Greece has been at the sharp end of the European financial crisis for many months, and faces huge difficulties in implementing the austerity measures demanded by the EU in order to ensure continued bailouts. Sofia Vasilopoulou and Daphne Halikiopoulou argue that Greece’s two party system, currently dominated by patronage and corruption, must make finding economic solutions futile. And the old Greek party system is splintering as voters grow disillusioned. So political reform is badly needed before the country’s economic recovery can begin.
As Greece receives yet another EU funding bailout, the prime question remains – To what extent will the country be able to overcome its overwhelming economic problems? Can it deliver on the Eurozone’s requirement to reduce its public debt to 120.5% of GDP by 2020? Greece’s capacity to overcome the current economic crisis rests on its ability to tackle the endemic cartelisation and corruption present in the current Greek political system. Already, voters are moving away from the larger parties that have dominated the political scene since 1977. But this may also bring about a potentially worrying swing towards the parties of the far right and far left.
Whether Greece can implement significant economic reforms is primarily a political issue and the outcomes achieved will depend largely on party politics. More specifically, there is a trade-off between providing economic solutions on the one hand and retaining political accountability on the other. Most modern democratic systems tend to be characterised by an adversarial government and opposition dynamic, whereby each party represents the interests of their voters. In clientelistic systems, such as the Greek polity, however, this dynamic is lost. This is because the voter-party relationships tend to be mediated by corruption.
In Greece, examples of historical divisions between clearly defined social groups are limited and the distinguishing line between them is blurry. It does not necessarily cut along lines of socio-demographic characteristics. What tends to define voting patterns is that Greek voters choose parties not on the basis of ideological and/or class divisions, but rather on the capacity and willingness of the party to provide patronage, i.e. to operate a spoils system where government-allocated benefits or ‘rents’ of various kinds all depend on a person or family having political connections.
For example, the government job market is often governed by nepotism, with job posts often opened up in the public sector so as to serve voters of the two main parties, known in Greece as the ‘green’ (PASOK) and ‘blue’ (New Democracy) children respectively. There is widespread lack of transparency in public affairs and increased levels of corruption in competition bids for the purchase of materials intended for state owned utilities and welfare purposes, such as defence equipment, telecommunications and health.
This system of politically-flavoured favouritism is reinforced by the nature of the Greek two-party system, where the centre-left PASOK and centre-right New Democracy alternate in government and together make up a very large percentage of the parliamentary seats. In the 2009 elections the two parties together accumulated 77.4 percent of the vote, translated into 251 seats out of a total of 300. This result does indicate a small decline from previous years – for example, in the 2004 and 2000 elections, the two parties gathered over 85 percent of the votes cast, taking up respectively 282 and 283 parliamentary seats. However, as Figure 1 shows, it is clearly the case that since the end of the dictatorship in the 1970s PASOK and New Democracy have between them monopolised Greek politics.
Figure 1: PASOK and New Democracy election results 1977-2009
This pattern has long sustained a cartel party system, characterised by a division between the two mainstream ‘cartel’ parties that dominate the political scene in terms of votes, partly because they alone have access to the ‘rents’ of office. Meanwhile the non-mainstream parties receive only a small percentage of the votes cast and have very limited political clout.
As a result, the solution of economic problems becomes a political issue with deeply embedded systemic roots. In order to tackle the economic crisis, the dominant parties must implement measures directed towards public sector cuts and tax evasion among others. Yet, in order to do this, they first need to tackle corruption at its core. They also must address a number of systemic failures, including:
- limited competition in many product markets,
- a distorted tax system,
- widespread tax evasion,
- a high and corrupt level of red tape that curtails competition, and
- the existence of much ineffective legislation which makes illegal rents attractive.
However, the implementation of any of the above policies runs flatly counter to party cartelisation incentives, because such measures are bound to hinder the future political and electoral opportunities of the cartel.
Recent opinion polls suggest a general political disillusionment amongst the Greek public and an increasing fragmentation of the party system. Figure 2 below shows that a recent opinion poll places PASOK at its lowest ever level of 8 percent support (reflecting its being in government as the crisis deepened), and New Democracy at 31 percent. Smaller parties are faring better in comparison to previous years, including the radical left-wing parties KKE at 12.5 per cent and SYRIZA at 12 percent, and the radical right-wing party LAOS at 5 percent. Interestingly, 18 percent of the respondents intend to vote the newly established ‘Democratic Left’.
Figure 2: 2009 election results and February 2012 public issue survey on vote intention
* Lighter colour is 2009 election percentage of vote share; darker colour is 2012 voter intention
Other smaller groups are also on the rise, for example the neo-fascist Golden Dawn has an alarming 3 percent support, which is the threshold for winning seats and entering the Greek parliament (see Figure 2 above). Quite clearly, voting preferences indicate a trend towards partisan dealignment, a collapse of the PASOK party (at least in the short term), the fragmentation of the left and the rise of right-wing extremism.
Greek elites have exhibited a continued inability to tackle the country’s economic problems, despite increasing political and social unrest. In the end it is this tension between successful economic solutions and retaining political accountability that defines Greek politics. Solving this problem would require a long-term process of detachment from patronage and clientelism, a reform that is not simply institutional, but would entail more deeply rooted generational and systemic changes. If the Greek socio-political system does not detach itself from cartelisation, and if voting behaviour continuous to be based on ‘rent-seeking’ and favouritism, achieving an economic solution to what is fundamentally a political problem will remain a futile task.
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Sofia Vasilopoulou – University of York
Sofia Vasilopoulou is a Lecturer at the University of York. She was previously a Fellow in Comparative Political Analysis in the School of Public Policy, University College London, and a Teaching Associate in Politics at Aston University, UK. She has taught extensively modules on Comparative Politics and Government, European Union politics, Political Parties, Political Economy and Quantitative methods. She is the Editor (with Daphne Halikiopoulou) of Nationalism and Globalisation: Conflicting or Complementary? (Routledge, 2011).
Daphne Halikiopoulou – LSE Government Department
Daphne Halikiopoulou is Fellow in Comparative Politics in LSE’s Department of Government. She obtained her PhD from the LSE in 2007. Her area of expertise is in comparative European politics, British politics and qualitative methodology. Her research focuses on the sociology of religion, nationalism and its relationship with the extreme right and extreme left, immigration and the criteria for inclusion in the nation. She is author of Patterns of Secularization: Church, state and Nation in Greece and the Republic of Ireland (Ashgate, 2010) and (with Sofia Vasilopoulou) of Nationalism and Globalisation: Conflicting or Complementary? (Routledge, 2011).
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[…] • 翻墙必读• 科学上网• 防火长城• 墙外导航(整理中)• 禁书禁片• 禁片目录• 禁书列表• 有关部门• 中宣部• 国新办• 网络监控• 国保警察• 真理部• 真理部指令• 敏感词库• 河蟹档案• 五毛大观• 网络审查• 布鸣真象• 马勒戈壁• 网络民议• 时政漫画• 麻辣总局• 热传视频• 歌曲精选• 草泥马语• 民主宪政• 人权记录• 天安门母亲• 良心犯• 异议人士• 国家安全罪• 强制堕胎• 结石宝宝• 黑监狱• 维权律师• 政治改革• 新闻自由• 司法独立• 宗教自由• 更多专题• 食品安全• 强制拆迁• 新疆• 西藏• 南海• 香港• 台湾• 朝鲜• 中美关系• 中俄关系• 中日关系• 中印关系 香港獨立媒體 | 別以希臘退休金太優厚來嚇人 原文 大部份香港人一聽到「全民退休保障」,就會想到「大鑊飯」,「全民派錢」會打消人們儲蓄意欲,依賴福利。然後,總會想到希臘民眾上街,抗議政府加稅,減少退休金和失業救濟等開源節流措施。這是福利主義的惡果。這種解釋無疑過份簡化希臘政治經濟危機的因果關係。危機爆發,是多種國外和國內因素互相扣連。筆者並非有獨到見解,只從不同的評論和研究文章歸納一些原因。圖一:希臘國債和歐盟27國國債佔國內生產總值(GDP)的比例(2000至2011年,歐羅)綠色:歐盟27國 藍色:希臘 圖片來源:Eurostat,2012先說國內因素。最重要的一個是希臘根深蒂固的政治主從關係(patron-client relationship)。縱使希臘有著數千年的歷史,這個國家經歷大大小小的整合和分離,是多民族國家,也有城鄉之別。1974年,獨裁政權終結,中央政府之後選擇投放大量資源到地方,確保維持體制,同時保證統治階層能夠延續。其中一個策略是擴大公共部門,讓更多人當政府工,又擴大福利開支(縱使未追得上北歐國家,因為部分留給家庭承擔),但又不大幅增加富人和企業稅收,並且容忍大量逃稅,結果就向外借款。有評論指過往二三十年的希臘國民,在選舉時不以意識型態或/和階級投票給政黨,而是政黨有多大能力和意願提供主從關係,即跟政府有關的利益,取決於個人或家庭的連繫。撇除今年,泛希臘社會運動黨和新民主黨長期共佔去七成以上的選票。然後簡述國外因素。希臘加入歐元區是主要原因。加入初期,受惠於歐羅良好的信貸評級,希臘容易發債,而2004年雅典奧運,國家又再借錢。然而,始終希臘的競爭力較德國等成員國低,不能以出口貿易減少國家赤字,加上國家失去自主財政能力,不能自行貶值貨幣,財赤問題就一直惡化。直至金融海嘯,其他國家紛紛「關水喉」,不願借錢,以致希臘缺乏資金。圖二:希臘的退休年齡跟歐洲其他國家的相若。 圖片來源:Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos,2012真的跟福利,尤其是退休金制度沒有關係?有學者批評希臘改革前的退休金制度,未能達致世代間和同代的資源再分配,而制度也對專業人士、公營部門僱員、固定職業人士有利得多。經濟合作及發展組織(OECD)去年的報告指出,希臘退休人士可以領回最後工作薪金的95.7%,比歐盟27國的62.9%的高。另外,在2007年,希臘的退休金開支佔政府開支的26.3%,比OECD的16.5%為高。2010年,希臘政府改革退休金制度,配合緊縮開支,包括整合不同退休金計劃,減少退休金額,例如減少金額,向退休金徵稅,減少政府退休金開支,下調提早退休人士的退休金等。最大的轉變是計算方法。由2015年起,政府固定每月發放基本金額,其餘的就根據國民參與社會保險年期,工作年期總收入不平均,以及回報率(accrual rates)計算,即由供款決定。這有別於過往幾乎全由政府支付,以及只計算退休前五年收入的方法。改革目的,是減少政府在退休金的開支,增加退休年齡國民繼續工作誘因(縱使希臘人平均退休年齡並非過早),以及拉近不同社會階層在退休金受益的差異。然後,是政府為了爭取歐盟注資救國,嚴格限制政府開支。剛在十月,國會通過公共資產私有化,減少公共部門開支,削福利和退休金,以換取國際貨幣基金會,歐盟和歐洲中央銀行未來兩年共115億歐羅貸款。這還未計算之前過百億歐羅的貸款。然後,是民眾不滿把金融海嘯的責任推在他們身上,批評財政緊縮措施是政府不向人民負責任,也即是破壞主從關係。筆者只是初步了解希臘債務危機的起因,也相信上文只是眾多原因一部份。篇幅所限,有太多嚇人的情節只能跳過,例如希臘為了加入歐盟,竟然造假,把入歐盟前三年的財赤佔GDP比例修改至3%以下。再者,筆者不願跳進一些很難有答案的討論,例如希臘人每周工作時數跟工作效率是否相關。本文強調的,是希臘政府和人民深知國家債務越來越多,而政府不會有足夠財政能力滿足人民(包括退休金),但希臘進入歐盟,令國家容易伸手取得貸款應付財政,間接減低政府和政黨改革經濟的迫切性,也維持了劣質的政治主從關係。國家至今仍然相當依賴旅遊業和造船業──兩項極受外圍經濟影響的行業。即使是農業,人們也把生產收益,購買樓房汽車,而非改善產品質素。希臘的福利開支還不夠北歐的優厚,而退休金制度演變至此,是政府籠絡公務員和專業人士,形成主從關係的結果。香港政府的債務甚少,財政充裕,而民間提議的全民養老金制度,並不會優待個別行業僱員,而且包含僱主僱員供款,並非全由稅收支出。讀者可以質疑全民養老金的供款能否延續,而且可以舉出其他國家和地區例子的問題,警惕香港不要重轁覆徹,但請不要以「希臘龐大的退休金開支拖垮了國家財政」這個極度片面的說法來嚇怕大眾。主題圖片來源:0neiros/cc本文由自动聚合程序取自网络,内容和观点不代表数字时代立场 墙外新闻实时更新 欢迎订阅数字时代 […]
[…] been fostered by society at large, not just by an inept or corrupt few. Clientelism, rousfetti, corruption, bribery, non-transparency, the rejection of meritocracy: each of these involves reciprocal […]
[…] who looks. Greece has a lot of well-recognized economic problems: Its public sector is bloated and marred by corruption, and many analysts say that the country cooked its books to hide the real amount of debt from the […]