A demonstration in support of Catalan independence from Spain was held on 11 September to coincide with the National Day of Catalonia. With no agreement between the Catalan and Spanish governments over whether a proposed referendum on independence should be held in November, we asked four* of EUROPP’s contributors to give their views.
- Francesc Trillas: “Catalonia should find a better way than a secession referendum to decide about its future constitutional status”
- Montserrat Guibernau: “Why should Catalans be ‘different’ from the Scots? Are they second-rate citizens?”
- José Javier Olivas: “This referendum would likely aggravate rather than solve the complex social problems that have emerged during the recent economic crisis”
Francesc Trillas: Catalonia should find a better way than a secession referendum to decide about its future constitutional status
Catalonia should find a better way than a secession referendum to decide about its future constitutional status, in a world of overlapping and shared sovereignties where the nation-state is becoming obsolete. If and only if, over an extended period of time, a very large and stable majority shows an unambiguous support for a detailed “independent” constitutional project within a clear international framework, then some democratic procedure accepted by all relevant actors should be established to peacefully negotiate and finally take a final decision about it. These conditions clearly do not apply today.
Most internationally recognised legal scholars and political scientists believe that the right to secede should be restricted to extreme cases. Accordingly, secession referendums are the exception in developed democratic countries, especially in the context of the European Union and the Eurozone, which are in a complex process of increasing political integration and redistribution of sovereignty.
There are three commitment problems, well-known to social scientists, associated to the unrestricted use of a referendum of independence in federal systems:
1) Federal governments should not be too powerful, and focus on the creation of the legal and regulatory frameworks for markets to operate efficiently (including a strong currency and clear borders), and commit both not to expropriate prívate investments and not to interfere with federal units, according to the theory of market preserving federalism due to Barry Weingast and his co-authors.
2) Potential majorities or elites in federal units should commit not to cheat opportunistically on the specific investments made by large minorities assuming the permanence of some federal institutions: educational degrees, retirement benefits for federal civil servants, language skills, factor mobility, currency…
3) The governments of federal units should commit not to use their resources to promote the partition of the federal state. Otherwise potentially federal states will be reluctant in the future to decentralise in contexts where it would be desirable to do so. When federal units are relatively rich, there should be a mutual commitment for the units to fairly, boundedly and transparently contribute to the common resources and for the federation to preserve self-government and the participation of the federal units in shared decision-making.
Unless these commitments are respected, societies may fail to build the stable federal systems that are necessary in our increasingly integrated economies. To preserve commitments, democratic societies build institutions that constrain the unrestricted use of majority rule. That is why we have constitutions, international treaties and courts of justice. To the extent that, as I believe, it is desirable that both Spain and the EU become better federations, the use of a unilateral independence referendum as a decision mechanism would jeopardise this objective. It would also trigger internal and external cascade effects that would make it impossible to focus the energies on a more integrated and democratic Europe.
Spanish and Catalan leaders should instead build on our common values to submit to the final decision of the electorate an agreement on a shared institutional architecture that can be legal and stable in the European context, and give satisfaction to historical grievances.
Francesc Trillas – Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB)
Francesc Trillas is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Applied Economics at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, and Associate Researcher at the Public-Private Sector Research Centre at IESE and at the Institut d’Economia de Barcelona.
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Montserrat Guibernau: Why should Catalans be ‘different’ from the Scots? Are they second-rate citizens?
According to an opinion poll by Metroscopia published by the newspaper ‘El País’ on 20 July, if 70 per cent of Catalans were to vote, support for secession would rise to over 50 per cent; the percentage of people prepared to back independence has risen 3 points since May 2014. Younger generations feel a strong sense of entitlement to decide upon their future and regard the negative of the Spanish State to allow a binding referendum on Catalan self-determination as diminishing. Why should Catalans be ‘different’ from the Scots? Are they second-rate citizens?
This brings to the fore awareness of the different political cultures and historical background of EU member-states and signals the need to reconcile contrasting views of democracy coexisting in the EU. To a point, it highlights diversity within the EU; it also reveals uneven perspectives from which democracy and civil rights are interpreted and applied by different member-states.
During the transition to democracy, and after almost forty years of dictatorship, Catalan majority nationalism defended the idea that the ‘one nation, one state’ theory was not an indispensable condition for a nation to attain its full development. Consequently, it endorsed devolution within Spain and rejected secession. However, this position has changed dramatically since 2000. At present a strong grassroots secessionist movement – which defines itself as pro-European and democratic – is demanding the right of the Catalan people to hold a binding referendum on whether Catalonia should become independent or not. So far, this is strictly forbidden by the Spanish State.
Catalans invoke democracy and the right to decide upon their collective future. In response, the Spanish State appeals to Articles 2 and 8 of the Spanish Constitution which state, respectively, that ‘the Constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards’, and that ‘the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up’.
Catalonia is not considered a separate demos within Spain and any decision affecting its political status has to be sanctioned by all Spanish citizens, including the Catalans. They are what I refer to as ‘a constant minority’: since the Catalans are a minority within Spain, it follows that they have little or no chance of ever having their voice heard, unless new policies destined to grant ‘voice’ and ‘veto’ power to minorities are put in place.
Catalonia should be allowed to hold a referendum on independence based on democratic grounds. Referendums are instruments that provide a clear response from the citizenry and which have been regularly used by European liberal democracies, including Spain. The key questions we should be asking here is why a solid non-secessionist Catalan movement has turned into a fully-fledged secessionist movement? What has prompted the shift from devolution to secession? Have all parts concerned done their best to find a democratic peaceful solution to a situation facing gridlock?
In Catalonia, fear associated with the dictatorship is still present among those who lived through the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship that followed it. The strong resurgence of conservatism and centralism in contemporary Spain endorses a static conception of the Spanish Constitution. In so doing it prevents further development of democracy as a dynamic process that requires to be constantly updated.
Montserrat Guibernau – Queen Mary, University of London
Montserrat Guibernau is Professor of Politics at Queen Mary, University of London.
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José Javier Olivas: This referendum would likely aggravate rather than solve the complex social problems that have emerged during the recent economic crisis
A multitude of criticisms have been expressed about the procedural and legal validity of the political process through which the Catalan government have sought to bring about a referendum. The questions proposed for the referendum were defined and approved by Catalan nationalist parties without the participation of non-nationalist parties. Their wording is ambiguous and the two-question design – “Should Catalonia be a state?” and, if so “Should it be independent?” – may lead to results which can be difficult to interpret. The thresholds required for the validation of the secession process have not been clearly defined.
Moreover, the purpose and questions of the referendum clash with the Spanish Constitution which explicitly states the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’ and received 91 per cent support in Catalonia in 1978. Claims of Catalonia being a sovereign entity have been unanimously rejected by the Spanish Constitutional Court. While the British Parliament validated the organisation of the referendum in Scotland, the Spanish Parliament rejected the Catalan one by a very large majority.
Through negotiation and persuasion the Spanish Constitution could be theoretically modified and the abovementioned procedural errors mitigated in order to organise another referendum. But even in that case it would be necessary to assess whether holding an independence referendum in Catalonia is a desirable option.
Deontological arguments against a referendum
Many of the justifications for Catalan secession are based on misrepresentations of the history and current situation of Catalonia. From a deontological perspective, systematic oppression or exploitation may justify the right of ‘self-determination’ of a territory. Nonetheless, Catalonia’s situation is far from that of a territory subdued to a colonial power and its citizens enjoy the same rights and opportunities as those in the rest of Spain. Catalonia has never been independent except from 1640 to 1659, during the so-called ‘Reaper’s War’.
Difference (or singularity) is another deontological justification used. The argument goes like this: ‘Catalans are different from other Spaniards; therefore, Catalans should have the choice to decide whether to have or not an independent state. However, this argument overemphasises the differences between Catalans and other Spaniards, is almost impossible to establish empirically and, if difference justifies self-determination for a region like Catalonia, couldn’t other sub-regional entities, such as provinces or towns, claim the same rights? In fact, ethno-linguistic and cultural differences do not seem a sufficient reason to separate people and create borders within modern democratic states.
The unilateral right of secession also collides with the principles of equality and redistribution, which are core to the modern conceptions of democracy. People should be entitled to similar rights regardless of where they live and of their ethno-linguistic or cultural backgrounds. Attributing the right to decide over the division of a country only to the citizens of some areas is problematic. Since Catalonia’s secession would have a considerable socio-economic impact in the rest of the country and hinder redistribution, denying the rest of Spain the capacity to participate in an eventual referendum could be deemed discriminatory.
Consequentialist perspectives
Consequentialist arguments should also be taken into consideration. Upon granting the power to the Generalitat to organise an independence referendum, it would be almost impossible to deny future referendums in Catalonia and other regions, turning Spain into an inherently unstable political entity. In addition, allowing an independence referendum is a de facto recognition of the sovereignty of Catalonia and a restraint on the Spanish sovereignty as defined by the 1978 Constitution. That is why pro-independence nationalists are not as concerned with the result of the referendum as they are with the capacity to organise it.
Referendums empower citizens and provide legitimacy, but the risks and costs associated with them have made their use marginal in modern representative democracies. An independence referendum frames a complex social problem in a reductionist way. It forces people to choose among two diametrically opposed positions and eliminates middle ground options, which are often the preferred choice of the majority. The political campaigns that accompany independence referendums tend to revolve around passionate discourses and contribute to a further polarisation of society.
Moreover, the secession of Catalonia may be considered a contradiction in the already fragile process of European integration and could produce negative spill-over effects. On the other hand, a no-vote would not make pro-independence nationalists abandon their claims either. They would continue their nation building process and prepare for other bids in future consultations. Thus, for the large majority of Spaniards (including many Catalans) the potential outcomes of an eventual referendum range from not positive, in the case of a no-vote, to negative or very negative in the case of a yes-vote.
In sum, referendums are powerful tools but politicians and academics should remember Maslow’s ‘law of the instrument’: ‘[…] it is tempting, if all you have is a hammer, to treat everything as it were a nail’. Overreliance on a particular tool can be dangerous. Referendums, like hammers, cannot fix every problem and can have harmful consequences. The Catalan independence referendum is being inadequately devised, and insufficiently justified. Most importantly, this referendum would likely aggravate rather than solve the complex social problems that have emerged during the recent economic crisis. Fortunately, Catalan and Spanish policy-makers have other instruments at their disposal. Institutional dialogue and collaboration between Spanish and Catalan governments and parliaments is probably a less traumatic and more efficient way to tackle these problems.
José Javier Olivas – London School of Economics
José Javier Olivas is a Fellow and Associate to LSE IDEAS and the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
*At the request of one of the original authors, we have removed their contribution.
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Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. Feature image credit: Rob Shenk (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
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“in a world of overlapping and shared sovereignties where the nation-state is becoming obsolete.”
Nonsense. The nation-state is, if anything, becoming more important, not less. Globalisation makes it imperative that people have a voice, and that is better done through being a small nation-state, rather than merely being a region of a large one. We’ve seen almost 150 “new” countries emerge over the last 100 years since the old empires started falling apart, and it’s unlikely this trend will stop with Scotland and Catalonia.
Small nations cooperating within transnational organisations – that’s the trend, and you can’t have that without nation-states. The clue’s in the “national” part.
“Globalisation makes it imperative that people have a voice, and that is better done through being a small nation-state, rather than merely being a region of a large one.”
This is the sort of thing that sounds plausible until you consider the effect it would actually have in international organisations. How can the EU possibly function in its current format if there are, for instance, 50+ member states instead of 28? It can’t without fundamentally altering the nature of national sovereignty – i.e. vastly increasing the number of policy areas in which “unanimity” is no longer used and where states can effectively be forced to go along with policies they disagree with simply because of what other states have decided.
So presenting this as some improvement in democratic terms is highly dubious. Instead of having smaller populations being led by a shared national policy (British, Spanish, Belgian, Italian) determined through a directly elected parliament in which they have full representation, we’ll have smaller populations being led by the opinions of foreign parliaments in which they have no representation. We can’t both drastically increase the number of small states in Europe while also affording them the same level of national sovereignty. The two principles are completely incompatible.
The two principles are hardly incompatible. Sovereignty can be shared in a number of different ways, but it is impossible to maintain that, for example, an independent Scotland would not be (and feel itself to be) more sovereign and enjoy greater independence in many spheres, as an independent state within the EU rather than as a devolved region of the UK, however extensive the brand of “devo” on offer.
I doubt many Irish (or Slovak or…. insert others of your choice here) voters or legislators, feel that they are less empowered today that they would have been had they never decided to become independent. The difficulties inherent in managing a 50 nation EU as opposed to 6, 9, 12, 15 etc. are a good argument for institutional change and reform of EU structures and governance, they do not ipso facto support the contention that a larger membership threatens the national sovereignty of small states or otherwise makes it somehow “second rate”.
There have been a number of commentators in Scotland, both pro and anti independence although it is certainly more common from the No camp, who insist that independence within the EU is not “real” independence. Very often this is simply because the are euro-sceptic and from the political right, but it is not a view that bears any close scrutiny. As Doug notes above, many small states are likely to be much happier surrendering or pooling some sovereignty within a supra-national structure like the EU, than consider a much more direct form of overarching authority such as rule from London or Madrid, whatever the devolved powers which may be on offer.
Of course they’re incompatible. The more states you have the more difficult it is to maintain unanimous decision-making. This is something that’s been demonstrated clearly over the last 20-30 years of European integration.
You can accept that point or ignore it (if you choose) but you haven’t offered a rebuttal – just a vague statement about the “reform of EU structures and governance” without defining what that actually means or how it can possibly be the case that 50 states are just as likely to find unanimous agreement as 28 (clearly they aren’t).
Please try to interact with what people say, not what you “wish” they had said to suit your argument. Nobody is arguing that insisting on unanimous decision making wouldn’t become more difficult with more states; the sane way of addressing this is reducing the scope of those matters which require unanimity. If states feel that they cannot agree with the diminution of sovereignty involved, than they have a choice to make. The problem for supra-national institutions like the EU is the availability of a unanimity requirement in areas where it isn’t appropriate, allowing anyone state to block progress.
If anyone appears to be hiding behind vague platitudes it is you; you haven’t addressed any of the issues raised in relation to why many entities such as Scotland, Catalonia or other regions/nations which may never become (or even particularly want) might see Brussels as a useful counter lever to their national capital.
This is a much broader question than your chosen hobby horse of unanimity in voting in the EU!
To start with, I need to say that I am Catalan, I live in Catalonia, I use Catalan as a first language at work. I definitely share Francesc’s views on the debate. I am an economist but I will not elaborate on the economic consequences of a potential future independence because it has already been well developed. But I feel the need to clarify a couple of misunderstandings in many debates related to Catalan independence:
1. Not all Catalans feel the same. To state certain opinions under the label of ‘Catalans think, or Catalans feel’ is certainly not the case. I absolutely respect the opinion of those who are in favor of independence, let me ask for the same respect. I do not share their views.
2. In Catalonia, Media is under the influence and control of the government. I am not the only one claiming about that. Recently many journalists already complained on this. Do I need to stress how this non-neutrality on the information about the debate is not exactly democratic?
3. The Catalan independence is sold to citizens by the government and other political parties in favor of it as ‘the’ tool to solve all kind of problems that are deeply affecting our society. Sure? The negative consequences of the neoliberal orientation of current Catalan policies are hidden under the independence debate.
4. And yes, I dislike corruption and until now it looked as if only corruption could be associated to Spanish political parties or governments. But we all know that also Catalan parties and government need to regenerate themselves in order to still be representative and legal. Will this also be solved with the Catalan independence? I doubt it.
Catalan media are NOT under the control of the Catalan government, but Spanish media are under the control of the Spanish government, and that’s been like that for decades, everybody knows.
Catalan independence is not sold by anybody, let alone any politicians. The independence movement in Catalonia was created by the people, and if politicians don’t behave as their voters request, the movement will sweep them away.
Whether corruption will disappear or not in an independent Catalonia is irrelevant to the fact that any nation has got the right of governing itself, corruption and all.
I don’t know in which country bb leaves. Surely not in Catalonia. We have just seen today an example of the degree of manipulation of the public media in Catalonia. The public TV and radio, TV3 and Catalunya Radio have extremely generously promoted, announced, covered and applauded the demonstration in favor of Catalan Independence. Even the trade unión of journalists in TV3 have denounced the sectarianism of this coverage. I hope that sooner rather tan later democracy and objectivity will come back to Catalan public media. Our benchmark should not be the Spanish televisión, but the BBC, and we are light years from that.
Judging on the biased coverage of Scottish independence, I’m afraid I think that not even the BBC would qualify Siscu!
Andy Ellis: “Please try to interact with what people say, not what you “wish” they had said to suit your argument.”
That’s a genuinely absurd response. You were responding to a very specific point I made about the nature of supranational decision-making. You provided no rebuttal to that point yet claimed to disagree with it. I merely restated my point and asked you to provide some evidence as to why it’s wrong.
Your response here makes literally no sense. You’ve claimed that the problem is “the availability of a unanimity requirement in areas where it isn’t appropriate” within the EU. You don’t seem to realise that unanimity only exists in these areas because states haven’t unanimously agreed to switch to QMV in the first place. I suggest you research a topic first before you launch into an argument about it – what you’ve said here is more or less gibberish to anyone with an understanding of EU decision-making.
“If anyone appears to be hiding behind vague platitudes it is you; you haven’t addressed any of the issues raised in relation to why many entities such as Scotland, Catalonia or other regions/nations which may never become (or even particularly want) might see Brussels as a useful counter lever to their national capital.”
You’re right, I haven’t addressed any of these points: they’re completely irrelevant to the topic of discussion. This is a common trait with people who are hell bent on pushing a nationalist agenda (yes, it really is that obvious) – they have an inability to stick within the confines of a specific subject and inevitably end up branching out into irrelevant tangents. I have no interest in that. I’m not campaigning in a referendum. You can respond to the academic issue at stake – the playoff between independence movements and supranational decision-making – or not. Your choice.