The practice of preferring sons over daughters is widespread in traditional societies of South and East Asia. The differential birth-stopping behaviour is one potential manifestation of son preference in those traditional societies. Rashid Javed and Mazhar Mughal examine the prevalence and strength of the phenomenon of son preference and its effect on Pakistani women’s fertility outcomes by analysing two representative nationwide household survey datasets.

‘Early harvest and early sons are always better’ is a traditional Pakistani proverb. Son preference is a form of gender bias that persists in many parts of the developing world. In patriarchal societies, sons are considered an asset: they carry forward the family name, take up the family business, care for parents in their old age and protect and provide for other dependent members in the extended family. In societies with a dowry-based virilocal set-up, sons add to family assets through marriage. Daughters, in contrast, are perceived as a financial liability as the family is required to gather sufficient dowry for their wedding.

Son-preferring households see daughters as a futile investment as girls will move to their husband’s homes after marriage and add to the capital of his household. Once married, women in traditional societies are expected to bear sons, an expectation that can have important consequences for them and for existing girl children. Women in Pakistan with at least one son are reported to have significantly more say in everyday household decisions. In China and India, giving birth to a first-born son is reported to improve the mother’s nutrition intakes and reduce her likelihood of being underweight.

It is therefore not surprising that the practice of son preference manifests itself in abnormally high sex ratios through sex-selective abortions, female infanticide and neglect of girls’ health and nutritional needs. According to the World Bank, in 2011 around two million girls under the age of five were estimated to be missing every year, most of them in Asia. In societies where sex-selective abortion is not deemed acceptable, parents continue their fertility as long as the desired number of sons is not attained.

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In a recent study, we examined son preference and its fertility effects in Pakistan. We based our analysis on two rounds of Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) to chart the evolution of son preference patterns over time, beginning with presenting the changes in different aspects of revealed and stated preference for sons by using a number of indicators. Following this, we studied the impact of son preference on actual and desired fertility outcomes observed in 1990–91 and 2017–18. We used presence of at least one son at parity n and the number of sons at parity n as indicators of son preference and considered first four birth parities.

Our findings showed a strong and persistent evidence for both the revealed and stated preference for male offspring. Son preference is more intense among middle-class and rural households, and decreases in couples’ level of education. Besides, parity progression slows with number of sons born. We found that reliance over differential birth-stopping increases significantly over time as couples are more likely to stop childbearing once the desired number of boys is achieved.

Pakistan’s Sex Ratio at Last Birth (SRLB) has increased from 117 boys per 100 girls in 1990–91 to 126 in 2017–18. The increase in the ratio over time has been particularly high in urban areas. This disproportionate preference for boys is also visible in the desired ratio of boys and girls, which has grown from 113 in 1990–91 to 138 in 2017–18.

Table 1 shows Probit estimates of the effect of having one or more son at a given parity on the probability of proceeding to subsequent birth. We found that, although the likelihood of second birth does not appear to vary with the sex of the first-born, women with one or more sons are found to be up to 17 per cent less likely to pursue additional fertility compared with women with no son. This probability is greater at higher parities and among women with more sons. Our findings are in line with our previous study where we reported strong evidence for differential birth-spacing occurring in Pakistan as a result of disproportionate preference for male children. In addition to these actual differential birth-stopping effects, we also found support for stated desire for stopping child-bearing among women with one or more sons.

Table 1: Presence of at least One Son and Subsequent Birth – Probit Estimates

Source: Authors’ calculations using PDHS 1990-91 and PDHS 2017-18. Columns 1–4 present results for subsequent birth at n’th birth order, first without and then with the full set of controls. Controls include woman’s characteristics (age, age difference with husband, education, employment status, media exposure), spouse education, household size, wealth status and geographical features (place of residence, region). Observations with multiple births are excluded. The final sample of the two rounds consists of 2,614 and 6,373 individual observations respectively. Sample weights are used. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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In this study, we provide fresh evidence that Pakistani couples continue child-bearing as long as at least one son is not born. Son preference continues in Pakistan, and remains a strong predictor of women’s fertility behaviour. Pakistan’s continuing skewed sex ratios and the country’s slow rate of demographic transition can be understood in light of these findings.

Though the country’s population growth has slowed, the rate remains one of the highest in Asia; policy measures that promote equal treatment of boys and girls can be helpful in curbing the rapid rate of increase in the country’s population.

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Banner image © Muhammad Kamran, Karachi, 2022, Unsplash.

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