Thai nationalists use the Bowring Treaty as evidence to support a discourse characterising Siam as a victim of British imperialism. Nonetheless, after examining British and Thai primary sources for my MSc dissertation, I have discovered that, without direct British intimidation by gunboat diplomacy, the Siamese court was inclined to sign the Bowring treaty because of its own desire for economic advantages and its anticipation that the signing of the treaty would spare Siam from military confrontation with Britain, writes Wisarut Junsook
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The Siamese court and Sir John Bowring, the British envoy to Siam, signed the Bowring Treaty—the second Anglo-Siamese treaty—in April 1855. The treaty, which was influenced by the Nanking Treaty between Britain and China in 1842, resulted in the abolition of the Siamese monopoly trade system, the reduction of the Siamese import tax rate, known in Thai as Berk-Rong Tax, to just three percent, the establishment of the first British consulate in Bangkok, British rights to purchase and rent property in Siam within a day’s boat journey of the capital, and granting of extraterritorial jurisdiction for all British subjects living in Siam. S.B. Singh and S.P. Singh contend that the Bowring Treaty resulted in the opening of Siam, particularly its economy, to Britain and other Western powers.
Nonetheless, because certain articles of the Treaty, such as the abolition of the monopoly trade system, the reduction of the import tax rate, and, particularly, the ceding of extraterritorial jurisdiction, were deemed unfair to Siam, Thai nationalist historians, such as Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, who has been celebrated as the father of modern Thai history, contend that the Siamese court was intimidated by British gunboat diplomacy into signing the Treaty during negotiations with Bowring, as Thai history textbooks and some Thai historical films have argued.
However, this blog, which summarises my dissertation for the MSc International and Asian History, refutes the orthodox argument of those Thai nationalist historians. After examining British and Thai primary sources about the negotiation between the Siamese court and Sir John Bowring in 1855, I have concluded that Bowring did not use gunboat diplomacy to coerce or intimidate Siam into signing the treaty during the negotiation in 1855, as the United States had done to Japan a few years earlier, during Perry’s expedition. Furthermore in the 1850s, London did not use gunboats or coercive measures to intimidate the Siamese court into signing the new treaty with Britain, as it appeared in the instructions of the Earl of Clarendon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir John Bowring about his mission in Siam on February 13th, 1854. Importantly, the Siamese court, by itself, was inclined to negotiate and sign the new treaty with Britain because it anticipated political and economic benefits for Siam.
The Anglo-Siamese relations before King Mongkut’s reign
After the Napoleonic Wars, Britain, both the British East India Company (EIC) and the government in London, sought to expand its sphere of influence over the Malay peninsula in order to exploit this region as British trading ports and military stations to secure its trade route between India and China as well as the safety of the British empire in India.
As a result, before the reign of King Mongkut (1851-1868), the EIC and London decided to establish diplomatic relations with Siam in order to negotiate with its court on the partition of their spheres of influence over the Malay peninsula, where Siam also claimed its suzerainty over the northern part, like Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah, and British trade in Siam, such as the request for the abolition of the Siamese monopoly trade system and the reduction of Siamese taxes on trade. To attain this ambition, the EIC and London dispatched three emissaries, including John Crawfurd (1821), Sir Henry Burney (1825), and Sir James Brooke (1850), to negotiate with the Siamese court.
However, none of the three British envoys to Siam succeeded in bringing negotiations to conclusion because the Siamese court was reluctant and wary about interacting with the Europeans due to concern over security, and the court had no interest in abolishing its monopoly trade system or reducing its taxes on trade, which generated a large amount of money for the Siamese royal treasury.
Even though Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian argues that Sir Henry Burney’s mission was fruitful because he could persuade the Siamese court to sign the first Anglo-Siamese Treaty, the Burney Treaty, in 1826, I still regard Burney’s mission as unsuccessful because the Treaty primarily resulted in political agreements, such as the division of the spheres of influence between Siam and Britain over the Malay peninsula in order to prevent casus belli between the two nations, as had happened between Britain and Burma during the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-26). Moreover, Burney could not persuade the Siamese court to abolish its monopoly trade system, which was a key aim of his mission in Siam.
The change in Siamese foreign policy towards Britain during King Mongkut’s reign
In April 1851, Prince Mongkut, aged 47, succeeded his older half-brother, King Nang-Klao (1787–1851), to the throne. The new monarch, who had been in the monkhood for 27 years and understood many European languages, such as Latin, French, and English, had a different view of negotiating a new Anglo-Siamese treaty, as King Mongkut, in the same year, instructed his friend in Singapore, Mr. John Taylor Jones, through his personal letter to convince the editor of the Singapore Free Press, a Singaporean newspaper, to publish his intention to renegotiate a new treaty with Britain after the failure of the Brooke mission in 1850.
In addition, a year later, the King and his court attempted to demonstrate their willingness to negotiate with Britain by reducing the rate of the import tax, allowing the export of paddy, and legalising the import of opium into the Kingdom by the Siamese court’s agent, moves which had all been rejected by King Nang-Klao during Sir James Brooke’s mission to Siam. Furthermore, when receiving the news of Brooke’s return to renegotiate with Siam in late 1852, the Siamese court, under the new monarch, was receptive to welcoming the return of Brooke, as it appeared in the letter of Phraya Si Suriwong, known as the Siamese prime minister, to Sir James Brooke on January 7th, 1852.
Robert Bruce argues that King Mongkut’s ability to understand English assisted him in following international situations by reading Singaporean newspapers. Therefore, the King understood the strength of British hegemony in the Far East in the mid-19th century, especially after the British victory over China in the First Opium War in 1842. Furthermore, the King, himself had no aversion to negotiations with Britain, as he explicitly blamed King Nang-Klao for his decision to disregard Brooke’s mission in 1850 during their private talk with Sir John Bowring during Bowring’s mission to Siam.
In addition, the imperialist threat to Asian nations became more apparent in the 1850s, as evidenced by the Opium War, the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852-53), and the American Commander Matthew Perry’s expedition to Japan during this period. These conflicts between Asian nations and Western powers made the Siamese court more fearful of a military confrontation with Britain if it did not comply with British requests. Therefore, it led to a shift in Siamese foreign policy towards Britain to be more proactive – and pre-emptive – in interacting with Britain.
The success of Bowring’s mission in 1855
In late 1852, King Mongkut’s court was ready to renegotiate with Brooke’s new mission to Siam. Nonetheless, London postponed this mission in response to John Crawfurd’s advice to Edward Smith-Stanley, the British prime minister, not to send another British envoy to Siam, because Crawfurd was afraid of another failure for the British envoy to Siam due to the influence of certain Siamese conservative administrators over the Siamese court despite the death of King Nang-Klao.
In 1854 London decided to send Sir John Bowring to negotiate with Japan, Siam, and Cochinchina (Vietnam) in order to extend free trade in the Far East. The negotiations between Britain and the Siamese court proceeded and resulted in the success of Bowring’s mission within six days, as Sir John Bowring reported to London that his negotiation with Siam was quicker, smoother, and more fruitful than any negotiations he had conducted with Asian nations previously.
In my dissertation, I argue that Bowring’s negotiations were the most fruitful of the three previous British envoys to Siam because British and Siamese interests coincided. For Britain, Bowring was able to incorporate the Siamese market into its free trade system and extend its benefits, as it had in China as a consequence of the Treaty of Nanking, to Siam. In the meantime, the Siamese court agreed with Bowring in order to avoid British gunboat diplomacy and a military confrontation with Britain. Furthermore, King Mongkut anticipated that adopting free trade, permitting the export of rice, and legalising the import of opium by the court’s agents would generate more tax revenue for the royal treasury.
The effects on Siam after the signing of the Bowring Treaty
After the rectification of the Bowring Treaty in April 1856, the Siamese court’s anticipation of economic and political advantages was realized. In terms of economic benefits, the amount of trade in Siam, particularly in Bangkok, significantly increased, as 103 British vessels entered to trade in Siam in that year. Furthermore, within a decade later, the Siamese court signed treaties, which were exactly identical in content to the Bowring Treaty, with the United States, France, and nine other European nations. The new treaties with those nations resulted in an economic boom in Siam, as, in 1860, the first Siamese mint was constructed in the Grand Palace to produce coins in the Western style in order to cope with the shortage of Siamese currency, Pod-Duang, due to the dramatic rise of trade in Siam.
In terms of political benefits, the decision of the Siamese court to sign treaties with the other 11 Western nations by duplicating the content of the Bowring Treaty assisted Siam in its efforts to pre-empt gunboat diplomacy by signing trade treaties with Western imperialist powers, along lines similar to the agreement forged between the US and Japan.
Importantly, besides the political and economic advantages for Siam, Bowring’s mission also opened a new chapter in Siamese foreign policy towards Britain and other Western nations, as King Mongkut expressed his desire to dispatch a Siamese envoy to the court of St. James to Sir John Bowring during his mission in Siam. Finally, the first Siamese emissary was sent to the court of Queen Victoria in 1857, and then to the court of Emperor Napoleon III in 1861. These two emissaries appointed and assumed office for the first time since King Narai dispatched an envoy to the court of King Louis XIV in the 17th century.
Conclusion
In conclusion, due to the transition of King Nang-Klao to King Mongkut, who observed the emergence of British power in the Far East, and Siamese concerns about imperialist threats from Britain and other Western powers, King Mongkut’s court, which had learned lessons from the fate of neighbouring states, such as the British wars with Burma and China as well as American gunboat diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, decided to prevent the possibility of a conflict between Britain and Siam by signing the Bowring Treaty with Britain in 1855. Fortunately, apart from the political advantages for Siam, the Bowring Treaty also benefited the Siamese economy, as discussed above.
Finally, the dissertation concludes that, because of the decision of King Mongkut’s court to sign the Bowring Treaty with Britain, Siam was able to pre-empt military confrontations and gunboat diplomacy from all Imperialist powers during the 1850s-60s, the decades when many Asian realms, like China, Burma, Cochinchina, and Japan faced imperialist threats and encroachments. Moreover, the signing of the Bowring Treaty with Britain was another factor that helped Siam to maintain its independence until the end of World War II, while its neighbouring states in Southeast Asia were colonised by the British, French, Dutch, or American empires.
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*Banner photo by and copyright of the Author.
*About the research: This blog is based on the Author’s dissertation for his LSE MSc International and Asian History, for which the Author was awarded SEAC’s Dissertation Fieldwork Grant.
*The views expressed in the blog are those of the authors alone. They do not reflect the position of the Saw Swee Hock Southeast Asia Centre, nor that of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
