A key issue ahead of Italy’s European Parliament election is the implementation of the country’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan through which it can spend funds from the EU’s COVID-19 recovery programme. Leila Simona Talani writes that despite Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s once vehement opposition to Brussels, relations between Italy and the EU’s institutions are now increasingly positive.

This article is part of a series on the 2024 European Parliament elections. The EUROPP blog will also be co-hosting a panel discussion on the elections at LSE on 6 June.

With the next European Parliament elections due to take place in June, it seems important to assess the attitude of the current Italian government, led by Giorgia Meloni, towards the EU and what the main issues at stake are in the relationship between Italy and Brussels. This helps to better understand the future positioning of the country and of the main party in government, Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, in the electoral campaign and in the future outlook of the European Parliament.

Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan

When it was in opposition during the Draghi government, Meloni’s party often expressed a dislike for the EU and EU policies. However, once in government, its position has changed substantially. This is particularly the case with reference to the most relevant issue the current government needs to deal with in its relations with the EU: the implementation of Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP).

It has been widely acknowledged that Italy is suffering from a significant delay in the implementation of the NRRP that is becoming more and more difficult to justify and manage. Delays have occurred as the government has failed to meet key objectives, including establishing hydrogen refuelling stations for road transport, awarding public contracts for the installation of 2,500 fast and ultra-fast charging stations for electric vehicles on motorways and at least 4,000 in urban areas, and awarding 100% of the work for kindergartens.

Reportedly, the government has only completed 7 objectives out of the 27 specified in the original document. The roadmap for the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan set 30 June as the deadline to meet 27 targets for the fourth instalment of funding, which amounts to 16 billion euros.

Moreover, there have been issues relating to the possible involvement of organised crime in the implementation of the plan. For example, the government has proposed a repeal of the offence of abuse of office, which remains an important topic, especially “at a time when billions from the NRRP are arriving and even more stringent should be the control of legality on the actions of public officials”. The abuse of office is closely linked to corruption and the repeal of this offence greatly violates the agreements between Italy, the UN and Europe, especially as even the EU in recent days has called for it not to be abolished.

The debate over justice reforms in Italy is illustrated by comments from the Democratic Party’s Walter Verini, who has stated that “to make justice work the Draghi government made the Cartabia reform, Minister Nordio rather than introducing divisive elements should commit himself to spending well the more than 3 billion that between the NRRP and the budget law have been allocated to justice, stabilise the 16,000 employees at the trial office and speed up the hiring of magistrates and chancellery staff.”

Changing relations

Considering the delays on the implementation of the plan, the European Commission’s attitude has clearly changed with regard to Italy compared to previous years as it has allowed delays in some of the projects. Thus, there is recognition that relations between the EU and Italy have perhaps warmed.

On the NRRP, Meloni is undoubtedly positive that Italy will fulfil its objectives, despite delays. Indeed, she mentions that her optimism persists “if we stop scaremongering on a strategic issue for the entire nation and which… is being exploited to attack the government. We are committed to responding to the latest requests for clarification from the Committee and I remind you that we are working on a plan written by others.”

Placing blame on the previous government seems to be a recurring narrative. In fact, Meloni has reflected on the efforts by her predecessors Giuseppe Conte and Mario Draghi, saying that “I cannot help but notice that if the painstaking work we are doing now, without any tension with the Commission, had been done upstream when the plans were presented, we could have saved a lot of time.”

So, despite the delays, the involvement of organised crime and the instances of corruption, Meloni’s government seems positive they will not only achieve the objectives in time but also that the Commission and the EU institutions are willing to be lenient towards the difficulties Italy has experienced during the implementation of its plan.

Mutual recognition

How can we explain this shift in attitudes? The reality is that the government led by Giorgia Meloni is extremely keen on keeping a good relationship with the EU and negotiating with the EU’s institutions all passages necessary to alleviate the difficulties in the implementation of the NRRP.

Leaving behind their once vehement opposition to Brussels, Meloni’s Brothers of Italy are now displaying a huge effort in achieving a harmonious management of the recovery funds. A radical right-wing party shifting from anti-EU attitudes to pro-EU ones once in office is predictable and is a trend that is well identified in the academic literature. But what is puzzling is why the EU has accepted this change of position, even to the point of appearing happy to accommodate new requests coming from Meloni’s administration.

This is partly explained by the Italian government managing to establish a role for itself in the international arena by adopting a strong pro-Ukraine and pro-NATO stance. On the other hand, it is also explained by the desire of the EU’s institutions to make their COVID-19 recovery programme a success, even if this means being more lenient towards the many vagaries in the implementation of Italy’s recovery plans.

Finally, the upcoming European Parliament elections present an incentive for the EU to keep Italy and its government content. But it remains to be seen what will happen after the elections have taken place, not least if scandals and corruption related to the implementation of the NRRP emerge and become increasingly difficult for the Italian and EU authorities to manage.

This is perhaps a story for another day. What is clear is the Italian case demonstrates not only how radical right-wing parties can drastically change their approach to the EU when they win power but also the disposition of the EU’s institutions towards them. It is this shift to a more positive form of “mutual recognition” that has characterised the relationship between Italy’s right-wing government and the EU until now.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union