Being a de facto state is not enough
Somaliland is a de facto state in the Horn of Africa. In 1991, the region in the northwest of Somalia broke away from collapsing Somalia. It had been the site of the first Somali civil war in the 1980s in which local guerrillas fought against the dictatorial Somali government. Today (in 2020), Somaliland exhibits all the characteristics of a ‘normal’ state featuring an effective and popularly supported political leadership that provides a degree of governmental services to a given population in a defined territory. It only lacks international recognition (which is what makes it a de facto state).i In contrast to Somalia that has been in turmoil for three decades now, Somaliland stands for sustainable peacebuilding and democratisation in the 1990s and early 2000s. Much of this was achieved without massive assistance by the international community, but rather with the help of financial and social remittances from the Somali diaspora.
The international community continues to hold on to the fiction of Somalia’s ‘state-ness’ and is arguing that, in order to solve the status of Somaliland, negotiations between the government in Mogadishu and the government of Somaliland in Hargeysa is necessary. For several years, official talks between representatives of both sides have been dragging on, but without concrete results. In the absence of international recognition, Somaliland’s situation remains precarious. Against this backdrop, a new development focussing on past violence committed by the previous Somali dictatorship (until 1991) against civilians in the territory of today’s Somaliland has been gaining traction. This involves a team of internationally renowned forensic anthropologists. The hope of the Somaliland government is that a scientific proof of past ‘genocide’ in the region would exert moral pressure on the international community to finally recognise Somaliland as an independent state.
Forensic anthropology to provide justice and recognition?
Peacebuilding in Somaliland in the 1990s was driven by lineage and clan elders using Somali customary law to establish peaceful relations between patrilineal descent groups in Somaliland that, during the civil war in the 1980s, had fought on different sides (some being pro-government, others supporting the guerrillas). Many details of killings and other abuses had deliberately been silenced to quickly achieve a fragile peace which served as basis for the further political developments in Somaliland. Things changed from 2011 onward, when contact between Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), a Peruvian NGO specialised in forensic anthropology, and officials in Somaliland was made through a diaspora Somali from an influential family in Somaliland who resided in the USA. The diaspora actor had been working with the Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA) in San Francisco. The CJA had been involved in bringing members of the former Somali dictatorship, who reside in the USA, to justice. In Somaliland, EPAF soon started to cooperate with the War Crimes Investigations Commission (WCIC). The WCIC was founded in 1997, after heavy rains had uncovered mass graves in Hargeysa. Yet, for the sake of keeping the peace, its work had been actively slowed down by subsequent Somaliland governments until EPAF arrived.ii
In September and October 2012, the first forensic-anthropological investigations of mass graves conducted by the Peruvian specialists took place. The exhumations and investigations were organised by international field schools, attracting students and practitioners of forensic anthropology (and related disciplines such as bio-archaeology and legal medicine) from around the globe. Since then, several exhumation-seasons have been conducted up until early 2020 (almost on a yearly basis with one or two interruptions). In each season, the work proceeded in three steps: exhumations, analysis of the remains, reburial. The official aims of the forensic experts are, first, to bring ‘peace of mind’ to the relatives of the killed by providing them with scientific facts about the death of their loved ones, and second, to provide professional forensic-anthropological reports informing (potential) court cases (nationally or internationally) that (may) deal with the violent past in Somalia (before 1991). Potentially, the future work of CJA in the USA could also benefit from such reports.
The government of Somaliland and some diaspora-activists hope to get proof of ‘genocide’ which can be used to advance the case for recognition. A key problem, however, is that the forensic-anthropological experts can only produce a state-of-the-art scientific report, but the decision ‘was it a genocide or not’ is up to courts, not to experts.
In addition, this forensic work raises profound challenges for the ordinary population. Many people did not understand the work and the government did not properly inform them about it. Rumours spread that the foreigners wanting to steal bones or gold fillings from the mass graves. Some also argued that opening the graves was haram (forbidden in Islam). During exhumations, that mostly took place in or near residential areas, bystanders who often were relatives of the victims complained that the exhumations and the subsequent forensic-anthropological analysis would bring back bad memories. At one point, during an exhumation in Berbera 2017, things became so heated that the local government and the external experts had to agree to conclude the forensic-anthropological analysis in a haste to not provoke public unrest.
Also, the results of the work were often hard to understand for ordinary civilians. Many had to watch the executions of relatives or partners in the 1980s. They had seen the dead bodies at the time. To explain their work, EPAF experts mentioned that through their analysis and also through DNA testing, those bodies intermingled with each others in mass graves could – potentially – be identified individually and given back for proper burial to their families. However, given the limited technical equipment in the improvised labs in Somaliland, the sometimes poor status of preservation of the bodies, and the lack of finances for DNA analysis, many bodies were only assigned a code for possible later identification. This disturbed some relatives who had expected something different.
Media success
Still, at the level of media representation, the strategy of the Somaliland government concerning the forensic-anthropological work occasionally yielded the desired results. In an interview by CNN, in 2014, with the then Foreign Minister of Somaliland, the interviewing journalist used the term ‘genocide’ and referred to ‘200,000’ people massacred in northwest Somalia in the 1980s.iii Previously, credible sources for the number of people killed have varied between 5000iv and 50.000.v Recently, online statements by Somalilanders and others supporting the forensic-anthropological work actually come up with much higher numbers of alleged victims of the Somali dictatorshipvi. These complex and sensitive issues are relevant regarding Somaliland’s ongoing quest for recognition.
i Pegg, Scott 1998. International Society and the De Facto State. Aldershot: Ashgate.
ii For more details, see Hoehne, Markus Virgil and Shakira Bedoya Sanchez 2020: ‘Forensic Fetishism’ and Human Rights after Violent Conflict: Uncovering Somaliland’s Troubled Past. In K. Seidel and H. Elliesie (eds.) Normative Spaces and Legal Dynamics in Africa. London: Routledge, pp. 19-40.
iii CNN, 17 February 2014: Interview with Mohamed Yonis Bihi, Somaliland’s Foreign Minister, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgIwZv-Jyuw (particularly minute 3:02–3:47).
iv Gersony, Robert 1989: Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts of Conflict Experience in Northern Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others. Washington, D.C.: Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State.
v Africa Watch 1990: Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People. Testimonies about Killings and the Conflict in the North. New York: Africa Watch.
vi See for instance: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/02/investigating-genocide-somaliland-20142310820367509.html
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of the Conflict Research Programme, the London School of Economics and Political Science, or the UK Government.
Markus Hoehne, the writer of this piece of writing is trying to mislead the noble human rights work doing in Somaliland by Peruvian NGO specialised in forensic anthropology.
There is no connection between the recognition of Somaliland by international community and the human rights forensic anthropology work of Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team (EPAF) are doing in Somaliland.
The preliminary assessment of the mass grave sites is to determine the possibilities of providing relief and redress to the victims and survivors of crimes against humanity and preserving evidence for any future transitional justice efforts.
Organized collection of forensic evidence of human rights violations is an important step toward discovering the truth, achieving justice, and ensuring that such crimes are not repeated. Incontrovertible physical evidence of such abuses is important both for the judicial process and for the survivors, as it provides the world with an objective account and acknowledgement of the abuses suffered.
This human rights project didn’t get any financial help from Somaliland government. This an international forensic training program. The project began on September 24, 2012.
The main four elements of this project was:
Justice – holding those most responsible for abuses legally accountable;
Truth – giving survivors a full accounting and acknowledgement of the abuses that occurred;
Reparation – providing material and moral reparations to survivors;
Non-Recurrence – reforming state institutions and strengthening civil society to ensure that the pattern of human rights abuse is not repeated.
The sole beneficiaries of this project are the voiceless and powerless victims, the survivors and the families of human rights violations perpetuated by the military government of dictator Siad Barre.
Thank you for your comment. There is a clear connection between the work of EPAF and the issue of recognition for some Somaliland elites. For instance, the head of the WCIC (Khadar Ahmed Liqe) as well as the former minister of justice (Hussein Aideed) and several foreign ministers (Mohamed Yonis Bihi and Sa’ad Ali Shire) made this connection. It was even stressed by several officials who spoke to relatives of the victims at the exhumation sites (e.g., in Arabsiyo) where I was present in 2016. You are correct in the sense that ordinary people whose relatives were massacred in the 1980s often are not so much interested in this political dimension of the matter. Yet, my ethnographic findings are that, while some relatives indeed appreciate the work of the forensic anthropologists and see it as part of their search for justice, others are disturbed by it and feel that old wounds have been opened (and this became very clear during two rounds of exhumations at which I participated 2016 and 2017). Besides, it is a fact that the government of Somaliland since several years (I believe since 2015) supports the exhumations and analysis by providing accommodation, transport and security for the forensic team (regularily consisting of a handful of EPAF experts and some 15 foreign students participating at the field school). While this support by the Somaliland government is moderate, it is nevertheless relevant for the continuation of the forensic work.
This article is confusing two separate efforts in the region, that of Somaliland’s government to regain de jure recognition from the international community and the human rights initiative aimed at forensically investigating Somaliland’s mass graves with hope of providing families of victims much needed solace as well as helping to bring perpetrators crimes against humanity to justice. In doing so the author Markus Hoehne misleads readership in believing that one is predicated on the other, this is completely inaccurate as recognition efforts are headed by Somaliland’s government whilst the forensic studies are conducted by a confluence of Somaliland civilians with expertise provided by EPAF, a Peruvian NGO.
Beyond that, the article is littered with factual errors. For starters, no one is seeking “proof of genocide”. It appears the author is not aware that the question of whether or not a genocide took place was concluded following a 2001 United Nation’s commissioned investigation on the issue of past human rights violations in Somalia, specifically to find out if crimes of international jurisdiction (e.g. genocide) had been perpetrated during the civil war. This investigation was commissioned jointly by the United Nations Co-ordination unit (UNCU) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and was led by UN Senior Human Rights Advisor Chris Mburu. The investigation concluded with a report that confirmed the crime of genocide taking place:
“Based on the totality of evidence collected in Somaliland and elsewhere both during and after his mission, the consultant firmly believes that the crime of genocide was conceived, planned and perpetrated by the Somali Government against the Isaaq people of northern Somalia between 1987 and 1989.”
Source: https://books.google.com/books?id=7w8VAQAAIAAJ&q=%22Based+on+the+totality+of+evidence+collected+in+Somaliland%22&dq=%22Based+on+the+totality+of+evidence+collected+in+Somaliland%22&redir_esc=y&hl=en
Dear Duale Ahmed, you write that ‘forensic studies are conducted by a confluence of Somaliland civilians with expertise provided by EPAF’. The evidence I gathered through several field visits to Hargeysa, Arabsiyo, Gabiley and Berbera between 2012 and 2018, following up on the matter, indicated that Somaliland civilians, at least ordinary civilians, have not been properly informed about the forensic work conducted in parts of the country. During my participation at the exhumations in 2016 (Arabsiyo) and 2017 (Berbera), several times relatives of the victims tried to resist (physically) the exhumations because they were not informed what was going on and perceived the opening of the mass graves as unwelcome intrusion (and as haram). It required the appearance security forces and subsequently of high-ranking government officials including the Minister of Justice and religious authorities from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to calm people down and convince them that the exhumations were religiously acceptable and would yield benefits for the country (not so much for the individual relatives).
You also mention the 2001 United Nation’s commissioned investigation on the issue of past human rights violations in Somalia which states that the consultant firmly believes that the crime of genocide was conceived. In contrast to this later report, in April 1997, after heavy rains had uncovered human remains in the Malka Durdurey area of Hargeysa, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a forensic mission to the grave site(s) and found the following in their report (published shortly afterwards): ‘The forensic team, having observed a large number of suspected and known mass grave sites in the vicinity of Hargeisa, Somalia, and having conducted an assessment examination of two graves containing a minimum of six individuals exhibiting evidence of perimortem injury, binding and haphazard burial, concludes that human rights violations were committed against these individuals’ (full report available here: https://cja.org/cja/downloads/Forensic%20report-%20preliminary%20assessment%20of%20mass%20graves%20in%20the%20vicinity%20of%20Hargeisa,%20Somalia.pdf ).
This is a much more careful formulation. The report dated 1997 does not once mention the term ‘genocide’. The issue of ‘genocide’ is clearly a complex legal matter, at least if you want to follow the Genocide Convention. In it, genocide is defined as ‘any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: Killing members of the group; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; etc. One question regarding what happened in northwestern Somalia between 1984 and 1990 is if ‘Isaaq’ were indeed targeted as a group. While some members of this descent group, who were suspected by the government to support the SNM, were persecuted and punished, others still lived and worked as businesspeople or even members of the security forces or as government officials in other parts of Somalia including Mogadishu. Another question is if Isaaq can be defined as a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Maybe this is a legalistic argument, but it is up to legal specialists to interpret this.
With regards to the question of genocide, it is not clear why you are presenting an older 1997 report by a US-based NGO when I have linked an official 2001 United Nations’ commissioned investigation conducted by a senior UN human rights advisor which explicitly states that the crime of genocide was “conceived, planned and perpetrated by the Somali Government against the Isaaq people” (source linked above).
Moreover, this older NGO report you are citing was confined to a limited site of only two graves containing a minimum of six individuals per your quote and as such never a conclusive study as the war crimes in question encompassed the whole territory of modern day Somaliland and stretched to other areas including Muqdisho. Besides, PHR have no legal mandate to determine what constitutes a genocide so your citing of their work, in the face of a more conclusive and official UN report is problematic.
Such dismissal of more recent, and official UN reports, for an older and more limited in scope NGO reports can be seen as an attempt to dismiss and deny the genocide. I am sure you are aware of this being a known genocide denial methodology. This is very upsetting coming from an academic who has been closely following recent history of the region. In any ordinary discussion, an official investigation sanctioned by the UN should be more than enough to address the issue of whether what took place was a genocide or not.
If you require further resources, you may wish to consult specialist work, such as that of genocide scholar Israel Charny (executive director of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem), who in Encyclopedia of Genocide explicitly names Isaaq in his table of “Cases of Genocides of Indigenous Peoples” (p. 350):
https://books.google.com/books?id=8Q30HcvCVuIC&pg=PA350
Another specialist resources you may wish to refer to is Genocides by the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice, where Isaaq are clearly labeled as genocide victims (p. 139):
https://books.google.com/books?id=AX3UCk_PdEwC&pg=PA139
Also please understand that persecution was never limited to traditional Isaaq territory only. Jasiira beach, located close to Muqdisho in the south, saw the extrajudicial execution of some 50 Isaaqs based on their clan identity alone.
Dear Duale Ahmed, Physicians for Human Rights is a time-honored and much respected organization when it comes to questions of forensic anthropology; it is a key player when it comes to forensic anthropology worldwide. Besides, this NGO was obviously invited by the government of Somaliland back then to conduct investigations close to the event when heavy rains exposed human remains in certain areas of Hargeysa.
Now, regarding the more recent report you are referring to by Chris Mburu. This author states in his report: “Based on the totality of evidence collected in Somaliland and elsewhere both during and after his mission, the consultant firmly believes that the crime of genocide was conceived, planned and perpetrated…” The word BELIEVES is important here. Chris Mburu is not acting as a judge here. He is an investigator and he voices a belief. He is not an international or national judge. Belief is one thing, proof and final conclusions is sth else.
You may certainly argue that for the victims of the violence in the 1980s and their surviving relatives, the question if the legal category of genocide applies or not to their suffering is rather meaningless. They died and suffered anyway. From a subjective perspective, I agree. Clearly, many people have been killed unlawfully and brutally by the government of Mohamed Siyad Barre; in the 1980s, many victims were Isaaq (while still some, but increasingly fewer, Isaaq served in the dictatorial regime until the end). But since from a legal perspective, the term “genocide” carries particular weight, it is worth reflecting on this issue deeply and not just using the term too quickly.
The question if what happened in the northwest in the 1980s was genocide or not also might have larger implications for the whole interpretation of what happened during the first phase of the Somali conflict, in general; and what actually led to the Somali state collapse. Would you also call the targeted killings of Majeerteen in Garoowe and Gaalkacyo and surroundings between 1979 and 1981 an attempted genocide? I know, those killings and destruction of property concerned fewer people (fewer victims; still, it could have been an attempt of g…). Yet, as we all know, this early episode of state-coordinated violence against civilians in Somalia is usually interpreted as revenge killing by the Somali government against patrilineal relatives of those military officers and their followers who established the first armed front in the emerging Somali civil war – the SSF (later SSDF). When the SNM was established a bit later, in 1981, the Somali government arguably followed the same pattern of political repression – cracking down on those it suspected to support the guerillas and revenging against extended patrilineal family members of the guerillas. Since the SNM activities lasted much longer than those of the SS(D)F, many more people became victimized.
One further detail that I would think is worth discussing is that, when you really research into the tragic and horrific events in places like Arabsiyo and Gabiley in the mid-1980s, you realize that several of the known massacres which happened did so in reaction to preceding SNM attacks against Somali soldiers or army or government infrastructure. One could interpret this as unlawful retaliation by the government against unarmed civilians – which certainly is a crime. It is in my eyes not a clear proof for genocide. Yet, I am not a legal expert. It is just sth to consider. The violence culminated in the events of 1988 and 1989 including the bombardments of Hargeysa and Burco and the massacres of civilians in Berbera (those who returned by ship from Saudi Arabia) and the Jazeera beach massacre. Regarding those events, the violence became increasingly unbounded. It was also seconded, already since the mid-1980s, by systematic oppression of civilians in major towns of the northwest including curfews, expropriation and extralegal imprisonment and torture of civilians in Hargeysa and Burco etc. and the extortion of money from their families.
So, yes, I would agree that Isaaq in the region were specifically targeted and became victims of state crimes, including crimes against humanity (again, this is sth judges would have to confirm, at least if these statements shall carry legal weight). BUT: Were these crimes conducted with the intention to commit genocide in the legal sense of the term – already in 1981? in 1983? in 1985? or in 1988? Without coming to any conclusion as a non-legal-expert, I think these issues – thorny as they are – need to be discussed carefully and intensively, based on in-depth investigations, without jumping to conclusions (and Chris Mburu also did rather believe than legally conclude; and the other sources you cite are also not the results of legal investigations).
Markus Hoehne, there seems to be an odd insistence on your part to downplay the gravity of the crimes that happened in the region and perpetrated by the Siad Barre regime. Beyond being inaccurate, such rhetoric is not conducive to the healing process in the context of a civil war.
You choose to ignore the specific wording as used by an official United Nation’s investigation conducted by a senior human rights investigator, which specifically states that the crime of genocide had taken place. And you choose to do so in favour of an NGO report based on a very small dataset. Any reasonable and unbiased observer would accept the wording as used by the UN report.
Furthermore, you ignore the opinion of specialists and genocide scholars like Israel Charny (executive director of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem), Adam Jones and others who all explicitly classify the crimes as genocide.. this is textbook denial rhetoric, and is not accepted in the 21st century scholarship. I am all for being careful with wording, but between an official UN report and an NGO report, it is blatantly clear which of the two carries more weight on the issue of what constitutes a genocide, specifically on the legal use of the word “genocide” which a senior human rights investigator explicitly used in a United Nations’ commissioned report. It is surprising that an academic like yourself thinks otherwise.
I would never argue that the usage of the term “genocide” is meaningless, as you stated, in fact I believe the opposite is true. Moreover, belittling the scale of tragedy by refusing to use the description as it appears in an official UN report in favour of a lesser classification is what you would expect perpetrators of genocide to argue, not a a scholar.
On the question of intention of the Barre government to target Isaaq as a group, you may want to consult the infamous 1987 “letter of death” which was leaked by the then supreme court judge of Somalia before defecting:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Letter-of-Death-1.jpg
The fact that any and all members of the Isaaq community were targets, even if they were not part of SNM operations (like the case in Jasiira, deep in the South were no SNM operations had taken place) demonstrates that they were targeted based on clan affiliations alone and not due to SNM activities.
– Would you also call the targeted killings of Majeerteen in Garoowe and Gaalkacyo and surroundings between 1979 and 1981 an attempted genocide?
First of all, the crimes that took place in Mudug, tragic as they were, were of fundamentally different scale to the northern campaign in terms of losses in lives and property. Attempting to equate the two is an exercise in whataboutism and not helpful. But if there is a UN report stating that what took place in Mudug was a genocide then we must accept that, why else would anyone attempt to belittle or dismiss the tragedy?
Do we have such investigations by the UN on the Mudug incident? Do we have further supporting evidence e.g. the opinion of respected genocide scholars? If not then perhaps the designation of genocide is not warranted.
I completely disagree that the government of Siad Barre followed similar methods to Mudug in the case of the former northern regions. The indiscriminate bombardment of whole cities, the strafing of refugees up to the border of Ethiopia, the hiring of foreign mercenaries to conduct the sorties, the sheer geographic spread of the targeting (e.g. as further south as Jasiira)… etc all point to this being persecution of very different nature.
When you say that the wanton killing of innocent civilians in places like Arabsiyo and Gabiley happened in reaction to preceding SNM attacks you are essentially repeating the Barre government line. Your purpose of stating this is unclear I am afraid. A repressive and genocidal regime will always justify their actions, but murder of innocent civilians can never be explained or justified.
I hope you reflect on your stance, which seems ideological and not based on sound evidence.
This article appears to conflate Somaliland’s quest for international recognition with the genocide perpetrated by the Somalia government that occurred in the late 1980s. As mentioned in the above comment, the exhumation of remains is to provide closure to the affected families and to provide a proper burial to the victims as per Islamic tradition. With regards to the number of people who died in the genocide, there are a number of citations that indicate estimates in upwards of 100,000 – 200,000 (https://books.google.ca/books?id=3SapTk5iGDkC&pg=PA93&redir_esc=y&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/02/investigating-genocide-somaliland-20142310820367509.html). Even the Gersony report cited by the article’s author estimated that “at least 5,000 civilians” were murdered, it was explicitly described in the report as a conservative figure and never presented as a conclusive total figure. This article appears to suggest that Somaliland officials are using the forensic anthropology team as a tool for international recognition as opposed to providing closure for the many families affected by the Siad Barre regime.
If we put Somaliland’s case for international re-recognition in a historical context, one would see that the quest for independence began right after the illegal union with Somalia in 1960.
It was exacerbated by the failed coup of 1961 by young military officers from Somaliland and ever since the people of Somaliland were marginalized and subjugated in what would be the home they created for all Somalis, since the newly found Somali Republic was based on Pan Somali ideals!
The Isaaq genocide that took place from 1978-1991 is not linked to the aspiration of independence and sovereignty. These aspirations preceded the Isaaq genocide!
So in this regard the author is trying create a new narrative with the objective of delegitimizing Somaliland’s quest for international re-recognition by claiming that the genocide is simply a front for international sympathy!
With that said, the Peruvian forensic team is enabling a final closure for many people in Somaliland whose family members met an untimely death at the hands of a brutal communist dictatorship.
Dear Adnan Sugulle, you write about ‘illegal union with Somalia in 1960.’ I would encourage you to study the concise analysis by Eugene Cotran (1963) on this matter entitled ‘Legal Problems Arising out of the Formation of the Somali Republic’, published in: International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 12, no. 3: 1010 -1026. There, close to the events, Cotran found that, despite some political confusion, the union took place legally. As you correctly write, the coup of 1961 was a failure. Why? It obviously did not have the backing of the masses in the northwest (and as a footnote, the population of that region does not only consist of members of the Isaaq clan family, as you know). You write that after the coup-attempt in Dec. 1961, ‘Somaliland[ers ?] were marginalized and subjugated’. It is hard to believe given that if actually all elites from the former British protectorate of Somaliland went at that time to Mogadishu to pursue their career, including Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who became Somalia’s prime minister (1967-1969). He was one of many Isaaq and non-Isaaq from the northwest who served in the Somali government partly in high-ranking positions until well into the 1980s. You also write about the ‘genocide that took place from 1978-1991.’ It is well documented by, e.g., Africa Watch (1990), in their book ‘Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People’, that between 1979 and 1981 the Majeerteen in the northeast were the first victims of military crack-down against masses of civilians in Somalia. It is well known also that at that time, several high-ranking Isaaq military officers were participating in the human rights violations against those civilians (including Hassan Yonis Habane). Some of those officers later on joined the SNM. It still took several years until the SNM grew into a mass movement (actually only after the bombardments of Hargeysa and Burco in May and June 1988). Until then, the official SNM manifesto(s) stated that the aim of the movement was not to seceed from Somalia but to change the system of government in Somalia. Taken all this together, it seems to me that actually you are, with your comment, trying to create a narrative about ‘Somaliland’s re-recognition’ which is based on the claim that ‘from 1960 onward’ most people in the northwest wanted to undo the Somali union, which is not in tune with the much more complicated historical developments and facts. The issue of exhumations today (and since 2012 actually), which I am writing about, is also more complicated than you present it. Its complications are directly related to the historical complexities of recent Somali history.
“The Somali Republic: An experiment in legal integration. By Paolo Contini” descriptively reports that the union was illegal.
According to Contini, the ‘Act of Union‘ was drafted as a bilateral treaty by the two countries but only Somaliland ratified the treaty.
In essence, the union was approved in principle but never enacted into law and therefore did not have legal validity in Somalia (the party that did not ratify the bilateral treaty).
Further evidence for the illegality of the union is the failed coup of 1961. The Supreme Court of Mogadishu could not prosecute the military officers from Somaliland because the territory where the alleged crime took place did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Somalia).
The reason why the coup failed, despite support from the populace (see the 1961 & 1963 anti union demonstrations in Somaliland), was a lack of coordination.
The economic and political marginalization of Somaliland during the illegal union is a reality. A handful of politicians pursuing their own interests in the 1960’s is not a solid counter argument. If that was the case, one could argue that a handful of “Somaliland politicians” based in Mogadishu today represent the people of Somaliland which is false.
You’re incorrect! There are many examples such as “ Somalia: A Country Study“, “Culture and Customs of Somalia” and “Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda”, stating that the crimes against the Majertein clan was carried out by the ‘Red Berets’, an elite force exclusively made up by Barre’s clan. Not a single source implies that Colonel Hassan Yonis Habane or any other Isaaq officer was responsible or implicit in these crimes! You have to present evidence for your allegations!
It is also very disturbing that a researcher at a prestigious university such as Leipzig University is insinuating that the Isaaq genocide was “reciprocity” for alleged crimes committed by Isaaq military personnel! Why else would you make a connection between the crimes committed against Majertein and the Isaaq genocide?
May I also ask, how am I trying to create a new narrative when all the evidence is there? Somaliland’s quest for independence/re-recognition began in 1961, 20 years before the Isaaq genocide, so your argument that Somaliland’s quest revolves around the Isaaq genocide or that the Isaaq genocide is the main argument for Somaliland’s legitimate case is simply disingenuous and false!
Dear Adnan Sugulle, you write that “The economic and political marginalization of Somaliland during the illegal union is a reality. A handful of politicians pursuing their own interests in the 1960’s is not a solid counter argument. If that was the case, one could argue that a handful of ‘Somaliland politicians’ based in Mogadishu today represent the people of Somaliland which is false.” I agree with the last part (Isaaq politicians in Mogadishu today do not represent Somaliland). But regarding the first part of the statement, I think it is obvious that you are wrong. Virtually ALL the elites and intellectuals etc. with a name (magac leh) who originated from the north (former British Protectorate) went to the south and engaged there heavily over decades. The relevance of this is visible when you look at the leadership of Somaliland today (and actually since 1991): all presidents of the country since 1991 had a military or political career in southern Somalia before; so did many ministers etc. Even people like Edna Aaden, who is such a staunch Somalilander today, was first lady of Somalia and ambassador of the Somali Republic to the WHO in the 1970s (or even 1980s?). Besides many of the older Isaaq elites also non-Isaaq elites who also, by colonial division, belong to Somaliland, established themselves in the south after independence. Thus, I guess you are misrepresenting the history of very many Somalis with your statements in that regard. Concerning what I said about the involvement of Isaaq officers in crimes against the Majeerteen 1979-1981: the names of Hassan Yonis Habane and others were transmitted to me in Hargeysa 2003 and 2003 by locals who otherwise were absolutely not in favor of the old Barre regime. I guess an oral history research with people who experienced the times we are discussing here would quickly show that these issues are more complicated than you or some other authors like to present them.
You just proved my point! The political elite from Somaliland in the 1960’s pursued their careers in Somalia during the illegal union. They were not there as true representatives of the people, not a single one of them addressed the economic/political marginalization nor tried to correct it because they were all fighting over breadcrumbs!
Similar to the political mercenaries based in Mogadishu today claiming that they represent the people of Somaliland.
It is truly unfortunate that a researcher at a well established German university is spreading libel based on hearsay! You are making very serious allegations without proof! You also used these allegations to insinuate that the Isaaq genocide was merely a consequence of alleged crimes committed by Isaaq officers! This is a departure from the evidence-based academic discourse and I don’t think Leipzig University condones such practices!