As income inequality grows in the United States, who seems to care for it, and who seems not to? Francesco Duina and Cary Wu discuss how, historically, income and concern with inequality had an inverse relationship, independent of political alignment. Since 2000, that has changed, with political alignment mattering a lot more – with implications for what can be done if we wish to address those inequalities.
As most people know, economic inequality in the US has been increasing for several decades. Americans have expressed concerns about this trend. In this post, we reflect on the variables that seem to predict who has seen inequality as a problem and who has not. Those variables have shifted over time. We aim to identify those variables and what the shift means if we wish to address those inequalities.
We can start by recognising the growth in economic inequality. This can be seen in terms of personal income inequalities, as reported for instance by the Council on Foreign Relations and the US Census Bureau, differences in income between already richer urban areas and rural areas (see the recent US Department of Commerce figures), and differences in wealth (see Congressional Budget Office). As a result, the US continues to be the most unequal country in the economically advanced world. The implications for such rising inequalities are numerous and well documented – ranging from the end of the American Dream (that is, the longstanding belief that anyone can make it in the United States if they are willing to work hard) and hopes of intergenerational upward mobility, to tensions between racialised groups and major gaps in life outcomes across different socioeconomic groups.
It would stand to reason that Americans’ concern with such rising inequalities would grow over time. And, crucially, that low-income citizens in particular would show the most worries. In our recent study published in Socius (an open access journal of the American Sociological Association dedicated to the dissemination of research findings of general interest), however, we show that income levels certainly used to predict pretty well how one would feel about economic inequality in the US: the more money one made, the less they would worry about inequality. This was true regardless of political affiliation. In 1987, for instance, poorer Democrats and Republicans perceived income differentials to be too big, and that perception decreased linearly with increases in income (with richer Republicans actually thinking it was not a problem at all). Today, however, the association between class and perceptions of inequality as too big is no longer there.
Our study shows that income levels predict far less. Something else, instead, has become more predictive: political ideology. Across all income levels, those who identify as Democrats care a great deal, while those who identify themselves as Republicans – again across all income levels – care a lot less. Additionally, we note something very important when it comes to those who identify themselves as Republicans. A major reason why income levels have become less predictive for them is that concern among poorer Republicans has actually dropped over time. As income inequalities have gone up since the 1980s, this particular group of Republicans have actually grown less worried about them. We note as well a second, interesting reason: richer Republicans actually show more concern than in the past. Taken together, these two changes have decreased the relevance of income levels for Republicans, while making Republicans as a whole less worried than Democrats. The drop in concern among poorer Republicans is remarkable and invites reflection. If we are interested in addressing rising inequalities, redistributive policies are a primary tool. These include reforms to the tax code, financial support for educational opportunities, investments in skill development and job training, and daycare and healthcare affordability. Importantly, recent studies and election results show at the federal and state levels the Democratic Party losing working-class support across racial and ethnic lines. And, as they move to the Republican Party, low-income voters appear less interested in changing a situation that is damaging them economically. Three implications stem from this.
First, the Democratic Party could work much harder to regain the support of lower-income Americans. And this would mean, as our findings suggest, seeking to alter how these voters view the world. This would entail, among other things, changing their minds about the current economic picture in the US. A good place to start would be to generate more accessible data on the current realities across the country. Compelling arguments could also be made that they can, and should, expect more. Realistic, tangible plans for redistribution – with immediate and longer-term effects – would in this regard be useful. But this might not work, and it could be seen as condescending and patronizing – precisely what the party has been accused of in the past and the reason they have lost so many low-income voters.
Thus, second, the Democratic Party itself would need to change its own ideological makeup. Why has this segment of the population shifted to the Republican Party in the first place? What concerns does the GOP seem to address for them that appear to have replaced economic ones? Here, ample evidence suggests that the success of Trump and MAGA candidates boils down in large part to questions of identity, a sense of worthiness, and dignity. The Democratic Party, with its perceived elitism, has alienated these voters. If it is to win back their trust, it must offer positions and visions that reassure them of their relevance and importance. These voters must feel heard and empowered. Their anxieties – from immigration to crime and their children’s education – must be acknowledged and addressed. The Democratic Party must, in other words, find new ideas of its own – different from the GOPs, and different from what it has today. In that mix, it would also want to offer convincing arguments about the need to see income inequalities as a problem, especially for low-income citizens.
Third, we return to the observation that richer Republicans have in fact become more worried about the income gap in the country. By 2021, even the richest Republicans were concerned. This represents a remarkable shift from the 1980s and therefore also an opportunity. Are these wealthier Republicans aware that their poorer party members have actually become less worried about inequality than in years past? Would these richer Americans be interested in working with their less well-off counterparts to identify problems and possible solutions? It is unclear at the moment what the points of connections are between these two segments of the GOP base. It is quite possible that much remains unexplored.
These are some ideas. The bottom line is that some of those most affected negatively by growing inequalities see it as less of a problem than before. Change and reform are unlikely to happen in these circumstances. A shift in those mindsets thus seems like a necessary step if we wish to decrease those inequalities and the harms they bring.
All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of the Department of Sociology, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Image credit: Merril Buckhorn from Getty Images
