Long considered to be “demographically destined” to support the Democratic Party, in recent elections Latino voters have increasingly favored Republican presidential candidates. In new research bringing together data from over 100,000 survey respondents, Derek Wakefield, Bernard L. Fraga and Colin Fisk examine Latinos’ changing partisan identity. They find that while Latinos are identifying less as Democrats and more as Republicans and independents, those Latinos who were born in the US are becoming less politically engaged overall.

As the Latino population in the United States becomes an increasingly large and politically important group, there have been numerous predictions and narratives about who they may support politically in the future. One common argument has been that because many Latinos are immigrants, partisan polarization on such issues should lead Latinos to become more Democratic either due to that party’s pro-immigrant outreach (like DACA) or in response to Republicans’ anti-immigrant attacks (such as Trump’s anti-Mexican rhetoric). Republicans themselves often attempt to appeal to Latinos on issues related to social conservativism and anti-socialism. However, both of these predictions about Latinos—that they are “(Dem)ographically destined” to be Democrats or are “Republicans but they just don’t know it yet”—focuses on Latino partisans and fails to account for the high proportion of Latinos who are more politically disengaged and identify as independent.

In our new research, we examine trends in how Latinos identify as Democratic, Republican, and independent over the last three decades to help predict the future partisan trajectory of this electorally influential group.

What’s driving Latinos’ partisan identity?

Our focus is on partisan identity (rather than vote choice, or voter turnout) because we are interested in the development of longer-term political attachments. Partisan identity is also important to consider for Latinos specifically because they are less likely than white or Black Americans to identify with either party. This is caused in part by demographic factors, such as the high proportion of Latinos who are immigrants, Spanish-dominant, and have lower incomes and education. However, lower rates of Latino political engagement can then produce a vicious cycle because partisan identity is often developed by learning from parents and peers—if Latinos are less likely to have partisan identities, then their children and social networks are also less likely to receive the necessary knowledge to develop their own partisan attachments. We therefore pay close attention to how differences between Latinos in terms of their age and place of birth affect their partisan identities.

To conduct our analyses, we gathered data from 35 political opinion surveys with large and representative Latino samples to create a dataset of more than 100,000 Latino respondents from 1989 through 2023. The quality of this data varies, especially for older datasets, so we also use Census/ACS data to re-estimate our survey weights. For each individual survey, we then estimated the percentage of Latino respondents who identified as or leaned towards Democrats (blue dots), identified as/leaned towards Republicans (red dots), and who expressed no identification or leaning towards either party (green dots). Our findings are the closest possible estimate, given these data limitations, of how Latino partisanship has shifted over the last three decades.

“Voto Latino” (CC BY-SA 2.0) by quinn.anya

In Figure 1, we show results for our full sample. In 1989, we find that the number of Latino Democrats was more than double the number of Latino Republicans, and rates of independent identification were low as well. These trends remain relatively stable through the Obama administration (2009-2017), although we see some slight evidence of further Democratic gains. After the 2016 election, we find that Latinos became steadily less Democratic and marginally more Republican than before. We also find rates of independent identification increasing after 2016. These overall findings go against the assumption that Trump would drive Latinos towards Democratic identification—instead, we find slight increases in Republican identification and proportionately larger increases in independent status.

Figure 1 – Partisanship trends among Latinos, 1989-2023

Note: This graph shows a weighted estimate from 35 public opinion surveys of the percentage (Y-Axis) of Latino adults identifying as either Democrat/lean Democrat (blue), Republican/lean Republican (red), or Independent (green) over the 1989-2023 time period (X-Axis). “Don’t know” and third-party responses are not included. Points show the average partisanship estimate for each individual survey, which are calculated using post-stratification weights based on Census/ACS demographics. Point size is proportional to survey N. Lines show a loess best-fit estimate using inverse variance weights and a 95 percent confidence band.

In Figure 2, we then separate our analyses for Latinos based where they were born: the left graph shows results for Latinos who were born outside of the continental US (i.e., those born in Puerto Rico were not counted as US-born) while the right graph shows trends among Latinos born in the continental US. For Latinos born outside of the US, we find shifts in both directions—towards Democratic identification during the Obama administration, and towards Republican identification during the Trump and Biden administrations. For Latinos born in the US, we instead find steadily declining identification with both parties over the full period and significantly increasing independent identification. While the partisan identities of Latino immigrants have shifted quite a bit over the last three decades, we do not find similar shifts among the US-born. Instead, this group has become less politically engaged over time. 

Figure 2 – Partisanship trends among Latinos by place of birth

Note: This graph shows a weighted estimate from 35 public opinion surveys of the percentage (Y-Axis) of Latino adults identifying as either Democrat/lean Democrat (blue), Republican/lean Republican (red), or independent (green) over the 1989-2023 time period (X-Axis). “Don’t know” and third-party responses are not included. Points (not shown for clarity) are based on the average partisanship estimate for each individual survey, which are calculated using post-stratification weights based on Census/ACS demographics. Lines show a loess best-fit estimate using inverse variance weights and a 95 percent confidence band. The left graph shows results for respondents born outside of the US or in Puerto Rico and the right graph shows results for those born in the US. 

Latinos’ political support is more complicated than we thought

Our findings complicate narratives from both parties about the future of Latino partisan identity. While Latinos have remained more Democratic on average, we have found large shifts among certain subgroups. Older Latinos, for example, have become more Republican over time while younger Latinos are increasingly not identifying with either party. We also show that differences by national origin (i.e., between Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban-origin Latinos) have become less apparent among US-born Latinos. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we find that Latinos have generally become more politically independent over time despite the intensity of partisan polarization in recent years, especially on racial topics like immigration.

With Latinos set to become the largest Global Majority group in the US, it is notable that they continue to express weak partisan attachments. To address this disengagement, it is crucial that campaigns engage Latinos with a variety of topics and strategies beyond the historical emphasis on immigration (such as economic issues). It is also clear that Latino outreach requires more investment to address this persistent partisan disengagement. Campaigns seeking to build out a more durable Latino electorate—rather than starting again every four years—must invest in longer-term strategies and efforts, or else Latinos will likely become even more politically disengaged.

• This article is based on the paper, “Partisan Change with Generational Turnover: Latino Party Identification from 1989 to 2023”, in The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics.
• Subscribe to LSE USAPP’s email newsletter to receive a weekly article roundup.
• Please read our comments policy before commenting.