In this article, Jonathan Franco explores the Jordanian politics in 2021. He claims that King Abdallah used three main strategies to overcome political crises in the first half of the year: conciliation, closure and focused enforcement. In the later part of 2021, the Jordanian Crown and Government felt safe enough to sit crises through, as the King promoted legislation to consolidate his power.

The year 2021 met a Jordan in crisis. The Hashemite Kingdom’s economy has long been staggering, a trend that was further exacerbated by the Covid-19 Pandemic [1]. Susser points out that this economic downturn also had political implications, as the traditional social contract of “loyalty for economic security” eroded [2]. These economic and social factors culminated in several political challenges to the authority of King Abdallah II and his government throughout the year. But despite the gravity of these incidents, it would seem in retrospect that the Amman leadership was wise enough to turn lemons into lemonade, contain the critics and even consolidate its power.

This article will argue that King Abdallah overcame the earlier political turmoil through three main strategies, typical of the Jordanian Royal tradition: first, to situate the Crown as part of the solution rather than the problem; second, to provide a clear closure for incidents, in order to eliminate their momentum; and third, to make surgical use of enforcement agencies against extreme protestors, while painting them as enemies of Jordan. In the latter part of the year, when the Crown’s authority had been properly established, Abdallah preferred to wait incidents out while actively promoting legislation to consolidate his power.

Early 2021: Conciliation, Closure, Enforcement, Repeat

Starting with the first half of 2021, this period was a time of major political incidents. The most noticeable three according to Laith al-Junaidi were the al-Salt Hospital Incident, the Hamzeh Affair and the al-Ajarme Affair [3]. In the al-Salt Hospital, ten Coronavirus patients died due to an oxygen shortage. The disaster sparked a nationwide wave of protests, referred to in Arabic media as “angry gatherings”. The King immediately took action to resolve the crisis: he personally visited the hospital, criticized the negligent treatment of the patients and promised that those responsible will suffer the consequences. Shortly after, the Minister of Health Nadhir Obeidat resigned, and the government sacked local health officials. Prosecutions also followed, with five of the former officials, including the head of the hospital, convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to prison time [4].

Alongside the conciliatory actions, enforcement agencies targeted the “angry gatherings”. Officials insinuated that these supposedly popular protests were in fact an orchestrated Islamist campaign. Authorities dispersed the gatherings, and their reasoning was epidemiological: the country was still under Covid-19 quarantine, and the unsanctioned convergence of people was a public health hazard [5]. Overall, the royal and governmental response to provide justice for the dissidents, alongside with the dispersal of the gatherings, eventually resolved the crisis.

Shortly after, in April, came the Hamzeh Affair. Prince Hamzeh bin al-Hussein, the former crown prince of Jordan and half-brother of the King, was accused of a conspiracy against the state and the government, alongside with approximately 20 high-ranking past and present Jordanian officials. The selected strategy of the regime was similar to the one employed at al-Salt, albeit the sequencing was different: first came the enforcement. The plotters were immediately arrested, and accused of endangering national security with foreign Saudi support [6]. But the arrests did not mark the end of the affair, as Prince Hamzeh released videos in English and Arabic from his house arrest, where he criticized the government for being incompetent and corrupt [7].

After this development, came the conciliation and closure. Just days after the crisis had erupted, the extended Royal Family gathered at the King’s palace. Surrounded by his relatives, Abdallah announced to his people that the family feud was now resolved, thanks to the arbitration efforts of Prince Hassan bin Talal, the uncle of the two half-brothers [8]. Tensions were further diffused when later that month, 16 of the arrestees were released, and Prince Hamzeh publicly signed a declaration of loyalty to his brother, the King [9].

Prince Hamzeh is a popular figure among tribal elements, and a relatively vocal critic of the Jordanian administration. Many see him as “a man of Jordan”, in contrast to Abdallah’s reputation as an “outsider” who was raised and educated abroad [10]. However, it was clear that April ended with a decisive victory for Abdallah. Not much public controversy arose when Hamzeh was placed in house arrest, and the Royal Family stood by Abdallah at the palace gathering. Even when Queen Nur, mother of Hamzeh, revealed in December that her son was still under house arrest, deprived of the right to defend himself against what she called the “assassination of character” that he had underwent [11] – she was met with relative indifference in most Jordanian outlets. The displays of familial unity and swift resolution of the affair, the insinuation that the accused were collaborating with foreign powers, and the prolonged (but silent) house arrest of Hamzeh, all helped to put the issue to rest.

The al-Ajrame Affair took place on the following month. On 21 May, the power in Jordan was cut off, and electricity providers attributed the outage to a malfunction. But Osama al-Ajarme, MP in the House of Representatives, claimed that this was a deliberate shutdown, designed to prevent the solidarity march of Jordanian tribes with Palestine [12]. Riots broke out in al-Ajarme’s hometown near Amman, and he fueled the flames by releasing several inciting videos. In one, he threatened to “kill the King with a bullet between his eyes”. In another he was seen wielding a sword, and inviting the Jordanian tribes to a mass protest rally that he was organizing [13].

Again, the crisis was handled delicately and gradually, with a display of national consensus. The first response was deterrence: law agencies warned that they would not allow al-Ajarme’s illegal gatherings. At the second stage, the House of Representatives decided to revoke al-Ajarme’s membership. The impeachment meeting took no more than 10 minutes, with a considerable majority supporting al-Ajrame’s removal and almost all the MPs present. The Speaker of the House accused al-Ajarme of offending the King and the tribes, and denounced his attempt to destabilize national security [14]. At the last stage, al-Ajarme was also arrested, tried, and sentenced to 12 years in prison [15].

Late 2021: Consolidation of Royal Power

It would appear that the dramas of al-Salt, Prince Hamzeh and al-Ajarme eventually played into the hands of the King. Perhaps these early successes help account for the change of Royal tactics later that year: in following incidents, the King and government seemed to be more confident, as they simply waited out public outcries instead of diffusing them. This behavior was apparent during the release of the “Pandora Papers”, financial documents that were leaked in October. At the height of the Coronavirus economic crisis, the Papers revealed that the King had amassed assets worth more than 100 million dollars abroad [16]. Relatively to the former incidents, the leadership’s reaction was modest: Abdallah explained that the assets were procured with his private funds, and therefore no corruption was involved. He also contended that the documents were part of a smear campaign against Jordan. Afterwards a media blackout was placed on the affair in Jordan, and that was the end of it. This course of action was retrospectively successful, as most critics decided to keep their thoughts on the affair to themselves, and no major outcry arose [17].

A second example for this Royal leniency was the leadership’s reaction to the campaign against Jordan’s water-for-electricity deal with Israel. Following Jordan’s severe water crisis [18], Amman agreed to provide Israel with electricity in exchange for desalinated water from the Mediterranean [19]. Islamists reacted to the deal by organizing Friday protests in Amman, claiming that the government “pawned the country to the (Zionist) entity” [20]. A heated debate on the topic also took place in the House of Representatives, with several MPs leaving the discussion in protest against the agreement [21]. But it would appear that the Amman protests attracted only several hundred people at a time, and these eventually died out without the King and his government having to take any major actions.

Despite this relative calm in the face of incidents, the King did not sit idly throughout the second half of 2021. He capitalized on his momentum to proactively address the political challenges. He did so by establishing a special committee that would propose ways to modernize the political system and enhance the public’s political participation [22]. The committee submitted its recommendations, which inspired 30 governmental amendment bills submitted to the Parliament. Most of the bills passed, but critics argued that instead of promoting democratization, these actually empowered the King at the expense of the elected branches [23].

Conclusion: An Auspicious Early 2022

By early January 2022, it seemed as if the Islamist opposition had lost its vigor. When the membership of Islamist MP Hassan al-Riati was frozen for two years following a brawl, they assumed a relatively passive stance. Unlike previous incidents, this time they did not take to the streets, preferred to simply complain at the undemocratic process, and threatened to resign in solidarity with their colleague [24]. Indeed, this might be an indication for the King and his supporters that the lemonade will taste even better in 2022.

Featured Image: King Abdallah with President Joe Biden. Taken from NBC News.

Footnotes:

[1] “The Jordanian government is turning towards the most difficult economic and social crisis” [Arabic], al-Araby al-Jadeed, 28 January 2021; “What is the secret of the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement, and what are its political and economic benefits?” [Arabic], Sputnik News Arabic, 27 September 2021; Oded Eran, “Jordan 2021 – A reason for Israeli concern, but not panic” [Hebrew], iNSS, 14 October 2021.

[2] Asher Susser, “Still Standing, but Shaky: Jordan at 100”, Fathom, 26 May 2021.

[3] Laith al-Junaidi, “Jordan 2021.. Domestic crises in the first half, and attempts to solve them in the second” [Arabic], Anadolu, 27 December 2021.

[4] ”Jordan: prison for those responsible for the manslaughter of 10 patients” [Arabic], France24, 5 March 2021; Muhammad Khair al-Ruwashda, “Jordan: Islamists are blamed for leading protests following the al-Salt incident” [Arabic], al-Sharq al-Awsat, 17 March 2021; Laith al-Junaidi, “Jordan 2021.. Domestic crises in the first half, and attempts to solve them in the second” [Arabic], Anadolu, 27 December 2021.

[5] Muhammad Khair al-Ruwashde, “Jordan: Islamists are blamed for leading protests following the al-Salt incident” [Arabic], al-Sharq al-Awsat, 17 March 2021.

[6] “The crisis in Jordan raises concerns in Saudi Arabia” [Arabic], al-Quds, 13 April 2021.

[7] Bruce Riedel, “Jordan in turmoil”, Brookings, 5 April 2021.

[8] “The King addresses the Jordanian people” [Arabic], King Abdallah II’s Website, 7 April 2021.

[9] “Affair of the Prince Hamzeh bin al-Hussein” [Arabic], BBC Arabic, 22 April 2021.

[10] Bruce Riedel, “Jordan in turmoil”, Brookings, 5 April 2021; Asher Susser, “Still Standing, but Shaky: Jordan at 100”, Fathom, 26 May 2021.

[11] “Queen Nur reveals the truth about Prince Hamzeh’s departure from Jordan to Canada” [Arabic], RT, 27 December 2021.

[12] Laith al-Junaidi, “Jordan 2021.. Domestic crises in the first half, and attempts to solve them in the second” [Arabic], Anadolu, 27 December 2021.

[13] “Head of the Parliament accused him of offending the King and the tribes” [Arabic], al-Jazeera, 6 June 2021.

[14] “Head of the Parliament accused him of offending the King and the tribes” [Arabic], al-Jazeera, 6 June 2021.

[15] “Jordan… 12 years in prison to the former MP Osama al-Ajarme” [Arabic], CNN Arabic, 26 January 2021.

[16] “Pandora Papers”, BBC, 3 October 2021.

[17] “Jordanians privately fume over Pandora Papers”, The New Arab, 4 October 2021.

[18] On this, read: “’Catastrophe’ faces Jordan’s water sectors”, al-Jazeera, 2 November 2021; “Jordan’s water crisis” [Arabic], al-Bayan, 20 November 2021

[19] “A new age of stability” [Hebrew], Walla, 22 November 2021.

[20] “We were pawned to the entity” [Arabic], al-Jazeera, 26 November 2021; “Jordanians stage mass rally”, PressTV, 4 December 2021.

[21] “Jordan MPs walk out of session”, Memo – Middle East Monitor, 9 December 2021.

[22] Laith al-Junaidi, “Jordan 2021.. Domestic crises in the first half, and attempts to solve them in the second” [Arabic], Anadolu, 27 December 2021.

[23] Oded Eran, “Jordan 2021 – A reason for Israeli concern, but not panic” [Hebrew], iNSS, 14 October 2021; “MPs brawl in Jordan Parliament”, EuroNews, 28 December 2021; “Jordan.. The House of Representatives approves constitutional amendments that widen the King’s authority and promote partisan governments” [Arabic], al-Jazeera, 6 January 2022.

[24] “After al-Riati’s Freeze” [Arabic], al-Quds al-Araby, 17 January 2022.