One of the most common arguments during the Eurozone crisis was that states required greater levels of political integration to help stabilise their economies. However, as Arthur Borriello and Amandine Crespy write, the crisis also witnessed a shift toward more intergovernmental forms of decision-making centred on the European Council. They note that the EU is now caught between competing narratives which simultaneously advocate ‘less Europe’ and ‘more Europe’, and that with the refugee crisis generating similar paradoxical positions, it is time for national governments to articulate a consistent vision for the future of the integration process.
At first, the crisis of the Eurozone revived the debate on federalism in the EU: a debate that had seemed to be at a standstill since the dramatic failure of the constitutional adventure launched in 2000 with the European Convention and which abruptly ended with the failed ratification referendums in France and the Netherlands.
Since the main problem of the Eurozone was deemed to be its incomplete construction, the only way out was more integration. However, while several measures have been taken to tighten macro-economic policy in significant ways, it quickly became clear that no federal ‘leap’ would happen. For a long time, European citizens have identified the EU as being part of the problem rather than the solution.
The same double movement can now be observed with the refugee crisis. Although a federal leap remains highly unpopular, the EU has nevertheless been prompted to act. This ambivalent process is not entirely new and used to be called ‘integration by stealth’ by academics. But the more politicised EU issues have become, the more problematic this method has appeared. In several respects, today’s EU seems to be on the verge of political disintegration.
In a recent study, we illustrate that the main problem is what we term the ‘double discourse’ of national leaders, which has exacerbated the EU’s legitimacy problem. Our analysis starts from the perspective that the current state of EU politics and policy making is unsustainable. As the EU is likely to transform itself radically in the years to come, national leaders will have no choice but to elaborate a consistent narrative for justifying the place of their country in Europe and the choices which will have to be made. Whether they like it or not, federalism will remain the elephant in the room.
The emergence of the paradoxical EU which we know today goes back to the post-Maastricht era. Many scholars of EU integration consider Maastricht as the moment which woke up public opinions, marking the end of the so called ‘permissive consensus’ which had existed prior to the treaty. The qualitative steps toward Economic and Monetary Union, and the fiscal constraints it involved, generated a new body of criticism that sought to protect national sovereignty. The 1990s witnessed a corresponding rise in Eurosceptic movements.
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks have previously suggested the EU has entered a ‘post-functional’ era. In spite of functional pressure to pursue integration, notably due to globalisation, the spillover effect that translates such pressure into action appears to have slowed considerably. In the face of popular opposition and the electoral successes of Eurosceptic parties, national leaders have become increasingly creative in their attempts to avoid new transfers of competences to Brussels, for example by inventing the open method of coordination. The political side of Economic and Monetary Union therefore never came to pass, and the failure to ratify the European Constitutional Treaty stopped federal ambitions in their tracks.
But the Europe of Jean Monnet – that of functional integration and pooled sovereignty in specific policy areas – has not died. The crisis of the Eurozone shed light on this paradoxical EU, which can be seen as both functional and post-functional. While hostility among European leaders and peoples has rarely been as acute, the common institutions of the EU (the Commission and European Parliament in particular) have been sidelined by the intergovernmental turn during the crisis and a new kind of politics focused on European Council summits.
At the same time, a brand of implacable functional logic during the crisis has led to a new form of centralisation: fiscal discipline, budget coordination, intrusion in the realm of social policy, banking union. We can also foresee that the current refugee crisis will lead, sooner or later, to an EU migration policy which is more integrated than ever before.
In the face of this functional/post-functional paradox, national leaders have adopted a highly ambivalent discourse in order to legitimise the latest steps of integration. A close look at the narratives of French and German leaders between 2010 and 2013 reveals one of the primary preoccupations has been to avoid using the ‘f-word’: federalism. In fact, two distinctive visions co-exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as inevitable, yet it is nevertheless a distant mirage, out of reach of today’s decision makers.
At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. Our lexicographic analysis of about 45 speeches by Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande at press conferences prior to or after meetings of the European Council reveals that there is no significant difference between the German and the French discourses.
Rather than austerity, it is the urgent need to enhance the EU’s competitiveness that is the central driving force behind the deepening of integration. From an institutional point of view, the period when Germany promoted supranational federalism while the French focused on sovereignty is now over: positions have become more subtle and, one could say, closer. In the Merkel era, Germany seems to have converged towards a more intergovernmental vision of the EU, with national states as the main actors driving the integration of macroeconomic and fiscal policy.
The persistent gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Today, the fairly stark decoupling between functionalism and constitutionalism unveils new emerging hierarchies within the EU federal polity. EU federalism has become more coercive, with tighter socioeconomic governance and hardship imposed upon indebted countries. Our analysis supports the claims made by other scholars, such as Jürgen Habermas and Ben Crum, that the responses to the crisis have brought the EU toward an executive, post-democratic form of federalism.
Dominant discourses in the crisis have shaped a model of integration where the competences transferred to the EU level, in the name of the functional imperative, remain under the tight control of national governments, while the role of EU institutions is limited to that of technocratic watch dog. Under the conditions of politicisation which we have witnessed develop, and the rise of far-right and far-left anti-system parties, it is doubtful that executive federalism can emerge as a viable model of integration for the EU.
As far as political legitimacy is concerned, it is now clear that it is problematic to have less and more Europe at the same time. It is equally clear that, in order to solve the equation, Angela Merkel’s German-centred economic, political and moral leadership will not be sufficient.
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Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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Arthur Borriello
Arthur Borriello is FNRS researcher at CEVIPOL/Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Université libre de Bruxelles.
Amandine Crespy – Université libre de Bruxelles
Amandine Crespy is Lecturer in Political Science and European Studies at CEVIPOL/Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Université libre de Bruxelles.
The EU provides a difficult subject of discussion for traditional political liberals, particularly those from “Generation X” or later. On the one hand, international cooperation and rejection of xenophobic and nationalist narratives have naturally tended liberals – particularly of the post-war generation – towards a pro-EU attitude.
However, in the face of the translation of this into what the authors call “post democratic” – unclear why this is not simply “anti-democratic” – tendencies, plus the unhealthy mutation of pro-europeanism into the current toxic mix of euro-centralism, gravy-boat politics and designed failure, make it difficult to see why any political liberal should continue to support the EU.
What is liberal about centralising everything? Why should tourism in Corfu or Blackpool be the responsibility of the commission, rather than Corfu Municipality and Blackpool Borough Council? How can anyone support the devolution of healthcare from the UK to Scotland but then also have it centralised to the EU?
In the meantime, so much of european politics is dominated by the spending of EU funds and subsidies – regional funds, agricultural funds, grants here and there – that the politicians forget that this is all taxpayers money, to be spent wisely and efficiently. Why on earth did we spend so much regional money that ended up just subsidising low air fares between regional airports? Why on earth does the EU still spend half its budget on food security – certainly not the top priority of EU citizens and probably not even in the top 10. Why on earth have we had to slash and slash national budgets on health, education, pensions and so forth – much, ironically at the imposition of the Commission themselves – when the EU budget has never failed to grow in its entire history? It’s not like there isn’t plenty of fat that could be cut!
And of course the anti-democratic tendency is the most concerning of all. After the Dutch said no to the constitution, the EU leaders decided simply to not ask the people again! This disastrous wrong turn has robbed the EU of badly needed legitimacy. The ECJ’s history of perverse judgements, consistently misinterpreting treaties in a euro-maximalist way – has frankly undermined confidence in the rule of law. On top of this, the dismissal of the Berlusconi government, the blackmail of Greece, the imposition of migrants on Slovakia and now the proposal that armed forces from Frontex could be deployed without the consent of the host government – this all adds up to a frightening direction for the EU.
It’s now becoming clear that so many key policies of the EU have been designed in a way that the designers knew would fail: but they figured that the failure would push a reaction in the euro-centralist direction they wanted. The same pattern is seen repeatedly – the Eurozone, Schengen, the CAP, the CFP, the Emissions Trading System – all had fundamental flaws that meant they would inevitably fail. But the victims – be they Greek pensioners, Cornish fishermen or anyone else – were simply collateral damage to a greater cause.
It’s really unclear what way back there can be for the EU. They certainly need a new generation and a new way of thinking that ditches the knee-jerk “more Europe” response, is more democratically responsive and. dare I say, more popular. Maybe a period of “dis-integration” will be needed before the message gets home.
Very good comment, though I disagree with the observation that the EU needs more legitimacy.The EU as it is constituted is beyond repair, unless one is minded to pursue a post-democratic agenda under the aegis of the western-based global government movement which is obviously of considerable influence in regards the supposed one-way movement of centralising power, nominally until world government is a fact, at EU levels.
To pursue the current policies to their logical conclusion, more legitimacy would take this project yet further down the authoritarian road.Ultimately, this will be disastrous.Unless one believes that the European peoples can be forced to co-exist under authoritarian rule by a central EU government which itself is beholden to a group which has designs on becoming the world government, the more legitimacy for this project, the further Europe gets into a mess and the greater the damage when it falls over.
Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, the old guard is quite unable to mend its ways.It has, likely right from the start, had a policy of establishing facts in the expectation that once certain structures are in place and certain obstacles have disapppeared out of oversight of the people who are directing this project, then the new facts will carry the day.It may be understood that the architects of this project never envisaged how it could be effected, other than by pulling the wool over people’s and the various peoples’ eyes.The EU apparatchiks who have to manage from year to year to bring it to fruition have to totally believe in it in order to be able to function at all.Doubt cannot be allowed to enter their minds.Hence, if the EU is going to fail, its current leaders will go with it to the bitter end, losing credibility and legitimacy all the way due to the fact that time and again they are shown up to be untrustworthy.Their methods are being exposed more as time goes on, and once understood no one will trust them again, though cooperation can still be bought at a price.
For students of history and human psychology and political science generally, the failure of this project is not in
doubt.
The two commentators here ignore that the vast majority of EU law relates to the Single Market… A single Market is not fee trade.. A s8nghe market requires joint sharing of devision making and a joint body to r force the rules.. The Single e Market is hugely beneficial to EU Citizens on an economic basis and practical basis.. Prescription drugs are cheaper on economy of scale and prescriptions readily available throughout the EU… The vast majority of of Law remains nationally based and that which is shared helps all EU citizens…