In the global political landscape, we occasionally come across entities known as de facto states—political entities that have control over a particular territory and perform regular governmental functions there yet lack widespread international recognition. These statelets often emerge from conflicts or secessionist movements and find themselves in a unique position on the international stage. Their very existence challenges the existing international legal framework and raises questions about what constitutes legitimate statehood. For example, under what circumstances do territorially concentrated groups have a right to secede from internationally recognised states? And what role do third parties play in assisting them achieving or sustaining de facto statehood?
The survival and functioning of de facto states often largely depend on the support of third parties—external patrons that provide crucial backing, and in some cases, even recognise the sovereignty of de facto states. These relationships impact most aspects of the de facto state’s existence, influencing everything from economy and domestic governance to foreign policy.
Our recent study published in the journal Territory, Politics, Governance delves into the complex world of de facto states’ patron-client relationships. The study investigates if recognition from patron states changes their status, affects their domestic governance, or makes them more dependent on the patron.
Various factors can affect how much a patron interferes in its de-facto state client’s domestic affairs. In most cases, the nexus appears fairly straightforward: if the de facto state has ethnic kin, it likely eases the patron’s influence, penetration and elite circulation. With formal recognition, the situation becomes more complex. It might be assumed that this would enhance the client state’s autonomy. After granting diplomatic recognition, the patron is expected to treat its client as a regular state entity. However, the reality is often different, and patron-state recognition could arguably limit, rather than expand, the de facto state’s room to manoeuvre.
As our research shows, recognition by a patron state does not necessarily enhance a de facto state’s agency or autonomy. Instead, it introduces a new dynamic into its international and domestic politics. While states might gain certain benefits from patron recognition, such as increased security guarantees, patron-state recognition may also come at a price: It can lead to a tightening of the patron’s grip over de facto state, limiting the latter’s flexibility and subjecting it to greater influence.
Take South Ossetia and Abkhazia—two breakaway territories in Georgia that offer compelling insight into the complexities inherent in patron state recognition. Following the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Russia recognised the independence of both territories, a move that further solidified their de facto status. However, this recognition came with certain strings attached. While it provided a certain boost to their international recognition (four other countries have since extended recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia), it also deepened their reliance on Russia for political, economic, and military support. In other words, their increased recognition correlated with decreased sovereignty, as their dependence on Moscow grew.
In Abkhazia, which arguably has tried to protect its de facto independence tooth and nail, agreements with Moscow on alliance and cooperation in 2014 and on harmonisation of legislation in 2020, brought the territory closer into Moscow’s orbit. Russian citizens started playing more active roles in Abkhazian politics, transitioning from private initiatives to state-backed support—especially in the local security apparatus, including law enforcement, intelligence, and military. Staff rotation between Russia and Abkhazia became frequent, with Lieutenant General Anatolii Khrulyov as a notable example. He commanded the Russian 58th Army during the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. After retiring from the Russian military, he was appointed as Abkhazia’s First Deputy Minister of Defence and Chief of the General Staff in 2015. In 2018, he was succeeded by Vasilii Lunyov, a Russian Major General still in service, who had previously served as the Minister of Defence for South Ossetia.
South Ossetia shares a similar trajectory although its state institutions are even more susceptible to patron-state penetration than those of Abkhazia. Like in the case of Abkhazia, recognition brought South Ossetia deeper into Moscow’s embrace with agreements on military cooperation and security significantly integrating it with Russia. Russian troop presence has increased in the region after August 2008, with the Kremlin exerting considerable influence over decision-making processes. All de facto presidents have been locals. However, since 2008, we have seen three consecutive prime ministers all hailing from Russia – Yurii Morozov (2005–2008), Aslanbek Bulatsev (2008–2009), and Vadim Brovtsev (2009–2011) – none of which had any prior ties to South Ossetia.
These cases offer valuable insights into the complex interplay of patron-client relationships in de facto states. While recognition certainly comes with certain benefits, such as enhanced security and economic guarantees, often it also deepens client’s dependency on the patron state. Moscow’s role as a patron has reshaped governance structures in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
As Abkhazia and South Ossetia face the challenge of balancing sovereignty with external support, the dynamics and intricacies of patron-client relationships further highlight the complexity of state recognition in contemporary politics, where legitimacy and power are often closely intertwined. In the future, understanding these dynamics will be crucial for addressing many of the complexities of conflict resolution and state-building processes in contested regions such as in the Caucasus.
Image: A Georgian police officer guards the administrative boundary line with Georgia’s province of South Ossetia. (AP)
