Labour’s poll lead is so big, it can make one question its validity. But Labour has been ahead for months, and polls rarely change dramatically in the run up to an election. Beth Mann and Simon Atkinson review the findings of a joint LSE and British Polling Council event looking ahead at the general election and explain the stories behind the poll numbers.
Some of Britain’s leading academics and pollsters assembled recently ay LSE to share notes on the current campaign. The event was originally organised as a summer “stock-take”, to share perspectives on the current state of play ahead of a summer recess and the expected autumn election. So, Rishi Sunak’s surprise decision to hold the election on the 4th July gave this half-day seminar a very real and immediate feel.
Front and centre of the discussion were the 2019 Conservative voters, including those who voted Tory for the first time at that election. But there was also a look at the ever-elusive “Don’t Knows”, of whom there are still a sizeable number. Crucially, however, it is not the size of this group that is important or unique in this election, but who is in them. 2019 Conservative voters make up the largest proportion, and while we sometimes expect these people to return “home”, there is little evidence so far that they will, instead redirecting to other parties, including Reform UK.
The presentations included a look at how the polls tend to evolve during an election campaign: massive changes between kick-off and election date are relatively unusual and the mean absolute error associated with the headline figures minimises the closer we get to the day. When we look back at the evidence over the past five years (see graph below), the decline in Conservative support as a result of numerous “competence shocks” is the stand-out trend. But, even if the “tide” may be going out for the Tories, the “tribes” of British politics (Remain versus Leave, or younger versus older voters) remain very much in evidence and a key reference point for better understanding today’s dynamics.
Scotland was a focus of particular attention. The fall in support for the SNP means that so many of its constituencies now fall into the “marginal” category. With the SNP having held power at Holyrood since 2007 and the Conservatives governing from Westminster since 2010, this election presents an opportunity to send a message to both Edinburgh and London. Labour is soaking up those who have lost trust in SNP (see chart below), and is now well-placed to take advantage in the central belt, but not so much in the Borders and Highlands. The changing climate of public opinion north of the border should not be mistaken for assuming that support for independence is on the wane; a decade on from the referendum, the Scottish electorate remain split on the broader question of the country’s future in almost equal measure. However, it appears that this (Westminster) election may be shaped more by a party’s competence on handling issues important to voters, than their stance on independence.
Voting intention has been relatively stable since the turn of 2024 so any big changes feel unlikely, and there is little evidence that the “don’t knows” are going to do much to save the Tories.
A roundtable devoted to the theory and evolving practice of MRP – those so-called “mega polls” which project the outcomes of individual constituencies – showed the decisiveness (or brutality) of how the first-past-the-post voting system can operate when there are significant shifts in party support. We see projections as high as 487 seats for Labour and as low as 66 for the Conservatives ,making a grim reading for CCHQ. The experts also touched on the caveats and concerns they have with this method, highlighting that this election is a real “stress-test” of its capabilities to model such a large party lead and predicted swing, its ability to pick up support for strong independent candidates, and the added complications of trying to model Scotland’s volatile political climate at this moment with limited census data. Other more specific concerns were around using the recent boundary changes, the effects of the introduction of voter ID and differentiating Reform UK voters from their very similar looking Conservative voter counterparts.
We have a projected Labour lead that is unprecedented, and the Conservatives are doing worse in areas where they were previously strong. But while this lead is surprisingly huge, there is still a lot of evidence to trust it.
Given the unambiguous poll readings, the question is whether anything can change before polling day. Voting intention has been relatively stable since the turn of 2024 so any big changes feel unlikely, and there is little evidence that the “don’t knows” are going to do much to save the Tories. However, there is still a significant amount of campaign time left and events that could lead to some movement in the polls, such as the debates or manifestos. The Greens are putting up a full slate of candidates and could play a key role in urban/university town constituencies, where they are poised to take the place of the role occupied by the Liberal Democrats over a decade ago. The current expectation is that Labour will be able to squeeze at least some of the “progressive voters” out of voting for these smaller parties. Another unknown is voter turnout, but there are some arguments to suggest it could be on the low side due to such a large lead potentially encouraging complacency, or frustrated Tory voters staying at home. All of this and more makes it difficult to assess exactly what the impact of tactical voting will be on some of the emblematic local contests and indeed how it will play out nationally.
We have a projected Labour lead that is unprecedented, and the Conservatives are doing worse in areas where they were previously strong. But while this lead is surprisingly huge, there is still a lot of evidence to trust it (other leader competence measures, favourability, by-elections, local election results). The impact of Reform UK upon the Conservative vote share cannot be understated either (see chart below). In 2019, the Brexit Party stood down in Tory seats – this time they are standing in all but one of them. Labour and the Liberal Democrats have an informal non-aggression pact. The best outcome at this stage for the Conservatives seems to be to minimise their losses and ensure they are as well-placed as they can be to make a reasonably quick recovery of any damage to their party brand.
But, of course, the campaign still has some time to run. People are still getting to know Keir Starmer. Political anoraks may have heard him talking about how his father was a toolmaker many times, but just 11 per cent of the public know about his background. However, in general while they may care deeply about the outcome, the public are not necessarily watching as closely as we might think they are.
To dive into the content, take a look at the presentations from the event, available now on the BPC website.
All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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