This year’s European Parliament election has been noteworthy both for the rise of Euroscepticism and the introduction of leading candidates for European Commission president put forward by some of the European political parties. Anthony Salamone argues that the European Council should freely choose its own nominee for Commission president in cooperation with the Parliament, rather than automatically selecting the top leading candidate. He suggests that the absence of a legal basis for the process, limited choice among the candidates, low turnout and lack of interest in both the candidates and broader European issues renders it illegitimate, and instead the Council and Parliament should work together to reach a mutual compromise.
This time it’s different, said the European Parliament in its enthusiastic promotion of the 2014 European election. Indeed, this time is different – following the election results, the European Council and the European Parliament are on the brink of an institutional showdown which may well descend into the abyss over the selection of the next President of the European Commission.
In the past, the EU’s Member States, in the form of the European Council, nominated the Commission President, with this nomination being ‘approved’ by the Parliament. Once the entire Commission had been appointed and its individual members subject to confirmation hearings in parliamentary committees, the European Parliament would vote on the whole group en bloc. The current procedure remains largely the same. However, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, added one new, and presently highly contested, element: that the President should be ‘elected’ (rather than approved) by the Parliament and that this should take account of the results of the European Parliament elections.
The outcome of the European Parliament elections, now aligned with the term of the European Commission, should be reflected in the choice of Commission President. As a result, Article 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union now reads that, ‘Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission…’
It would seem redundant to note the European Council must select a candidate with the election results in mind. Apparently it is not, for the European Parliament at least. It decided to interpret this obligation on the part of Member States to take the election into account as a license for its political parties to propose their own candidates for Commission President. The idea was that each party should have a leading candidate (frequently called by its German name, Spitzenkandidat) and after the election the European Council should simply nominate the designated candidate from the party with the greatest number of seats.
The concept of leading candidates was invented by the European Parliament Secretariat in cooperation with some of the European political parties. In the end, parties from five of the seven political groups in the outgoing Parliament – the centre-right EPP, the centre-left PES/S&D, the centre ALDE, the Greens and the European Left – stood candidates. The centre-right ECR and the right EFD did not participate, nor of course did the Independents. This process is not provided for in the treaties nor was it agreed with the Member States in legislation.
The candidates engaged in campaigning across much, but not all, of the EU, including participating in debates, notably those organised by Euronews and the European Broadcasting Union. The UK barely featured on their itineraries, which was mostly attributed to the fact the EPP has no British party in it since the Conservatives left in 2009 and Labour, part of the PES, decided not to back the party’s candidate. In any case, most voters across the EU had little idea who the candidates were before Election Day.
This unilateral move by the European Parliament and some of the political parties appears to have had two main goals. The first was to make the election more interesting for voters by allegedly giving them a direct say on the next Commission President, thereby increasing voter turnout, which has been declining ever since direction elections began in 1979. The second was to ensure that the Parliament would have the greatest influence possible in selecting the Commission President. The message was that people should come out to vote to choose the President. It didn’t work.
An illegitimate and ineffective process
The argument on the part of the Parliament and the participating political parties was both disingenuous and misleading to voters. Four principle factors are at play here. First, as stated, no legal basis exists mandating that the Commission President be proposed from nominations by the Parliament or its parties. More to the point, it was never agreed in advance, even on an informal basis, with the Member States. The European Council maintains the prerogative of nomination and national leaders guard this power closely, so it should be no surprise to anyone that they have not rushed to appoint the candidate of the winning political party.
Second, voters suffered from a substantial lack of choice among the candidates. The top three contenders, the EPP’s Jean-Claude Juncker, the PES’s Martin Schulz, and ALDE’s Guy Verfohstadt, all share broadly the same views both on issues and how they should be addressed. They all favour more European integration to address the EU’s biggest challenges. Indeed, they are all Brussels veterans, certainly with a great deal of experience, but not necessarily with an outsider’s perspective. It’s extremely difficult to argue convincingly that offering the public a choice between candidates who share so much in common on policy and priorities is really much of a choice at all.
Third, the initiative didn’t increase voter turnout. It was 43 per cent across the EU in 2009, and it remained virtually the same in 2014. In the UK, turnout was 35 per cent in 2009 and 36 per cent in 2014. The prospect of voting to select the Commission President appears to have had little to no impact on persuading people to vote or abstain. It was always going to be a challenge – attempting to reach 400 million voters across 28 countries in (at least) 24 different languages in a period of a few months. Nevertheless, presuming the Parliament wishes to repeat this process next time, it’s highly optimistic to say that this was a good start.
Fourth, the European issues which rather naturally ran through the debate are not what most voters care about when choosing their MEPs. European parliament elections are seen as a national election based on national and local issues. They are frequently used to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with parties in government. Very little has shown the 2014 election to be any different. Even the one transnational trend – Euroscepticism – had little to do with the EU itself. It derives from national concerns within individual Member States on issues such as the economy, jobs and immigration.
How the next President of the Commission should be selected
What should the European Council do then? It should take the election results into account and work with the European Parliament. From the Council’s perspective, the logic runs that, since the centre-right has the most seats in the Parliament, it should likely chose a Commission President from the centre-right. This doesn’t preclude a compromise candidate from the centre-left or the centre, depending on the discussions with the Parliament. The Council is well within its prerogative not to select Juncker, or for that matter any of the other leading candidates. Considering the content of the treaties, the pure invention of the concept, the limited choice, low turnout and obvious lack of interest, it is unfounded to suggest that nominating someone else is in any way undemocratic.
The European Council and the European Parliament will have to work together to agree a new Commission President. It could go smoothly, with both institutions striking a deal in the first instance. It could equally result in a protracted struggle, particularly if the Parliament continues to demand that a leading candidate be selected. It’s difficult to see the Council moving much on this issue itself, as many national leaders defend their right to choose the presidential nominee. At the same time, of all the individuals interested in the job, presumably none of them would like to be nominated first without a deal in place, only to be shot down by the Parliament in an act of defiance.
Technically the Council only needs a qualified majority to nominate the Commission President, but it is highly unlikely that an institution which infinitely prefers consensus will bypass strong national objections. It’s almost inconceivable that it would propose a Commission President over the objections of a big Member State, such as the UK. Trading may well be involved to reach a compromise – for instance, in exchange for a more favourable Commission President, the UK may have to accept a downgraded portfolio in the incoming Commission.
The European Council should not feel obliged to choose any of the leading candidates as President of the European Commission. The Council’s clear role is to nominate the President, for approval by the Parliament. Such an arrangement inevitably requires negotiation and compromise between the two institutions. The treaties make them more or less equal on the matter. If the Council can only accept the candidates the Parliament dictates, they are certainly not equal.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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Anthony Salamone – London School of Economics and Political Science
Anthony Salamone is a Master’s student in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He will start a PhD focusing on UK territorial politics in autumn 2014. His research interests include European integration, UK devolution and comparative politics. Follow him on Twitter: @AMSalamone
The point is that it’s not about a legal basis. As I’ve shown in my recent post on the matter, the (open) legal basis isn’t so different compared to other European countries, and the process – both the choice of leading candidates and the debate about who really should get it – isn’t either.
So the debate is not about legal bases, because the legal basis is open enough to allow a Spitzenkandidaten-process. In reality, it’s a political debate about what kind of European politics one wants.
The fact that the opinions of leading candidates were so similar isn’t unknown in national elections either where parties fight for the centre, and with European Political Parties integrating a range of national parties the tendency for the European centre seems only natural. In the end, the person selected will actually have to work towards compromises, so the fact that no extremely different candidate has been chosen may actually reflect the reality of EU politics (for the moment).
I should also not that most of the members of the European Council activily campaigned with or for their party families top candidate, implicitly accepting the process at least pre-elections, at least for the public eyes.
I’m not saying that one of the Spitzenkandidaten has to become Commission President, but any argumentation in favour or against them is not about law but about politics, about what kind of political process one prefers. And that either process is well-known in national systems with coalition governments, too.
The author is badly wrong in his analysis. He denies almost every aspect of a usual democracy. The full explanation on the Euroblog kielspratineurope.eu
“Why @AMSalamone is badly wrong at @LSEEuroppblog on the current battle about the EC President”
http://kielspratineurope.eu/?p=1797
Thanks for reading my article and for your replies.
@ Ronny Patz
I happen to think that the legal base is important – but it’s not the only part of this debate. I’ve said that the treaties do not specifically require a process of leading candidates, where the Council merely formally appoints the Parliament’s nominee. This is important for the fact that the EU, as a multilateral organisation, is based on the conferral of powers and on the procedures outlined in its treaties. Since the EU is made up of a number of states with distinct constitutional practices (admittedly with some commonalities), it does not follow that a process could simply be inferred based upon national traditions. In the same respect, nation state practices can’t be simply grafted on to the EU and be expected to turn into an instant success, particularly where there is no consensus.
All the same, leaving the treaties aside, critical problems remain. As I’ve argued in my article (cf 9th paragraph), the Member States and the EU institutions could have reached an informal understanding or an inter-institutional agreement on the selection of the Commission President – they did not do so. There was no mutual agreement on this process in advance. Naturally, the question goes beyond law and into politics. Process, however, is just as important as politics.
With respect to the choice of candidates, I agree that it’s common for large parties to converge on the centre. In this case, the top candidates did converge, but not on the centre of the spectrum of EU integration. They all agree that the EU’s problems should be solved through more integration – that is not a centrist viewpoint. Moreover, the differences between them are quite small, even by comparison with national politicians – at least on the question of how the EU should address the challenges it faces.
Even leaving that aside too, we know that most people couldn’t recognise any of the candidates. A number of polls have demonstrated this, including one (http://goo.gl/cIeK63) conducted in 15 Member States during the time of the election in which only 13% of people could name a single candidate. If over 85% of the public hasn’t got a clue who the candidates are, it’s hard to say the idea of electing the EC President this way was a success.
The fact that some Member States’ leaders campaigned is certainly noteworthy. However, such a massive change and an important process as this can’t be justified simply on the basis of passive acceptance by a number of national leaders. That’s not how the EU works nor how it should work.
All of these factors progressively build a picture of a process which lacks legitimacy. However laudatory the notion of the electing the Commission President might be, it surely cannot be based on an absence of agreement and a dramatically uninformed public. Legitimacy derives not from what something is supposed to be, but how it is perceived by people. If the Member States clearly wanted the leading candidate process as offered by the Parliament, they could have very easily put it directly in the treaties. They didn’t. The Council and Parliament could have reached an (informal) agreement on the matter. They didn’t do that either.
In order for the leading candidate concept to be successful, it requires (1) agreement between the EU institutions and the Member States on the basis of broad consensus and (2) that the public be well informed on the facts and the process. Neither was the case. So, what should they do then? As I’ve argued, the Council and the Parliament should work together to reach a mutual compromise. If the Commission President is ever elected, directly or indirectly, it must be based on consensus and public understanding.
@ Karsten Lucke
I’ve written a comprehensive reply in response to your blog post, explaining why I am not wrong. It is here: http://goo.gl/cgk7oc and reproduced below:
[Hi Karsten,
It’s great to see that you’ve read through my article. Thanks for your reply to it. I’d like to respond to the criticisms you’ve raised. You’ve got seven quotes and replies, so I’ll take them in the same order.
(1) The idea of leading candidates. It’s very clear that the entire concept of leading candidates was thought up by the European Parliament, with the participation of most of the political parties. The procedure was not set out, directly or indirectly, in the treaties, nor was it agreed with the Member States. This is fundamentally important. Unlike in nation states, everything is the EU does must be based in the treaties. In order to have a credible process, there must be consensus among the Member States and the EU institutions – and it was clear from the start that such consensus did not exist.
(2) Not knowing the candidates. Leaving process aside, how can candidates be legitimate when voters do not know who they are? One poll (http://goo.gl/cIeK63) around the time of election showed that only 13% of people in 15 EU countries could name ANY of the candidates. If people were voting for Commission President, not recognising the candidates’ names is a major problem. Regardless of whose fault it is or isn’t, this simply can’t be brushed aside under the guise of lack of interest. It’s also clear matters weren’t helped by the candidates not campaigning in some countries, such as Spain and the UK.
(3) Legal basis. The TEU says that the Council proposes the Commission President and the Parliament elects, having considered the election results. It does not say that the Council shall appoint the Parliament’s chosen candidate. If such a process was agreed between the Member States and the Parliament, then that’s fine. But it wasn’t. In fact, several Member States have objected to the idea ever since it came about.
(4) Lack of choice among candidates. If people were voting for the EC President candidates (and it’s evident most voters were not), they would have had top choice between three leaders who have remarkably similar approaches on how they would wish to confront the EU’s challenges. At the same time, the relationship between the leading candidates and their parties’ MEPs is nothing like the link between national party leaders and their parliamentarians. It is beyond doubt that the choice of Commission President must indeed reflect the election outcome. It does not mean the President must be a leading candidate.
(5) Voter turnout. A clear indicator that the leading candidate experiment was working would have been an increased voter turnout. In fact, that was one of the main aims – to motivate people to vote. Despite the effort, turnout was almost exactly the same EU-wide as the last election. Clearly, the leading candidates did not motivate voters (which makes sense, considering polls show they didn’t know who they were). Any legitimacy which might have existed for the process evaporates in the face of this. It would be deeply concerning if voter turnout was very low in a national election – and if 92% of people didn’t know the top party leader, that leader too would certainly lack legitimacy.
(6) Issues voters decide on. The reasons why voters don’t see European elections as a separate vote on European issues are many. I’m not going to try to defend them. However, pretending that’s not the case will not somehow make the election more focused. Legitimacy derives not from what something is supposed to be, but how it is perceived. Most voters do not see the European elections as important and they mostly vote on national and local issues. While this is regrettable, it does not mean this fact can be simply ignored.
(7) Selection process. The European Council and the European Parliament both have a role in deciding the European Commission President. While it may be desirable to have an EC President who is chosen by the Parliament and only appointed as a formality by the Council (like in many parliamentary systems), that it not what the treaty says, nor is that what was agreed. It is fundamentally important that the correct legal process is followed. The Council is free to nominate a leading candidate if it wants, but it is not obliged to. The Parliament may also block any nominee who is not a leading candidate, if it wants. This is why I’ve argued that both institutions must work together in a spirit of cooperation.
I should point out that I don’t have a particular problem with electing the European Commission President. I’m much more concerned about the process rather than the concept. In order for the EC President to be elected and for this to be legitimate, the process for doing so must be agreed in advance between the EU institutions and the Member States on the basis of broad consensus. It clearly wasn’t. The public must also be well informed on the facts and the process. It also certainly wasn’t.
It’s highly likely that we won’t agree on this. It was kind of you to the take the time to read my article and to set out your points against it.
Also, I’m not British. It’s a bit amusing that you’ve assumed so. I’ve simply written in English on a UK-based blog.
Best wishes,
Anthony]
Hello!
May I remind you that Elect is stronger than Nominate…the EP elects the president and does not simply approve….as the EP is the last to decide on whom to elect,it would be better for the council to accept the wishes of the parliament,as the latter can potentially veto the council’s nomination again and again…anyway WE,the European demos, want to decide who is the presdident ! So better get used to our wishes!
Thank you!