very small states. Today, fully evading the erratic gaze of a complicated hegemon might be more difficult than ever, even if there might be hope that the UK can avoid conflict simply by relying on the Trump administration’s notoriously short attention span, while shelter-seeking outside US-dominated frameworks may offer it some leeway to focus on those security and economic issues most central to its national interests.

More recently, relevant scholarship has emphasized more “entrepreneurial” approaches. Niche norm entrepreneurship involves states leveraging specific areas of expertise or moral authority to shape global standards within the parameters set by the great powers—Norway’s proactive role in peace mediation and development aid policy is a textbook case. The “competent performance of vulnerability” is an even subtler tactic, where small states showcase their vulnerabilities to secure protective commitments and employ their nominal smallness and insignificance to influence international outcomes, as seen in the way Pacific Island nations frame their existential threat from climate change to galvanize international support. These strategies highlight that even materially weaker states are far from powerless; their success lies in carefully selecting and combining their options to navigate the pressures of global politics.

What strategies should UK foreign policy follow?

For the UK, a successful strategy is unlikely to rely on a single approach but rather a hybrid that is both pragmatic and opportunistic. Small states succeed when they prioritize goals clearly and employ entrepreneurial tactics that are problem-solving, proactive, and responsive. In practice, this will mean a departure from the Labour Government’s current hesitancy to develop a clear strategy vis-a-vis the US, which may in part be derived from residual hope that the Trump administration can again be ‘managed’ and that any changes to US foreign policy can quickly be undone by Trump’s successor. Were the Government to realise that neither is probable, a new strategic UK foreign policy should involve a mix of soft balancing—tightening ties with the EU and other middle powers to counterbalance US unpredictability, while maintaining enough engagement with Washington to avoid full alienation (i.e. a form of hedging).

In light of the trajectory of US withdrawal from European security, more actively investing in balancing for autonomy and independence from the United States in critical military domains, both operationally and strategically, is a critical step to avoid becoming collateral damage.

As the threat from Russia will demand more effort from Europeans, increasing its defence capabilities seems an indispensable step for the UK to mitigate this threat and Russia’s expanding power. In light of the trajectory of US withdrawal from European security, more actively investing in balancing for autonomy and independence from the United States in critical military domains, both operationally and strategically, is a critical step to avoid becoming collateral damage. A key step to achieve this is close cooperation with European partners within NATO, but also through enhancing EU-UK cooperation, for instance on defence industrial cooperation. In parallel, UK policymakers need to develop options on how the UK can manage US policy which is at best challenging, at worst openly opposed to British strategic interests. Soft balancing strategies can inspire this approach: whilst seeking cooperation with Washington should be prioritised where possible, managing confrontation must be prepared when necessary. Together with other Europeans, the UK and its European partners jointly need to enhance awareness of their “spoiler potential” for US foreign policy objectives that undermine theirs. Linking European political support for the US approach in the Indo-Pacific to a cooperative posture of the US in Europe could be a good first step.

Together with other Europeans, the UK and its European partners jointly need to enhance awareness of their “spoiler potential” for US foreign policy objectives that undermine theirs.

Finally, the UK could seek to capitalize on its enduring diplomatic clout and soft power in niche areas such as climate leadership, international development or global financial governance, practicing norm entrepreneurship and seeking to quietly maintain those parts of multilateral cooperation essential to its security and welfare. Here, displaying a “competent vulnerability”—acknowledging its reduced post-Brexit leverage while skilfully navigating global forums—might even coax the US into sustaining some of its commitments.

The challenge, then, is to craft a grand strategy that is as adaptive and nuanced as the new global realities demand. Recent scholarship suggests that Keir Starmer might well have the leadership profile necessary for such a move. Domestically, the Starmer government faces strong incentives to prioritize stability and pragmatism over grand ideological projects. After years of Brexit-induced turbulence, there is little appetite among voters for major foreign policy experiments. Starmer’s Labour has sought to position itself as competent, cautious, and managerial — qualities that suggest foreign policy will be treated primarily as a question of safeguarding national interests rather than pursuing sweeping visions of the UK as a global superpower. IR theory presents a set of useful tools for addressing this challenge; it is now up to decision-makers to apply them wisely.

• This article first appeared at the LSE British Politics and Politics blog.
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• Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor the London School of Economics.