Following one of the worst results in its electoral history, a narrative is developing around why the Conservative Party lost so badly: it wasn’t “conservative enough”. Leadership hopefuls like Suella Braverman, Kemi Badenoch, Priti Patel and Robert Jenrick seem to espouse this diagnosis, which at the same time points to a path back to power. But Tim Bale argues, that strategy is unlikely to lead the Party back into government.
It was the Roman historian Tacitus who observed that “it is the singularly unfair peculiarity of war that the credit of success is claimed by all, while a disaster is attributed to one alone”. He was right – it would be a little cruel to lay the blame for the Conservative Party’s epic defeat on July 4 solely on Rishi Sunak alone.
Every one of the five prime ministers the Conservative Party cycled through in just eight years had a hand in it suffering its worst defeat in its near two-hundred-year history .
True, Sunak made far too many promises (for instance on small boats and NHS waiting lists) that he couldn’t possibly keep, called an election that took his own party by surprise, and proceeded to fight a catastrophically bad campaign. But, while he needn’t, perhaps, have drunk so deeply from it, he inherited one heck of a poisoned chalice. Liz Truss had trashed the Tories’ reputation for economic management and Boris Johnson had shredded their claim to integrity. Before them, Theresa May’s struggles to persuade the parliamentary party to pass her EU deal had thrown it into complete chaos from which it never really recovered. As for David Cameron, not only had he called a referendum on Europe that divided his party and triggered his own resignation, he also imposed cuts on the country so swingeing that they ended up wrecking many of the public services which the vast majority of Brits rely on just to get by.
In short, every one of the five prime ministers the Conservative Party cycled through in just eight years had a hand in it suffering its worst defeat in its near two-hundred-year history – a defeat so disastrous that both the blame-game and the suggestions for what to do next had begun even before the polls closed. They have continued apace ever since.
The most popular “take” holds that the Tories lost because “they weren’t Conservative enough” – one that suits the overwhelmingly right-wing party in the media (the Tory-supporting reporters, columnists, editors, owners, and broadcasters who are an integral part of the Conservative eco-system and every bit as influential as its politicians and grassroots members).
To Suella Braverman, Kemi Badenoch, Priti Patel and little Robert Jenrick – and to all the “Nat-Con” Tories – this explanation for their party’s dire defeat also points the way to rapid recovery.
If only, several right wing leadership hopefuls are arguing, the Party had offered even more tax cuts, rowed back even further on progress toward net zero, hit back even harder against all things “woke”, and taken even more radical action not only to “stop the boats” but also to cut back on legal migration, then things would have turned out very differently – not least because such a strategy would, they claim, have discouraged so many erstwhile Tory supporters from drifting off to Reform UK.
To Suella Braverman, Kemi Badenoch, Priti Patel and Robert Jenrick – and to all the “Nat Con” Tories – this explanation for their party’s dire defeat also points the way to rapid recovery: just say it like you really mean it next time and, as Labour saddles the country with even higher taxes and punishingly expensive green measures, crushes it under the weight of cancel culture, and rolls out the red carpet to any old foreigner who wants to come to this country, victory will surely follow.
There is always the chance that Starmer’s Labour government will either mess up big time or suffer an external shock it simply can’t handle, prompting an already volatile electorate to swing back the other way as a result.
But will it? Even leaving aside the thorny question of where Nigel Farage and his four fellow Reform MPs fit into such a strategy (invited to join by Braverman, kept at arm’s length by Badenoch, or something in between by Patel and Jenrick), is there really a big enough market for such a stance to afford the Tories victory under first past the post? The electorate, after all, not only includes Reform and “Reform-curious” voters but also (albeit rather inconveniently) the 53 per cent of voters who on July 4 supported Labour, the Lib Dems and the Greens – voters whose economic priorities and cultural values, post-election polling suggests, differ markedly from their own.
At least some of those voters, as most Tory politicians surely realise, will have to be detached from the parties they voted for this time – unless, of course, the right wing of the Conservative Party has taken to kidding itself (much like the left wing of the Labour Party used to do) that the majority of those who don’t bother to turn out to vote are actually just waiting to be given something truly radical and inspiring to come along before flocking to polling stations next time round. And in order to detach them, the Tories will almost certainly need to talk rather more about bread-and-butter issues like the economy and public services and rather less about boats, bathrooms, and boilers. Whether the Conservatives can pick a leader willing and able to do that – and none of the leadership hopefuls we’ve so far mentioned seem very likely right now to do a David Cameron à la 2005, and insist that it projects a more moderate, modern image – remains to be seen. And given the composition of the post-apocalypse parliamentary party looks (at first glance at least) fairly evenly balanced between right and centre, it’s hard to imagine that at least one right winger won’t make it to the final two of the leadership race, and then be selected by the grassroots.
It might even prove possible, short of the Conservatives merging with or absorbing Reform, to “unite the right”, although anyone seriously suggesting that we can simply add together their two sets of voters and “Hey presto: victory!” is indulging in some serious magical thinking.
Of course, there is always the chance that Starmer’s Labour government will either mess up big time or suffer an external shock it simply can’t handle, prompting an already volatile electorate to swing back the other way as a result. Moreover, as Labour’s ability to secure itself a huge overall majority of 172 seats on a paltry 34 per cent of the vote has demonstrated, miracles can happen. It might even prove possible, short of the Conservatives merging with or absorbing Reform, to “unite the right” via an electoral pact so as to conjure one up, although anyone seriously suggesting that we can simply add together their two sets of voters and “Hey presto: victory!” is indulging in some serious magical thinking.
However, as we have just seen in France, two can play at that game if they absolutely have to. What price for an electoral pact between Labour, the Lib Dems and the Greens as a response to the Conservatives and Reform agreeing to help each other out? Stranger things have happened, and one day probably will.
All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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