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Luke Waggoner

Philip Waggoner

June 26th, 2024

Using data on information repression to develop a digital rights early warning system

0 comments | 1 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Luke Waggoner

Philip Waggoner

June 26th, 2024

Using data on information repression to develop a digital rights early warning system

0 comments | 1 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Luke Waggoner and Philip Waggoner use Nicaragua as a case study to examine the key dynamics of when a regime or government is likely to crack down on access to information. By analyzing media and information-related censorship variables they find that since Daniel Ortega’s return to the Nicaraguan presidency in 2006, his regime has increased restrictions on information access and that threats to journalists and reliable media coverage have risen dramatically. By better understanding these factors and their contextual indicators, they write, there is more chance that actions can be taken to preempt them and protect digital rights and wide access to information. 

Heralded by many as the year of elections, with ongoing civil wars and interstate military conflict, 2024 is a critical moment of global need for reliable information. Yet Freedom House’s latest Freedom on the Net report finds the world at the bottom of a nearly decade-and-a-half decline in internet freedom complete with an increase in attacks on online expression. We’ve seen this in a range of countries from more traditionally restrictive ones like Russia to, more recently, contexts like the US where freedom of information is proclaimed to be a hallmark of the country’s democracy.

Nowhere is this trend more troubling and more prominent than in Nicaragua. The country is a useful case study to examine the contours of this issue and isolate key political dynamics that signal an imminent crackdown in information access. This will be instructive in at least two ways: descriptively to better understand the context surrounding increased and prolonged information crackdowns, and to encourage information freedom advocates and policymakers to be on guard to more preemptively protect such a fundamental freedom.

A Nicaraguan case study 

In 2018, Nicaragua saw mass protests turn deadly after President Daniel Ortega’s regime responded with violence toward citizens demonstrating against the government’s proposed social security reforms. In addition to the bloodshed, Ortega initiated several other tactics aimed at silencing critics and re-establishing the heavy-handed control he had enjoyed since regaining power in 2006. Ortega’s instinct to stifle dissent through minimizing access to information is not unique to Nicaragua, nor was this type of action new to the Nicaraguan people in 2018.

Understanding these sorts of government-led crackdowns on information access is critical in helping democratic actors prepare for and endure assaults on digital rights.

Examining media and information censorship 

For our analysis, we examined three media and information-related censorship variables from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data. The variables include government censorship of media, harassment of journalists, and government censorship of the internet. Our analysis involved standardizing the measures of these variables so that we could directly compare values across each. Our study period ranges from 1993 – 2022, with a focus on 2000-2022 to explicitly examine Nicaragua’s recent trajectory of variable access to information.

Rising digital and information suppression in Nicaragua 

In Figure 1 we see that since Ortega returned to power in 2006, restrictions on information access as well as threats to journalists and reliable media coverage have risen dramatically. While internet censorship lagged due in large part to limited internet uptake in the country during the 2000s, it is now the most regulated as it represents the main point of access of independent information and opinion sharing.

Figure 1 – Forms of Government Information Suppression in Nicaragua

But which contextual dynamics led to and defined these peaks in information crackdowns? We suggest there are three key contextual indicators of digital repression that drive these dynamic shifts in access to information: eclectic political pressure, perceived electoral invincibility, and unchecked legal warfare. In many cases, these are factors that can be observed before digital repression formalizes. As such, they represent critical early warning signs for policymakers and free expression advocates interested in detecting, preempting, and mitigating authoritarian suppression of free media and access to information.

Photo by Tobias Tullius on Unsplash

Before unpacking each factor and its role in an early warning system, let’s add some contextual clarity to Figure 1 to show several key moments.

Figure 2 – Key Warning Signs and Events

Note: Light gray lines at years 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021 denote election years.

In Figure 2, the major information crackdowns closely align with elections; however, as opposed to using information restrictions to preempt elections, the Ortega regime seems to ramp up digital repression after elections. Since taking power in 2007, there has been no notable easing of information restrictions, rather a ratcheting up effect has characterized Nicaragua’s last quarter century of information access.

With the full pattern in view, let’s unpack each contextual factor surrounding these trends in Nicaraguan government repression of information.

Factor 1: Eclectic Political Pressure

After failing three times to regain the presidency since last holding office in the late 1980s, Ortega finally returned to power by narrowly crossing the newly lowered victory threshold of 35 percent in the 2006 presidential election. His – until then -spate of electoral defeats suggested significant domestic opposition to his fifth run for president: a reality Ortega would need to address should he win. Throughout the campaign, the United States government openly expressed opposition to Ortega’s candidacy, even publicly urging his opposition to unite to increase their odds at winning. In fact, the US had spoken out against Ortega in most of his campaigns for the presidency. In 2001, the successful contender for the presidency, Enrique Bolanos, even highlighted the prospect of a US invasion should Ortega win amid the early weeks of the George W. Bush Administration’s war on terror, targeting states – especially those unfriendly toward the US – that could serve as safe havens for terrorists.

The combined effect of fierce domestic political dissent and threatening foreign opposition spurred Ortega to immediately wield his new presidential power to shut down dissent where he could.

Factor 2: Perceived Electoral Invincibility

In what appeared as a virtual post-election ritual, the Ortega regime ratcheted up repression on journalists and media actors immediately following the wins at the ballot box. As seen in Figure 2, sharp upticks occurred just after the 2006, 2016, and 2021 elections. The relative decline in media censorship and harassment after the 2011 elections was offset by one of the biggest increases in internet censorship to date. Information restrictions following election victories do not subside before subsequent elections resulting in an exponential worsening of the media and information landscape. With each new electoral success, Ortega’s sense of electoral invincibility seemed to embolden him to intensify his campaign to suppress any version of public critique.

The growing sense of invincibility has also resulted in a string of laws aimed at further restricting objective information that could upset Ortega’s increasingly authoritarian rule.

Factor 3: Unchecked Legal Warfare

The Ortega regime’s increasingly overt assault on the free access to information has been augmented by his regime’s increasingly draconian legal assault on political opposition and civic dissent. Nicaragua’s Attorney General, Wendy Carolina Morales Urbina was recently sanctioned by the US for “exploiting her office” to harass and harm political opponents without any legal basis. These government-initiated efforts to hamstring political opposition through illegal seizure of property coincided with the most recent uptick in Nicaragua’s crackdown on media and internet freedom.

These three factors represent critical political dynamics that typify Nicaragua’s troubling descent into authoritarianism. However, they also represent key contextual developments that can be used in other countries as early warning signs presaging significant crackdowns on a given country’s media and information ecosystem.

An early warning system for repression

Certain contextual factors and their dynamics portend increased repression Nicaragua highlights how upticks in information crackdowns do not happen in a vacuum nor do they lack systemic unity. As with Ortega, political leaders (authoritarian or otherwise) may engage in digital and information repression as a response to outside factors and as part of larger efforts aimed at developing and maintaining societal control. Properly identifying and then aggregating these factors is critical for policymakers and practitioners working to minimize authoritarian actions that undercut free access to information. This allows for greater understanding and greater potential to preempt such actions to protect digital rights and wide access to information. 


About the author

Luke Waggoner

Luke Waggoner is the Director of Governance for DT Global based in the U.S. Luke brings more than fifteen years of experience in democracy and governance work both in the U.S. and abroad.

Philip Waggoner

Philip Waggoner is the Director of Data Science at YouGov America, and a Postdoctoral Scholar at Stanford University at the School of Medicine.

Posted In: Democracy and culture

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