The future relationship between the UK and the EU following Brexit has the potential to alter the nature of the border between the UK and Ireland. Katy Hayward considers how the three most likely scenarios would translate into trade relations and what the result would be for the UK-Irish border.
The European Council has given an unusual playing card to the UK government by stating an openness to ‘flexible and imaginative solutions’ for managing the Irish border after Brexit. The fact is, however, that these ‘flexible and imaginative solutions’ have to come from the UK government in the first instance. Instead, so far, there has been only an effort to reassure people that a ‘hard border’ would be avoided by the use of technological solutions. This reflects the crude assumption that by ‘hard border’ one simply means ‘visible border’.
However, the real impact of a ‘hard border’ hits far away from the actual crossing – it is felt in the obstacles to trade, to supply chains, to employment catchment areas, to business cooperation and expansion, and in the additional costs and delays entailed in crossing the border. At the moment, the Irish border is ‘seamless and frictionless’ (to use Teresa May’s phrase) because Single Market and Customs Union membership [in the EU] together covers domestic goods and imported goods. Exit from either of those necessitates border controls of some sort; technological solutions will not substitute for these controls nor entirely avert the need for checks.
To posit ‘technological solutions’ at this stage is like trying to decide on the light fittings before you have even got planning permission for the house. When the Irish government expressed its frustration at the lack of progress on this matter, it did so because it is still unclear as to whether the UK government wishes to build a neo-colonial mansion or a modest semi on the plot of land ‘wrested’ from the EU.
This needs to be made clear as soon as possible in order to make progress on two tracks. For there are two agreements that have to be negotiated in Brussels: the Exit deal and the future trade arrangement. David Davis is quite right to note that we can’t be completely clear about the post-Brexit Irish border until we know the nature of the future trade arrangement. However, it would be sufficient at this stage for Davis and his team to set out what future trade arrangement they are aiming for, so that the Exit negotiations can work towards this. This would ensure, for example, that certain aspects of standardisation and regulatory coordination across the Irish border could be preserved by the Exit deal in order to be able to facilitate the trading relationship intended to follow it.
Image by Irishferries, (Wikipedia), licenced under Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported.
And what are the options for the future UK/EU trade relationship? There are three ball park scenarios. First, to remain in the Single Market. This would be the most straightforward as it would mean continuing membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), albeit via an application to join the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and subject to the approval of the EEA members. The UK would have to accept the existing EFTA trade deals, it would still make budgetary contributions and be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, but it would have some scope to pursue an independent trade policy.
For the Irish border, UK EEA membership would mean that freedom of movement (of people, goods, services and capital) would continue unabated and that there would continue to be a matching of standards and regulations on both sides. Customs checks, however, would be required for goods coming from outside the EU and for those goods not covered by EEA membership, which unfortunately would include agricultural produce.
The second option would be a bespoke customs union with the EU. This would require more negotiation/transition time as it is not an ‘off the shelf’ solution. The UK would have tariff-free trade with the EU (although, again, not in agricultural produce, unless that was specially arranged) but it would have little freedom in the deals it makes outside the EU, it would have to apply the Common External Tariff, and it would need to continue to comply with EU regulations and harmonisation in some areas.
For the Irish border, the UK being in a customs union with the EU would mean tariff-free trade, but it would not secure freedom of movement of people or services. Customs documentation and checks would be required on the Irish border for (among many other things) compliance with standards, Rules of Origin, and for agricultural produce (which could be subject to tariffs and quotas).
Finally, there is the option of a deep and comprehensive free trade arrangement, such as with Canada. There is no hope that this can be finalised on top of the exit deal within the coming year so any transitional arrangement would be vital. This would offer an escape from the jurisdiction of the ECJ, the freedom to negotiate other deals, and an end to budgetary contributions to the EU. However, this would mean a ‘hard’ customs Irish border in that divergence between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would increase and Northern Ireland would presumably be open to goods that are restricted in the EU Single Market (e.g. the infamous chlorinated chicken).
Of course, there is another option: a ‘no deal’ Brexit, in which the UK leaves with no trade agreement in place and falls back on WTO terms. This would automatically mean the hardest form of an economic border between the UK and Ireland as tariffs would have to be applied both ways and there would be no regulatory equivalence between them. Even if this were the will of the UK government and unionist parties, to hurtle towards this outcome with no preparation and no information is to leave businesses, services and citizens brutally and unnecessarily exposed. Flexibility and imagination cannot be gifted by the EU – it must be demonstrated by the UK as an act of sovereignty and self-preservation.
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Note: This article originally appeared at our sister site, LSE Brexit. It gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics.
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Katy Hayward – Queen’s University Belfast
Katy Hayward is Reader in Sociology & Senior Research Fellow, Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice at Queen’s University Belfast.
Ireland left the United kingdom a hundred years ago. Ireland will have to build the infrastructure to secure the EU’s external border and manage it’s customs post with the UK. This is not a threat from the UK this is a fact of membership with the EU. Ireland has also to ensure the security & integrity of the Airspace & Seas above & around this European Union Territory as it will be impossible to obtain a visa for the Royal Airforce to step in & do the job for them at such short notice.
As one who is quite sure the best response to Brexit is not to do it, and that sooner or later (possibly too late, but I have to hope not) a majority of both MPs and the UK electorate will think so too, I am delighted to have such a clear description of the issues for Ireland. Yet another example of what the whole UK electorate should have had before it, and discussed in detail, before the referendum. Katy Hayward may well be right that technological solutions are not any sort of effective answer, but as the Brexiteers are adamant that they are, and can be simply applied – as they are across the Canadian/USA border, so we are often told – it would be good to have a bit more on just what has been proposed and why it/they would not work adequately, so I can effectively challenge those who espouse such solutions.
It is refreshing to read an article on Brexit being practical.
The Author’s Option 3 is pretty much what most of us want – but one can take issue with the assumption that of a “hard border” Irish resulting from:
“divergence between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would increase”.
This nods at one of the recurrent Remain themes – that Leavers want “everything to be different”.
We don’t.
We only want the freedom / option to be different e.g. to ignore new EU rules that have nothing to do with cross-border trade.
“Divergence” would only arise where the UK Govt. chose a different standard.
i) With standards increasingly being proposed at Global level the likelihood of divergence reduces.
ii) The number of diverged items would be few and easily managed
In any case, Customs already operate a “Trusted Trader” scheme (that’s not the terminology) allowing foreign exporters to pre-register their containers/packages.
“Northern Ireland would presumably be open to goods that are restricted in the EU Single Market (e.g. the infamous chlorinated chicken)”
Oh dear … not falling for the old journo story-making “Minister fails to rule out XYZ”.
The UK would only be “open to chlorinated chicken” if it chose to be – and clearly it would be an offence to re-export it – just as it was for East European abbatoirs to export horse-meat labelled as beef !
(And with Health warnings against home chicken-washing … who says chlorine-washing would be a bad thing anyway …..?)
I understand that one of the faculty of LSE is currently enjoying premature success of an unpublished paper, a paper that includes some startling claims about Brexit.
One of those claims is that the Brits are pretty indifferent to the question of the Irish Border. This is on the day that some lad’s magazine called Country Squire (everything for the fashionable EDL member down from town for the weekend) published a scurrilous article about Ireland.
On this day, more than ever, I’m of the opinion let the Brits screw themselves. I want to see the maximum distance between England and Ireland, and to hell with the cost. The advantages of being rid of this narcissistic, anti-social neighbour from Hell far outweigh the disadvantages. At the moment, that disadvantage means little more than a temporary loss of trade and the loss of some dreary soap-operas.
So, I’m for Northern Ireland leaving the United Kingdom when it’s woken up to the toxic relationship it’s got with Great Britain and committed to forging its own destiny. And if, in the fullness of time, that includes it joining the EU or joining with the Republic in a United Ireland, I will welcome it.
What I won’t welcome is any kind of partnership with England. (And I do mean England – the Scots are fine and the Welsh unobjectionable for the most part.)
The premise of this paper is false. The burden of the border is not on the UK outside the EU; it falls squarely on the Irish Republic, as an EU member state bordering a non-EU country. In the absence of a free-trade agreement with the EU, the UK may choose, in its sovereign will, to deem acceptable on its territory any and all goods permitted inside the EU. The UK may also permit its businesses, including those in Northern Ireland, and its citizens as individual travelers, to travel themselves and to transport across the Irish border any and all goods and services that are lawful within the UK. The solution is obvious. The EU should allow the Irish Republic to belong simultaneously to both the EU and UK-Ireland free trade and travel areas. All goods and services permitted by the British government into the UK will be allowed into the Irish Republic, but goods and services not permitted in the EU will not be permitted to transit through the Republic into any EU country, such as by sea or air to the Continent. In return for being granted the right to maintain a completely open land border with a non-EU country, the Irish authorities should be willing to enforce a broader, EU-wide hard border at their ports. The present stance of the Irish government is too much a wanting-everything-to-be-made-easy-for-them approach, which is not reasonable. They need to focus on what is most important for them, which is maintaining the present open land border, and be willing to accept a manageable burden of extra responsibility away from the border, at their ports. Regarding the movement of individuals, the UK can choose to continue unrestricted migration from the EU, but only across the Irish border into Northern Ireland, and limit the right of entry of non-Irish nationals into Britain to those who are willing to first establish residence in Northern Ireland for a 5 or even 10 year period. Why would it do that? Well, Irish citizens from the Republic have already been assured by the UK government that there will be no change to their free right of entry and settlement throughout the UK, including into Northern Ireland. Continuing to admit all EU nationals, as it currently does as an EU member state, but adding a requirement that they first establish themselves in Northern Ireland, will likely lead to most of them simply staying there. Over time, this migration will lead a majority of the Northern Irish population having no ties of family history to the political divisions in Northern Ireland. They will identify themselves as British nationals born in Northern Ireland of EU citizen immigrants, following the religion and customs of their EU citizen parents, or abandoning that heritage, but in any case having no personal connection to the ancient local feuds. This outcome is clearly in the UK’s national interest, and the EU has no restriction on citizens of member states choosing to settle outside the EU, if the outside country of their choice allows it. These new settlers in Northern Ireland would be EU nationals already, from their previous countries of origin, so there is no need for a border for them with the Irish Republic. They will already have the right of free movement in and out of the Republic. As a small island, the Irish authorities, aided by their EU partners, will have no difficulty in preventing unauthorized arrivals on their territory by non-UK, non-EU nationals attempting to come by sea or air. The British coast guard and airport security officials should have no difficulty preventing entry by non-EU nationals into Northern Ireland, a very small land area with a very small coastline, a task the UK already performs every day in its own national interest, so the EU does not really need to place a hard border for that purpose between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Individuals who somehow managedto evade the British or Irish border patrols by air or sea will be few and far between and can be handled by the police.