Fred Kaplan writes that while many have characterized the US as being in a “new Cold War” with China and Russia, the reality is that the current global situation bears little resemblance to the world of 1947-91.

It has become commonplace to characterize the tensions between the United States and China—and, in some quarters, between the US and Russia—as a “new Cold War.” It’s the title of at least three new books, a phrase dropped in countless articles, and the assumption of many seemingly serious analyses. But is it true? Does “Cold War” really summarize the state of play in world politics?

I would argue that it does not—and that those who believe otherwise are doomed to recommend or adopt mistaken, possibly disastrous, policies.

Let’s recall what the phrase was understood to mean during the real Cold War—the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union from roughly 1947-91. This was a confrontation between two competing systems on a global scale, in political, economic, military, and ideological domains. To put it in only slightly simplistic terms, the world was divided in two spheres—the capitalist West vs. the communist East—and all conflicts were seen in the light of that division or squeezed into its Procrustean bed (whether or not they were caused by that divide).

George Orwell, who coined the term in an October 1945 essay called “You and the Atom Bomb,” defined it as “the prospect of two or three monstrous super-states, each possessed of a weapon by which millions of people can be wiped out in a few seconds, dividing the world between them”—a prospect that would likely  “put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely a ‘peace that is no peace.’” Though he may not have known it, Orwell was not the originator of the phrase. Back in the 14^th century, the Spanish writer Don Juan Manuel used it to describe the protracted, irreconcilable conflict between Islam and Christendom on the Iberian Peninsula.

Competition not confrontation

Both observers—Orwell and Manuel—describe a total, all-encompassing confrontation. This does not characterize America’s 21^st-century disputes with China or Russia at all. Russia’s reach is not remotely global; it is barely regional. The late Sen. John McCain once described Russia as “a Mafia-run gas station with nuclear weapons,” a putdown that still resonates. China does have global aspirations, at least in terms of creating markets and trying to lure the West away from its American protectorate. But Beijing’s foreign policies are entirely opportunistic, mainly mercantile; its emissaries don’t hand out copies of Xi Jinping’s Red Book; nor does Xi care whether a potential customer or ally follows China’s model of politics or, for that matter, any particular political doctrine.

In other words, the US-China-Russia competition is neither global nor ideological. In some isolated areas, it is military; in others, it is economic. But almost nowhere is it both; nor does it illuminate, much less drive or shape, conflicts elsewhere in the world. During the Cold War, America’s allies were encouraged—and Soviet allies were forced—to take their particular superpower’s side in all global issues. (The domination wasn’t total, but it was the underlying premise.) This is not the case today. Many countries that go along with US policies in some areas part from its policies in other areas. For instance, India—a member of the Quad, the US-led alliance to contain Chinese expansion in the Pacific, which also includes Japan and Australia—has maintained its special relation with Russia, even in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Qatar, host to the largest US military base in the Middle East, and for that reason a “major non-NATO ally” (in a designation signed by President Biden), is also a leading supporter of Hamas and a vociferous critic of Israel.

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

What is going on—the state of the world, the motives and behavior of nations, large and small—has no resemblance whatever to the world of the Cold War. It is more reminiscent of standard-issue big-power politics that have driven international relations from time to time—in fact, more often than not—going back to Thucydides.

The Cold War, which dominated world politics in the last half of the 20^th century, was an anomaly. Horrible as it was in many ways, especially for the victims of Soviet dictatorship and various “proxy wars” instigated by both superpowers, it was also a system of international security; it prevented the outbreak of another world war through the preservation of a “balance of power” (bolstered by nuclear deterrence). In this sense, the period of the Cold War was similar to the era of the Congress of Vienna, in which the major nations of the early 19^th century formed a peace of sorts after the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte. That earlier balance of power lasted until the dawn of the 20^th century and the rise of nationalism, especially in Germany, which eventually triggered the First World War.

A return to a more anarchic world

In this sense, the world today is more like the anarchic world that the Congress of Vienna and the Cold War—in their own, very different ways—mended, at least for a while. Some countries dominate some spheres (e.g., economic, military, political); some dominate others; some do so regionally, some globally. But there is no cohesive pattern, no consistent multipolarity, in the parties and nature either of war or of peace.

To say that we are not witnessing a new Cold War is a matter of mere semantics. It has profound implications for policy. If you think there is a “new Cold War” between, say, the US and China, then you probably view China as an existential enemy and favor policies that are mainly or entirely confrontational. But in fact, the US and China have many converging and conflicting interests—and we will only hurt ourselves if we focus exclusively on the latter. The two countries are also inextricably bound up with each other in terms of trade, debt, and supply chains. And while it is a good idea to loosen these ties (our economic health should not be so dependent on China), it is impossible to pretend they don’t exist.

In its official doctrine, the 27-member European Union defines China as “a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival.” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, scoffed at the formula, complaining to reporters, “It’s like driving to a crossing and finding the red, yellow and green lights all on at the same time. How can one drive on?”

And yet, that’s the way of the world. It almost always has been the way of the world. It’s why diplomacy is a challenge, why keeping the peace is so hard, why tumbling into war is so easy. This is not a Cold War. It’s an era much more turbulent, in many ways more dangerous—an era much more like history before the Cold War.

Listen to an interview with Fred Kaplan for The Ballpark podcast

In May 2024 the Phelan US Centre spoke to Fred Kaplan about his 2020 book, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War.

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