Anthropologists have often explained human behaviour as though people predictably act in their own interests. But in Against Better Judgment, Patrick McKearney and Nicholas H. A. Evans compile research on the contradictory and commonplace phenomenon of “akrasia”, whereby individuals decide against the best course of action. Highlighting akrasia’s complexity and its implications in clinical, religious and wider social contexts, this rich, eclectic volume will be of interest to anthropologists, philosophers and psychologists alike, writes Lenhardt Stevens.
You bought cigarettes when you said you wouldn’t. You went onto social media when you said you’d quit. You skipped the gym after vowing to get in shape. These examples of modern-day akrasia (choosing x when we believe y is better, all things considered) reveal a persistent psychological and moral quandary: our propensity to do what we believe we should not. When Plato used the term in the Protagoras, Socrates rejected the notion outright, saying that it was only ever possible for someone to believe that the action they were performing was good, even if they later regret it. Aristotle disagreed, saying akrasia is an actual mental phenomenon. Conceptually, akrasia has the unfortunate role of being both controversial to define and to locate. One thing for sure is that cross-culturally, many of us are doing what we believe is not in our best interest.
Cross-culturally, many of us are doing what we believe is not in our best interest
Patrick McKearney and Nicholas H.A. Evans’s latest edited volume, Against Better Judgment: Akrasia in Anthropological Perspectives, demonstrates how various cultures, communities and societies have manifested these issues. As it turns out, akrasia is not only generalisable across different cultures but can be built into the cultural walls, so to speak, for how certain institutions are perpetuated. I was tempted to keep score on how each author used the term akrasia, including how many believed it was possible in the Aristotelian sense and how many opted for alternative definitions. Ultimately, I settled on two major schools throughout the collection, one believing that akrasia was internal to the individual and the other that it was external in how an individual interacts with the expressed aims of particular organisations or even particular selves.
Two major schools […] one believing that akrasia was internal to the individual and the other that it was external in how an individual interacts with the expressed aims of particular organisations or even particular selves.
The collection is eclectic, which is part of its charm but also a feature that threatens to overwhelm the discussion. Rebecca L. Lester and Darin Weinberg’s discussions on eating disorders and addiction, respectively, make for essential reading in this volume. In particular, Lester’s focus on the phenomenology of bulimia invites an account of akrasia that highlights several distinct issues in the literature. She posits that some patients describe the triggering mechanism for eating disorders as a separate will rather than a mere competing desire. The inference is that every individual has exactly one will and that eating disorders feel as if someone else is behind the wheel. In like manner, Weinberg argues that his addiction research impinges on several popular theories in philosophy, including Henden’s dual process theory of addiction. Weinberg’s contribution is particularly apt for phenomenological investigations into addiction, which some theorists may neglect from the armchair.
The pivot from the clinical setting to the church comes from Saint Paul’s usage of the term in his letters. In 1 Corinthians 7:5, Saint Paul uses akrasian to mean something more like lack of control rather than the presence of competing wills. The psychological lineage back to Aristotle is apparent, but Jon Bialecki argues that the Fallenness identified in Paul and ritualised in Charismatic Christian communities becomes “a term which…could be glossed as a…inescapable, akratic condition” (92). Simply put, our wills are too weak to modify, and we cannot help but sin. Fatalism regarding our efforts to reform our wills becomes inflected with theological justifications. It was by this essay that I began to see, even for the internalists in the volume, the differences over akrasia’s meaning emanate from accounting for what mental furniture would allow us to do what we will.
[endemic] akrasia is not limited to the collection of beliefs internal to the individual but the inconsistencies we find in the expressed views of institutions or social structures.
Ethnographic studies try to find how the behaviour in the communities they study fits together rationally. When it fails the rationality test, we get “endemic akrasia.” The thought is that akrasia is not limited to the collection of beliefs internal to the individual but the inconsistencies we find in the expressed views of institutions or social structures. In the case of the caste system of Nepal, even though a Nepali may disagree with its practices, Ivan Deschenaux found the treatment of Dalits and their “untouchability” to be irretrievably part of Nepalese social relations. These collective action problems of gaining enough momentum to abolish an immoral cultural practice warrant further investigation into what other desires individuals who make up that group may have. For example, it may be that preserving culture outweighs the desire to treat others fairly. No invocation of akrasia would be required. These issues related to individual and social epistemology are not limited to Deschenaux in this volume. Still, they must be resolved to clarify what agency, if any, individuals and groups have to alleviate akratic thinking. One immediate suggestion is to distinguish between institutional demands and the psychologies of their members. Even if I disagree with traffic laws, I may observe them, but this does not make my relationship to the law akratic. Some of this conceptual blurriness must be clarified before it can exist as a report of a genuine epistemic phenomenon.
The editors’ primary challenge was how the philosophical literature surrounding akrasia is meant to interact with the anthropological literature. In the introduction, the editors refer to work by Peter Singer and Donald Davidson, two giants in the history of philosophical literature on akrasia. Recent work by Brian Weatherson on normative externalism impinges on many of these questions of where the beliefs are and what rational behaviour is. Patrick McKearney’s paper on “relational akrasia” moves the term to apply to the relationship between two people. He thinks akrasia may only be possible given some kinds of relationship. The previous care in making akrasia ostensibly about an individual’s psychology is on less sure footing when other individuals’ competing interests are brought into the overall cognitive picture.
Most normative approaches toward akrasia include aspiring toward its elimination, but collections like this give credence to the idea that akrasia is a mental phenomenon that greases the wheels of daily life.
These anthropological perspectives in akrasia do well to illustrate both the ubiquity of the phenomenon and the need to continue to collect cases of akratic human behaviour. Most normative approaches toward akrasia include aspiring toward its elimination, but collections like this give credence to the idea that akrasia is a mental phenomenon that greases the wheels of daily life. In other words, akratic thinking allows us to move through myriad decisions with limited resistance. Contradicting ourselves is the stuff that keeps us participating in social organisations while our individuality continues to assert itself. Whichever formulation of akrasia one is working with, the strength of its accuracy rests on how well we capture the phenomenon as we witness it. Philosophers, psychologists, and anthropologists alike have something to gain here.
- This review first appeared at LSE Review of Books.
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- Note: This article gives the views of the reviewer, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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