After leaving the EU, the UK needed to rethink its place in the world. Kristin Haugevik and Øyvind Svendsen examine the aspirations and meanings underpinning the “Global Britain” narrative and argue that its scope and ambitions have changed significantly in the years following the Brexit referendum.

In a new research article, we make the case that for the Conservative governments in charge after the 2016 referendum, the narrative about “Global Britain” became a way not only of rebuffing international critique, but also one of soothing domestic concerns and creating a positive and hopeful spin about the future.

Many have suggested that the “Global Britain” aspirations initially spanned too wide – the post-Brexit UK was trying to deliver more than it had the resources to. This pertained especially to its so-called Indo-Pacific tilt, exemplified by the international reception when the UK went sailing in the South China Sea with its new flagship carrier HMS Queen Elisabeth in 2021.

In our study, we find that the “Global Britain” narrative itself has gone through several tilts, now being more solidly grounded in familiar turf. Despite broad – and yes, global – ambitions for UK foreign policy post-Brexit, the narrative about “Global Britain” was gradually adjusted both in thematic and geographical terms. That happened well before Russia’s attack on Ukraine, but the war appears to have strengthened the tendency even further.

The “Global Britain” narrative itself has gone through several tilts, now being more solidly grounded in familiar turf.

Filling a concept with meaning

Narratives like the one about “Global Britain” are an integrated part of everyday life in all societies. They provide states with a link between identity and action and offer meaning and direction to policy decisions. Through speech and texts, audiences are presented with dominant and alternative accounts of who the state is – at a specific point in time, in a specific context, and in relation to specific Others.

After the UK’s Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016, many scholars and pundits around the world found it hard to envisage any positive effects for UK foreign policy.

In her Lancaster House speech, delivered more than half a year after the Brexit referendum and some two months before the British government triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, then-Prime Minister Theresa May proposed a way forward. It was time, she said, for Britain to “step back and ask ourselves what kind of country we want to be” on the international stage:

I want this United Kingdom to emerge from this period of change stronger, fairer, more united and more outward-looking than ever before. I want us to be a secure, prosperous, tolerant country – a magnet for international talent and a home to the pioneers and innovators who will shape the world ahead. I want us to be a truly Global Britain – the best friend and neighbour to our European partners, but a country that reaches beyond the borders of Europe too.

A core argument in May’s speech was that the UK had once been, and would therefore again become, a global power. The speech centred mainly on economic aspects and possibilities for global trade – references to “trade/trading” appeared 49 times and economy/economic 10 times. Similarly, while stressing the importance of maintaining strong relations with European allies, most of May’s speech focused on partners, arenas and networks outside of Europe.

In the ensuing months and years, the “Global Britain” narrative became increasingly prevalent in government discourse on post-Brexit UK foreign policy. This included collecting relevant speeches and policy documents on a designated “Global Britain” webpage. Through speeches, decisions and policies, the government was signalling that the UK was not a power in decline.

A new direction for “Global Britain”

However, the task of “delivering” Brexit and, by extension, offering a credible narrative about the “Global Britain” that would now emerge, turned out a tall order for the May government. Having failed three times to get her negotiated deal with the EU through the British Parliament, she resigned as prime minister in the summer of 2019.

The task of “delivering” Brexit and, by extension, offering a credible narrative about the “Global Britain” that would now emerge, turned out a tall order for the May government.

While numbers suggested that not only the UK economy, but also its diplomatic clout and relations with key allies had weakened after Brexit, the “Global Britain” narrative lived on also under Boris Johnson’s premiership. A fortnight before the formal exit date, 31 January 2020, Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab envisioned “a bold new chapter for our country – ambitious, self-confident and global in its international outlook”.

However, the initial operationalisation of “Global Britain” – emphasising global trade opportunities and a broader British turn to the Indo-Pacific – proved difficult to communicate to relevant audiences. In the ensuing years, we find that the “Global Britain” narrative underwent some significant changes.

Making defence “the spear of Global Britain”

First, as the formal exit date drew closer, security and defence were increasingly weaved into the “Global Britain” narrative. The notion of “Global Britain” also manifested itself more frequently in security and defence discourse. In March 2020, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace announced that the government was about to make defence “the spear of Global Britain”. The announcement came shortly before the release of the guiding policy document for the “Global Britain” approach in 2021, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age” (“the Integrated Review”). The review formulated a vision for the UK to leave a stronger footprint across the globe.

At the centre-stage stood a firm recommitment to security, at home and – “in keeping with our history” – internationally. Also in the accompanying defence document, defence investments were explicitly linked to “Global Britain”.

Increasing the focus on the Anglosphere and Euro-Atlantic

The second shift was that, while the 2021 Integrated Review’s “Indo-Pacific tilt” received considerable attention – at home and abroad, key initiatives homed in on the Anglosphere. In September 2021, Australia, the UK and the United States announced that that they had signed the so-called AUKUS deal. Founded on the longstanding “Five Eyes” intelligence collaboration, and excluding other close allied nuclear powers, the deal spurred a public diplomatic row with France, whose government signalled that it felt side-lined and betrayed.

More profoundly, through 2020 and 2021, British government officials’ speeches and statements increasingly came to foreground the Northern European region. The 2023 update to the Integrated Review leaned on and emphasised the war in Ukraine to reiterate the UK’s ambition to remain a leading security provider in the Euro-Atlantic. Foregrounding security and defence, the Anglosphere and the Euro-Atlantic, one could argue that the narrative about “Global Britain” became more convincing to audiences at home and abroad.

Where security and defence had become a contentious area in UK-EU relations post Brexit, the Ukraine war helped depoliticise cooperation in that field.

Unlike the new trade agreements, which had until this point proven difficult to deliver for both the May and Johnson governments, security and defence policy was not directly affected by Brexit. Moreover, the reinforced focus on the Anglosphere and Euro-Atlantic allowed the UK to cultivate and put on display longstanding partnerships, while still carving out its future relationship with the EU. Where security and defence had become a contentious area in UK-EU relations post Brexit, the Ukraine war helped depoliticise cooperation in that field.

Is Britain back?

“Global Britain” started out as a bold and broad narrative about the UK’s role in the world, but low on specific content. We argue that for now, it has ended up pivoting “home” to secure bases: security and defence, and the UK’s “near abroad”.

This is not to say that the UK has abandoned its global ambitions – it clearly has not – but the renewed narrative about the UK’s role in the world has been more distinctly anchored in its most familiar areas of competence.

During the Conservative Party Conference in 2023, Foreign Minister [now Home Secretary] James Cleverly launched a new slogan: “Britain is back!”. While it remains to be seen whether Britain is indeed back as a global power, the slogan resonates well with our finding that Britain has returned to traditional home turfs.

This post draws on the authors’ published article On safer ground? The emergence and evolution of ‘Global Britain’ (International Affairs, 2023)

All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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