Tensions between Poland and Brussels have raised the prospect of the country pursuing a “Polexit” from the EU. But how realistic is this possibility? Roch Dunin-Wąsowicz, Gabriel A. Pierzyński and Max Josef Migden write that while a Polexit remains unlikely, Poland’s upcoming election on 15 October will go some way toward setting the country’s future relationship with the EU.

During its EU membership, the UK remained a hesitant and awkward member, characterised by a sense of apartness in terms of both structure and culture. Throughout its membership, various opt-ins and opt-outs were employed as manifestations of the semi-detached approach favoured by successive governments. The UK, by cultivating a relationship characterised by partial and distant commitment, effectively hollowed out a structural gap, which was the enabling factor for Brexit.

The presence of “red lines” and opt-outs was integral to Britain’s interaction with the EU. Although this approach was not unique to the UK (with Denmark and Ireland also having opt-outs of their own), it provided fodder for pro-Brexit narratives. Supporters of Brexit could point to this history as evidence of strained relations, where the EU’s supranational framework failed to align with Britain’s goals, intentions and sovereignty claims. Just as an observer might predict a breakup between a bickering couple, proponents of Brexit found it all too easy to envision an inevitable split.

In contrast to the UK, a potential exit scenario for Poland faces structural conditions that are far less favourable. This is particularly evident given Poland’s economic reliance on EU aid and foreign investment, especially in light of the need to sustain economic growth due to the Ukraine conflict. The EU’s refusal to release COVID-19 recovery funds in Poland, its decision to issue Poland with a daily fine of a million euros over unconstitutional changes to the Polish legal system, and Poland’s escalating conflict with Ukraine over grain imports have had considerable implications for Poland, demonstrating that the consequences of a Polexit would be far more severe than those resulting from Brexit.

However, a crucial, and little discussed, structural consideration remains relevant in the Polish case. To date, EU membership has not been constitutionally affirmed in the framework of the Polish legal system. Thus, EU membership in Poland can be viewed either as akin to an international treaty or, from a practical standpoint, as a component of internal state legislation.

Consequently, a decision regarding a potential EU exit within Poland could conceivably be made through a legislative majority vote sanctioned by the President. This approach, distinct from a constitutional vote, would require securing over half of the total votes (at least 231), as opposed to the two-thirds majority (approximately 307) mandated for constitutional decisions. To form a functional government capable of enacting new legislation, it is imperative to secure over half of the parliamentary seats within the Sejm, the primary legislative body. Critically, this means that Polexit would not require a popular referendum, as in the UK case.

In essence, the structural prerequisites for effecting an EU exit are embedded within the Polish legal system. These provisions could theoretically be harnessed by an anti-EU government as a mechanism to pursue withdrawal from the Union. The potential for such an exit is legally plausible, though its triggering would depend on the agency of political actors and their determination to exploit the existing structural gap.

Parallels with Brexit

It is possible to draw some similarities between the rhetoric of the Leave campaign in the UK and that of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS), which has engaged in conflicts with the EU over the rule of law. The disruption of the legal order in Poland began with the appointment of three “ghost judges” with voting rights to the Constitutional Tribunal, undermining the established system of checks and balances and challenging the legal foundations of the Polish and EU legal systems. Questioning fundamental principles of national and EU law may increase the opportunity for political actors to exploit the structural gap outlined above.

The conflict between PiS and EU institutions has led to growing resentment. Despite Polish society being one of the most pro-European within the EU, it has elected a populist Eurosceptic party to power in two consecutive elections. Populist Eurosceptic positions have become a central element of political discourse, with parties like Suwerenna Polska and Konfederacja making extensive use of these positions.

In the context of the upcoming election on 15 October, the ruling party is unlikely to secure an overall parliamentary majority without forming a coalition government with other parliamentary actors, such as Konfederacja. Such a coalition would likely shift the rhetoric towards a more populist Eurosceptic stance.

However, the election’s outcome remains uncertain, as does Konfederacja’s willingness to form a coalition with PiS. Populist Eurosceptic positions are not a prominent element of public debate, with PiS often framing its conflict with the EU as a dispute with Germany. The consistent pro-EU sentiment in Polish society suggests that the conflict with the EU is primarily an issue of party politics, with the possibility of a future EU exit contingent on political actors’ willingness to exploit the structural gap in the Polish legal system.

Enabler, initiator and amplifier

Political agency will prove to be a fundamental factor in determining Poland’s EU future in the long-term. However, this agency alone would be insufficient without the presence of a structural gap in Polish law. In this framework, agency serves as the factor capable of instigating Polexit (initiator), while the structural gap functions as the factor that can facilitate it (enabler). The structural factors (amplifier) outlined above are likely not pivotal in directly triggering the process.

However, they could considerably magnify the impact of the process if a structural gap exists as an enabler, and if political actors are inclined to initiate the process. Under the present circumstances, in which public support for the EU is strong, and with crucial geopolitical factors increasingly tying Poland closely to the ‘West’, it is hard to see a majority PiS government instigating a Polexit. However, it remains to be seen how a coalition with Konfederacja may affect this calculus, with the latter frequently expressing support for leaving the EU.

Polexit as a process

Although Poland’s economic, structural, and geopolitical context differs significantly from the UK’s, the presence of a structural gap within the Polish legal framework provides political actors with the means to initiate the Polexit process without a referendum. An examination of the agency-based dynamics in the Polish political landscape reveals that the potential for state actors to make the decision to trigger this process is increasing and is likely to depend on the result of the upcoming parliamentary election.

Consequently, the potential for a Polexit cannot be underestimated. Addressing this matter should undoubtedly be a central focus for the opposition, particularly in their efforts to highlight the erosion of the Polish democratic state under the governance of the PiS government.

For more information, see the authors’ accompanying report, published by the 89 Initiative

Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Simon Walker / No 10 Downing Street (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)