On June 21st, following Israel’s own attacks, the US struck three Iranian nuclear facilities. Rupal Mehta writes that these strikes were prompted by concerns about Iran’s nuclear latency – its ability to quickly obtain a nuclear weapon if needed. She comments that, following the strikes, questions remain about the future of Iran’s nuclear objectives and how the process of de-escalation might be continued.
The world watches as tensions between Iran and Israel simmer, occasionally boiling over into open — albeit contained — conflict. While headlines often focus on missile exchanges, proxy wars, diplomatic stalemates, and ceasefires (and potential ensuing violations), a more insidious and less understood threat lurks beneath the surface: nuclear latency. Indeed, the recent US military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities that produce the necessary components for a nuclear weapon underscore the importance of understanding the role that nuclear latency plays in broader debates about deterrence and conflict.
Nuclear latency and Iran
Nuclear latency refers to a state’s ability to quickly develop nuclear weapons once a political decision has been made. For many states, the pursuit of nuclear latency gives them the opportunity to obtain all the necessary ingredients, knowledge, and infrastructure to assemble one on short notice and continue to be “one screwdriver turn away” from a nuclear weapon. In the context of the Iran-Israel conflict, nuclear latency isn’t just a theoretical concept; it remains a destabilizing factor that could redefine the security landscape of the Middle East.
In accordance with international law, states are legally allowed to pursue a nuclear latent capability as many of the components are dual use (and can be used for civilian, peaceful purposes) but may be adapted for military, or weapons, purposes. These component parts include developing enriched uranium or plutonium (the fissile material, often produced through civilian nuclear programs like power generation or medical isotope production), technical expertise through scientists, engineers, or other technical experts with the knowledge of nuclear weapon design and construction, and potentially even operational delivery systems such as ballistic missiles or other delivery platforms that can make the threat of nuclear proliferation even more credible. By procuring these dual-use ingredients, states like Japan, South Korea, Germany, and, of course, Iran, can more easily hedge their bets and convert a peaceful program to a weapons program if the need arises. Indeed, at this step of the nuclear ladder, it can be difficult to assess the true intentions of a nuclear program.
Iran has consistently maintained that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. However, its history of clandestine activities, advanced uranium enrichment capabilities, reluctance to engage with international weapons inspections through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and development of long-range missiles have fueled international suspicion. Even as American intelligence notes, if prior to the current crisis, Iran didn’t currently possess a nuclear weapon, its significant advancements in enrichment technology bring it dangerously close to a “breakout” capability. This inherent capability, even without an overt weapon, is the essence of nuclear latency and the instigating force behind recent hostilities.
Israel’s military action against Iran’s latent nuclear capability
Israel’s historic decision to launch preemptive military strikes against Iran – namely against its nuclear and military facilities – was due, in large part, to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear latent capability. A resolution passed by the IAEA on June 12 revealed that Iran was no longer in compliance with its non-proliferation commitments as a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran’s subsequent decision to ramp up its nuclear capabilities, along with stalling US-Iran negotiations, prompted Israel’s decision to embark on a military operation that “struck at the head of Iran’s nuclear weaponization program…for as many days as it takes to remove this threat.”
Israel’s security doctrine is deeply rooted in the principle of preventing any adversary from achieving a credible nuclear capability, especially one that openly calls for its destruction. If Iran were perceived to be actively breaking out or getting close to producing a nuclear weapon – further altering the deterrence calculus in the region, Israel’s long-standing red lines would likely be crossed. And from the international community’s perspective (especially the US intelligence and policy communities), Iran’s theoretical ability to divert its enriched uranium, withdraw from international safeguards, and produce enough weapons-grade material for a bomb in a relatively short timeframe had likely moved to the realm of actionable.
“P20250621DT-0687” by The White House is United States government work
What does US involvement mean for Iran’s nuclear program?
The decision by President Trump to strike three nuclear facilities in Iran on June 21st underscores the perception within the US policymaking and intelligence communities that Iran’s nuclear progress, and the ongoing conflict with Israel, was unlikely to be stopped without the use of military force. According to IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi, air strikes against the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear facilities suggest, that “given the explosive payload utilized, and the extreme(ly) vibration-sensitive nature of centrifuges, very significant damage is expected to have occurred.” Further, as noted by other analysts, the unprecedented use of American ‘bunker-buster bombs’ especially against Iran’s most important enrichment facilities that are buried nearly 300 feet below ground reveals that “a considerable amount of damage could have been done to the enrichment hall and adjacent halls that provide support to enrichment.” While it still may be too early to tell the long-term effects on Iran’s nuclear program, recent military operations in Iran may have significantly damaged Iran’s latent capability and delayed its breakout capacity – though for how long is uncertain.
Yet, there remain several open questions about what this may mean for the future of Iran’s nuclear and military objectives and broader regional dynamics. First, while Iran’s technical capability to quickly use its latent nuclear capacity to develop nuclear weapons may have been hindered as a result of weeks of Israeli air strikes and more targeted US military engagement, it is less clear if Iran’s appetite for nuclear weapons has abated, especially in light of the increasing precarious security environment in the region. As I and others argue, the use of military force may further entrench the Iranian regime and convince them that the only way to prevent foreign military aggression is by developing (or procuring in other ways) an operational nuclear weapons deterrent. These events may also help to reestablish a stronger international norm against preemptive counterproliferation strikes in the future.
Regime change in Iran appears unlikely
Throughout the conflict, the Iranian regime has celebrated increased domestic support from a weary populace frustrated with slowed economic growth, increasing internal divisions and mounting dissatisfaction with the regime, and diplomatic and societal exclusion from the international community. As noted by analysts, ““Most Iranians are hostile to the regime and oppose it, but there is a sense of national solidarity at the moment. Right now, the people are focused on one thing: survival.” The hope of using this conflict to sow discord and instigate leadership or regime change may indeed turn out to be counterproductive and actually encourage further Iranian domestic support for a nuclear weapons deterrent.
Opportunities for de-escalation
These factors may prove prohibitive to reaching a new nuclear agreement to permanently halt Iran’s nuclear development as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action intended to do before the first Trump administration withdrew from it in 2017. During this tenuous ceasefire (at the time of writing) between Israel and Iran, it will be important for the international community to find opportunities for diplomacy and deescalation that help create sustained pathways to continue to reduce tensions, build trust, and find a pathway for Iran to integrate more fully into the international community without pursuing nuclear weapons.
From the American perspective, the goal of finding suitable and concrete off-ramps to the conflict appear to be working. Both Washington and Tehran have sought opportunities to signal their intentions to deescalate the conflict through intermediaries and public statements; the US maintains that it remains open to finding a more permanent solution that will resolve the Iranian nuclear question decisively. What these negotiations will look like remains an open question, but it is clear that nuclear latency will remain a critical challenge to navigate in a fundamentally altered security landscape in the Middle East.
- Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor the London School of Economics.
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