Since Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, Russia has used economic, political, and (indirectly by means of Azerbaijan) military means to undermine the country’s democratic government. The recapture by Azerbaijan of Nagorno Karabakh and the displacement of its entire ethnic-Armenian population was achieved under the watchful eye of Russian “peacekeeping” troops, making a mockery of Russia’s formal status as an Armenian ally.
This unfortunate reality raises the question of whether Armenia’s democratisation has come at the cost of its security – a view encouraged by authoritarian, pro-Russian figures seeking to return to power in Yerevan.
This dangerous thesis would fly in the face of the idea of democratic security – the idea that democracy is a security asset. If democracy is so good for national security, how come democratisation in Armenia has coincided with lost wars and destabilisation?
But if we are to prove this Kremlin-friendly narrative wrong, we need to understand why Armenia has ended up in this position. And also ask what methods can be used to bolster a “defeated democracy”?
The Kremlin doesn’t trust or like any government that rises to power as a result of democratisation. It is also usually hostile to any democratic system, at least within the borders of the former Soviet Empire. Modern Russia has become an antidemocratic revisionist power that aims to roll back the post-1989 democratic wave and reinstall autocratic regimes in its neighbourhood. This is similar to the position of the Russian Empire during the mid-19th century “Concert of Europe” era when it attempted to push back against contemporary developments such as the Austrian revolutions.
The new democratic government in Armenia at first tried to avoid confrontation with Russia and minimise the level of mistrust and animosity. For this reason, Armenia supported every major Russian initiative before the war in Ukraine (even violent interventions in Syria and Kazakhstan). There was a period when the Armenian political elite believed that it was possible to both remain within the Russian sphere of influence and pursue democratisation. But this proved impossible not only because of the Kremlin’s principal opposition to democratic development but also due to changes in the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus. Since 2016, Armenia had already been steadily losing its role as Russia’s key strategic ally in the region. For Moscow, Armenia’s principal rivals – Azerbaijan and Turkey – were transforming into more important partners. Just before the Ukraine invasion, Putin hosted Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev and signed a strategic partnership agreement. Azerbaijan has now become one of the Kremlin’s most important partners on logistics and energy, and has been used as a tool of hybrid warfare against Armenia. Turkey has also become a major energy and connectivity hub for Russia. Turkey is now the only major market on its western border still open to Russia and the only partner in the West with whom Russian cooperation grows. For example Turkey and Russia have cooperated on nuclear power stations, the Turkstream gas pipeline, and Turkey’s purchase of Russian S400 missile systems.
Furthermore, all three countries are led by governments with authoritarian leanings. Thus, Armenia, currently the only country in the region where democracy is advancing rather than backsliding, confronts a triple alliance of Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian Turkey and the outright dictatorships of Russia and Azerbaijan. This was evident in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, the attacks on Armenia proper between 2021-3, and finally during the full capture of Nagorno-Karabakh and the total displacement of its population.
In the latter case, Russia did nothing to stop Azerbaijan. But Russia had already long been conducting a campaign of hybrid warfare against Armenia. Russia cut off the gas supply to Armenia for more than 2 months in 2023, created artificial problems for Armenian goods in its market, and failed to supply weaponry that Armenia had paid for. According to a statement by the secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, the latter move aimed to weaken Armenia’s negotiation leverage with Azerbaijan. Russia has also backed attempts to replace Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, including through non-democratic means.
One might ask: Why is this all being done? The answer is simple: Moscow wants the complete subordination of Armenia. It also supports the creation of an extraterritorial “Zangezur corridor” that would link Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan.
Despite this grave picture, Armenia remains too dependent on Russia to act boldly on its own. Russia maintains a military base in Gyumri, Russian border guards stand on Armenia’s western and southern frontiers, and Armenia is a member of the Russia-led CSTO alliance set up as an alternative to NATO. Armenia and Russia also have joint air defence divisions. But this dependence goes beyond these hard security issues. There is also the issue of the economy (Russia is Armenia’s biggest trade partner), energy (Russia supplies almost all the natural gas and uranium), and infrastructure (Russia controls Armenia’s railroad system, power cables, and natural gas pipelines).
All this adds up to a difficult position for Armenia.
To withstand this and survive as a democracy, Armenia needs support. This, at best, could look like what France is currently doing. That is supplying weapons and ammunition, supporting reforms in the armed forces, and helping develop territorial and air defence systems. But Armenia also needs political support to enable it to normalise the situation on the ground. Such projects include the country’s initiative to start border delimitation and demarcation processes with Azerbaijan and Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace initiative. The latter is a connectivity project that aims to unlock the economic potential of the region based on international order and the rule of law.
Russian hybrid warfare targets not only Armenian democracy but also Armenia’s very independence. Russia maintains an imperial land collection mindset and is ready to sacrifice its former Armenian allies’ interests to fulfil its goals. This puts Armenia in a similar position as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which also see Euro-Atlantic integration as a means of survival and protection against the Russian threat. But there also needs to be a matching willingness in the West to support Armenia and ensure that the tiny Caucasus nation is rewarded and not punished for its fealty to democratic values.
This blog is published in partnership with the Democratic Security Institute (DSI) based in Tbilisi, Georgia. It is part of a series of blogs authored by fellows from DSI’s Eurasia Democratic Security Network (EDSN) on the interrelationship between democracy and security in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood. EDSN is supported by the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
Image: Gleb Garanich / REUTERS
