Last Sunday’s presidential elections in Serbia saw a surprise win by opposition leader Tomislav Nikolic, of the right-leaning Serbia Progressive Party. James Ker-Lindsay argues that Nikolic will not be able to ignore the issue of Kosovo during his term as the EU is very likely to push Serbia to resolve its differences with Pristina for it to be able to continue down the path towards accession.
The shock win by Tomislav Nikolic, the leader of the Serbian Progressive Party, in Sunday’s presidential run off vote has sparked considerable debate about the future of Serbia. For some observers, the victory is seen as proof that Serbia is once again shifting towards nationalism. There is no reason to believe that this is the case. The result of the election is not because Boris Tadic, the incumbent, has become more right-wing, as one prominent commentator suggested. Instead, it is a reflection of deep seated concerns within Serbia about the economic situation and the pervasive influence of corruption at all levels of society (It also seems to have been driven by the negative message but out by Tadic and his team). Fed up with the government’s inability to crack down on cronyism, many supporters of Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS), and other centre-left voters Tadic needed to stay in power, decided to stay at home and abstain from voting. In truth, foreign policy played almost no part in the presidential campaign, or the parliamentary elections held just a couple of weeks earlier.
As well as a reflection of greater concerns over the economy, this apparent apathy over foreign policy issues is also shaped by the fact that, in the four years since Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, most ordinary Serbs have come to terms with the effective loss of the province. Few now talk about it openly. Even fewer seek to make it a core issue of political debate. Again, this was reflected in the election campaigns. The only party now represented in the parliament that did so was the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), led by Vojislav Kostunica, which received just 7 per cent of the vote.
However, while Kosovo had sunk down the political agenda, it would be wrong to suggest that it no longer matters to ordinary Serbs. The reality is that, under certain circumstances, it still has the potential to affect public opinion in the country in a profound way. While most Serbs accept that it is gone, they still seem likely to oppose any decision by Belgrade to confirm this formally – at least not without gaining something significant in return (such as retaining formal sovereignty over the north and securing better rights over the Serbian Orthodox religious sites elsewhere in Kosovo). This means that the government still has to tread carefully on the matter.
The trouble is that while the incoming government would undoubtedly prefer simply to put Kosovo on the backburner, and avoid taking any major decisions on the issue, it will not have the luxury of being able to do so. It seems almost certain that as soon as a new administration is formed Serbia will once again come under considerable pressure from the European Union to restart the dialogue with Pristina, was put on hold during the election campaign. It also seems likely that the government will also be required to loosen its influence over the predominantly Serb inhabited north of Kosovo. If it does not make progress on these two issues, it seems unlikely that Serbia will be given a start date for formal accession talks. It is therefore vital that any new government tackles these two issues. The coalition talks that are just getting underway are therefore crucial.
Although the parliamentary elections, held a couple of weeks prior to the presidential run-off vote, were won by Nikolic’s Progressives, there has been widespread speculation that the eventual government will be made up of DS and their partners in the previous administration, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). As far as the Kosovo issue is concerned (and setting other issues to one side), this is an ideal outcome for Nikolic. Under these conditions, he will have very little actual political power. Instead, he will be a figurehead president. This will allow him to avoid having to take any action on Kosovo, letting DS and its partners in the actual government take the blame for any further concessions, all the while giving him a platform to maintain the rhetoric that ‘Kosovo is Serbia’. From this perspective, he can only win.
Nikolic’s real problem would be if the DS decides not to form the government, and lets the Progressives do a deal with the Socialists, or if the Socialist actively opt to partner with the Progressives. Under this scenario, it is likely that Nikolic and the Progressives would come under an enormous degree of pressure from the EU. Having insisted that they have left their nationalism behind them, it seems almost certain that they would be expected to prove that this is the case by showing how moderate they can be over Kosovo. This would present a dilemma. If they give in to the EU, they will almost certainly face a backlash amongst their supporters. If they don’t, then it seems likely that Serbia’s further integration into the EU will be put on hold. This will almost certainly have an impact on Serbia’s image abroad, which could serve to inhibit the crucial foreign investment needed to tackle the dire economic situation. This would also harm their electoral prospects next time round.
Of course, there is one other scenario. As one analyst in Pristina suggested, with Nikolic as president, and the DS and SPS as the government, there is also the possibility that the way would be open for a historic settlement of the Kosovo issue, whereby all the parties would take responsibility for any decision reached. In many ways, this would be the ideal outcome. However, such an outcome seems unlikely given the fractious nature of Serbian politics. For the time being, it seems that Kosovo will remain as problematic for Serbia as it has always been.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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James Ker-Lindsay – LSE European Institute
James Ker-Lindsay is a Senior Research Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science. A specialist on issues relating to conflict, peace and security, his authored books include Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans(2009), Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey(2007), and EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (2005). He is the co-editor of The Cyprus Review.
I for one believe that the forthcoming “pressure from the European Union” to “restart the dialogue” and for Serbia to “loosen its influence over the predominantly Serb inhabited north of Kosovo” is simply not enough. That’s hardly a pressure, to continue talking without intending to implement and to “loosen influence” over Mladic & Karadzic supporting gangs in the north, doesn’t constitute progress.
Serbia must be required to do much more. Americans want modus vivendi that allows for normalisation without recognition. Germany wants complete abolishment of parallel structures and immediate implementation of all agreements. UK and France will also insist for Serbia which also means Serbia not pulling stunts like making political pressure on UEFA to overturn FIFA decision to allow for Kosovo kids to play friendly football with their peers from Europe. Serbia must simply be required, if not to recognise, then at least not actively undermine Kosovo’s attempts to become a part of the region and wider world, equal in rights and obligations like all other European states. Kosovo’s isolation will not bring anything good to Serbia. Its recipe that has been tried throughout the better half of 20th century by various hardline Serbian governments and it didn’t work then either. Serbia has been so hellbent and spent so much energy to prove that Kosovo is a “black hole” and “failed state”, that the signals it sent to Kosovo as well as the partners in West became undistinguishable from the discourse used by Milosevic. Jeremic mentioned “Jerusalem” at least 2 dozen times in his UN speeches on Kosovo, falsifying history and using dangerous imagery borrowed from the same pool of references that are used by likes of Seselj. Tadic insisted for a while that he would only talk with Albania and Albanians on “historic deal”, again showing no willingness to consider Kosovo equal.
Serbia must, and there is no other way than this one if we want finality of peace and European agenda in Balkans, normalise relationship with Kosovo. It will not be required to change constitution or recognise Kosovo, but it will have to recognise the right of Kosovo to issue telecom licences (it currently doesn’t). It will have to recognise Kosovo’s airspace and allow PR-BG flights. It will have to not object to Kosovo kids play football internationally or indeed in any sports. It will have to recognise Kosovo’s SWIFT code so it enables quicker and cheeper banking transfers. It will have to recognise Kosovo insurance companies so people don’t have to pay ransom at the border between the two. It will have to recognise that Kosovo and Serbia companies can and should sign roaming agreements so people in Serbia can send SMS’es to people in Kosovo (they currently can’t).
Serbia will have to not object to Kosovo becoming member of Council of Europe, as ECHR is the best tool to protect minority rights, and currently Kosovo is the only dot in Europe not covered by the court in any way. Fulfilling CoE criteria will also strengthen democracy and human rights, an aim that surely every pro-EU serbian gov should have.
In short, we expect much more, but nothing extraordinary in EU, from an EU-canddate country of Serbia, we who have been victims of the Serbian state-organized and implemented massive violence to displace us all (see Milutinovic et al, ICTY)
Petrit, Many thanks for the comments. I am sorry about the belated response. You raise a lot of valuable points. However, I would like to pick up your comments about the north. As you know from a previous exchange we had, I do not believe that the situation in Kosovo can simply be solved by imposing your will on the Serbian inhabited north. Just as the Albanian population of Kosovo was never willing to accept Belgrade’s rule, and actively resisted Serbian authority throughout the 1990s (and long before then), so the Serbs in the north are now effectively playing the same game with you. To paint them all as gangsters, or thuggish nationalists, in the hope that this will allow you to pursue some sort of military solution is extremely dangerous. You would simply be doing to them what Milosevic tried to do to you – with all the disasterous consequences that this has had for Serbia.
Trying to take the north by force would not only run the risk of a major regional conflict, it would almost certainly an that you would come out weaker either way. And even if you succeed in imposing your will on the north, what then? Do you for one moment think that Russia will simply relent and allow you to join the UN? I think its opposition to your statehood may actually grow. Meanwhile, if you fail, you will almost certainly lose the north forever anyway. I don’t think that there would be much sympathy for your cause after that, and many countries would simply regard the division as the most sensible outcome to the problem.
A peaceful solution that is based on accepting the will of the people in the north therefore needs to be found. As you know, I have long believed that a negotiated redrawing of the boundary/border between Kosovo and Serbia in return for Belgrade’s acceptance of your statehood is the most logical solution. However, it may equally be possible that some form of enhanced autonomy for the area would also be satisfactory for the Serbs in the area. Either way, the views of the community need to be repected. Trying to impose your will over them is as futile as Serbia’s earlier efforts to impose its will over you. Also, simply hoping that Belgrade can be ordered into giving them up is problematic.These people have shown that they have their own views and opinions, and live a reality that is far removed from the politicians in Belgrade. Serbia cannot give them up. They need to give themselves up. As the recent refrendum in the north showed, that is not going to happen anytime soon.
Without doubt, the best way to win them over is to provide them with an attractive alternative to Serbian rule. To do this, your first task has to be to make Kosovo as functional, democratic and economically viable a state as possible. Faced with being a tiny forgotten backwater of Serbia, which the area will always be, or an autonomous and influential part of a prosperous Kosovo, the people may eventually choose to throw their support behind an independent Kosovo. It will not happen quickly, and it may not happen at all, but it is the best option to keep the north in play and eventually keep it within Kosovo – if that is what you really want. Many in Serbia want to solve the Kosovo problem. If the Serbs in the north are happy to be part of an independent Kosovo, then so be it. I don’t think many in Belgrade would be devasted by this. However, if you try to use force, you will leave the Serbian Government with no option but to side with their compatriots in the north and press the case that they cannot be integrated in a Kosovo state – in much the same way as, after the events of 1998-1999, you argued that the Kosovo Albanian community could not be realistically reintegrated into the Serbian state after all that had happened.
I know that there are many in Pristina who believe that a forced solution is the answer. It isn’t – just as it wasn’t for Serbia in the late 1990s. Constructive engagement is the best way to ensure that everyone will hopefully get what they want. If you can reach an historic agreement with Belgrade, which would require an agreement over the north, then UN membership, participation in the Olympics and major football tournaments, as well as involvement with a whole host of other economic, political, sporting and cultural organisations and events – which you call for in your comments – would occur overnight. Really, all the problems you highlight could be solved at a stroke if you reach a negotiated settlement of your ‘northern problem’.