Lobbying is an ingrained part of US political culture. But do lobbyists come from similar racial and ethnic groups as the legislators they are trying to influence? In new research examining state-based lobbyists, James Strickland and Nathan Tarr find that in 2009, slightly more than two percent of state lobbyists were Black and nearly three and one percent were respectively Hispanic or Asian-American. Black lobbyists were found to have lost clients relative to other lobbyists over the past thirty years. They also find no apparent correlation between the election of African American, Hispanic, or Latino and Asian American legislators and lobbying groups claiming to speak for populations of these groups.

Last year more than 12,600 lobbyists were active in the US and working to influence Congress and the federal government. But who are these lobbyists? Although the racial and ethnic diversity of lobbyists in America has received interest from members of Congress and lobbyists themselves, political scientists had not measured such diversity reliably or proposed a theory for why some communities of lobbyists are more diverse than others. In new research, we measure and explain diversity among thousands of state lobbyists. Our findings have implications for representation. Although they should prove of interest to members of the public, including the members of Congress, our findings also raise new questions.

Diversity among lobbyists does not reflect the diversity of the US

For years, members of the Congressional Black Caucus have expressed concerns over a lack of racial diversity among Washington lobbyists. Members have pointed to possibly discriminatory hiring practices and a lack of viewpoint diversity, and at least one member has threatened to cut off access to lobby firms that did not hire a African American, Hispanic, or Latino and Asian American advocate. Indeed, American lobbyists are less diverse than the American people in terms of race or ethnicity. The most recent survey from 2021 found that about 17 percent of Washington lobbyists were people of color. Just under 25 percent of the overall US population is Black, Asian, American Indian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or Hispanic or Latino, or some combination of these.

Concerns over diversity among lobbyists inspired us to examine the factors that explain diversification. After all, understanding the causes of diversification would provide insight into the level of diversity among Washington lobbyists.

In our research, we proposed that interest groups hire lobbyists who resemble their legislative targets such that diversity among legislators is correlated with diversity among lobbyists. This was said to occur due to groups hiring lobbyists whom they thought could achieve access and influence most effectively. Earlier research had found that numbers of women lobbyists were correlated strongly with numbers of women legislators in the American states. We also proposed alternative explanations for levels of diversity related to the mobilization of identity groups and state-related factors such as demographic trends.

“Maryland State House – Lobbying” (CC BY 2.0) by DHuiz

Estimating diversity among communities of state lobbyists

Testing our theory required variation in diversity among communities of lobbyists, so we turned to the American states. There were no existing surveys of lobbyist demographics across the states, so we turned to a software package, wru, developed by Imai Kosuke and Kabir Khanna. By applying the software to the names of registered lobbyists, we generated estimates of the numbers of African American, Hispanic, or Latino, and Asian American lobbyists registered in each state. The software provided estimated probabilities for each lobbyist belonging to each identity, based on how often the lobbyist’s surname was shared with individuals of different backgrounds in the counties with the capitol cities of each state. By applying the software to lists of registered lobbyists spanning seven decades, we developed a picture of how diversity has changed among state lobbyists since the 1940s.

Figure 1 below shows the percentages of state lobbyists that were African American, Hispanic, or Latino, or Asian American, and the percentages of contracts (clients) those lobbyists represented. Slightly more than two percent of state lobbyists were Black in 2009 while nearly three and one percent were respectively Hispanic or Asian-American. Of note, the client share of African- and Asian-American lobbyists decreased relative to that of all other lobbyists between the late 1980s and 2009.

Figure 1 – Percent of lobbyists by race and percent of contracts represented

Figure 2 shows the percentage of lobbyists in each state belonging to the three backgrounds we examined.

Figure 2 – Percent of lobbyists by race and by US state

No link between the election of identity-based groups and lobbyists who claim to speak for them.

Our analysis revealed that the election of African American, Hispanic, or Latino and Asian American legislators was not correlated with the emergence of identity groups among lobbyists. For decades, political scientists have found that interest groups or their lobbyists form relationships with lawmakers that result in steady access and information-exchange, and the research of political scientist, Michael Minta, of the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, had suggested a link between identity-group mobilization and the presence of legislator allies. So, we were surprised to find no apparent correlation between the election of African American, Hispanic, or Latino and Asian American legislators and groups claiming to speak for populations of these groups.

Our strongest finding was that identity-based groups hired lobbyists who share the identities of their members. As examples, groups such as the National Association of Black Social Workers or Hispanic Chamber of Commerce respectively hired Black and Hispanic lobbyists. (Similar trends were found for Asian-American identity groups.) Interestingly, there was practically no overlap between the African American, Hispanic, or Latino and Asian American populations. In other words, Black lobbyists were no more or less likely to represent Hispanic or Asian-American interests than were white lobbyists. The same could be said for the other populations of lobbyists and group types.

Finally, we tested whether African American, Hispanic, or Latino and Asian American lobbyists came to represent more clients as more legislators who shared their identities were elected to office. Our findings on this front were mixed. We found no evidence for a link between the clienteles of African Americans and the election of African Americans to legislatures. We did find a link for Hispanics, but only in more consistently Democratic assemblies. (This makes sense given that 87 percent of Hispanic lawmakers are Democrats.) We also found a link for Asian-American lobbyists in general. Importantly, tenure or average years of service did not moderate or enhance any of these correlations.

Why have Black lobbyists lost clients relative to others?

Our findings raise important questions. We don’t know exactly why Black lobbyists have lost clients relative to other lobbyists over the past thirty years, but we speculate that this may be due to differences in lobbying among groups of former legislators. Former legislators often boast the most clients and our data indicated that African American former legislators were substantially less likely to lobby than former legislators from other identity groups. We cannot yet explain the difference in rates of revolving.

Perhaps most noteworthy: the failure of interest groups to hire Black lobbyists more often in response to the election of Black people to state legislatures suggests a lack of responsiveness to electoral trends or even unwillingness to diversify lobby staff. We encourage others to examine these questions more closely.

• This article is based on the paper, ‘Diversity for Access? Legislative Diversity, Identity Group Mobilization, and Lobbying’, in the Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics. 
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• Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor the London School of Economics. 
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