The cleavages created by Labour’s 2017 electoral performance and by Brexit have made the political landscape in Scotland much more challenging for the SNP. But if the party are able to tack successfully into the new political winds, these challenges can be met, writes Sean Swan, making their forthcoming conference on 8-10 October decisive for the party’s future.
Credit: The CBI (CC BY 2.0)
The SNP annual conference will be held on 8-10 October in Glasgow. It comes as Alex Rowley, Scottish Labour’s acting leader, claims that Scotland is past ‘peak SNP’. Support in the latest opinion polls has the party on 41% support in a future Westminster election, and 38% for a Holyrood election. Meanwhile, support for independence languishes at 43%, which is 2% lower than the Indyref result. These figures are hardly disastrous: the SNP share of the vote in the 2017 Westminster election was 36.9%, and the party took 41.7% in the 2016 Holyrood vote. But there is a tendency to judge the SNP’s performance against the 2015 Westminster general election when it took almost 50% of the vote.
The 2015 victory was the product of disappointed Yes voters, who effectively decided on a long march through the institutions, joining the SNP en masse in the wake of the 2014 independence referendum defeat. The 2015 victory was as close to total as it could realistically be, but failed to deliver much tangible progress towards independence. Had 2015 resulted in a hung parliament and a Labour government supported by the SNP, things might have been different. But it did not.
While 2015 was an outlier, the fact still remains that the SNP has not performed as well in recent elections as 2015 might have led people to anticipate. What has changed is that the SNP faces two issues which were not a factor in 2015: Brexit and Jeremy Corbyn.
Supporters of independence, the SNP’s broad voter base, can be broken in to three rough categories:
- Those who wish to see Scotland independent ‘within Europe’;
- Those who want an independent Scotland outside the EU;
- Those who see independence as the only alternative to neoliberal Tory or ‘Tory lite’ Blairite government from London.
Brexit has opened up a new political cleavage, not only within wider Scottish politics but also within the independence movement – including the SNP. The SNP was traditionally opposed to membership of the EU, and campaigned for a ‘No’ vote in the 1975 EEC referendum. It was not until 1983, due in part to Jim Sillars, SNP veteran and one time deputy leader, that the SNP changed its stance to one of ‘independence within Europe’.
But by the time of the Brexit referendum, Sillars had changed his mind. In fact, Sillars has stated that he would refuse to vote for independence in a second referendum if it meant re-joining the EU. And Sillars is far from alone. A poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft immediately after the 2016 referendum showed that 36% of SNP voters had voted Leave. In a similar vein, another SNP veteran and former minister in the Scottish government, Alex Neil claimed that ‘five or six’ SNP MSPs – himself included – had voted Leave. The British Election Study has shown that 9 out of 10 SNP voters who voted Yes to independence in 2014 and Remain in the 2016 Brexit referendum, stuck with the SNP in 2017. But the story was different amongst those who supported independence and then voted Leave. In 2017, four out of ten of them deserted the SNP for another party, having been ‘driven away by the party’s strong pro-remain stance’.
This is the first new cleavage: the split between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ nationalists on the EU question. The SNP needs somehow to decouple the independence question from the EU question. One possible solution would be for them to adopt a policy that any future referendum on independence should be a double ballot, like the 1997 referendum on creating a Scottish parliament. In 1997, voters were asked two questions – 1. should there be a Scottish parliament, and 2. should a Scottish parliament have tax-varying powers. A future independence referendum might similarly ask two questions: 1. should Scotland be an independent country? and 2. should an independent Scotland be a member of the European Union? The two issues would thus be disentangled.
The second problem the SNP faces is Jeremy Corbyn. Not only are many SNP voters former Labour voters, but modern Scottish nationalism grew under, and in reaction to, Thatcherism and New Labour. They came to support independence due to despairing of the possibility of a more social democratic government. The UK seemed irredeemably addicted to neoliberalism and increasingly dominated politically by the City. For left-wingers who came to see the UK state as essentially irreformable, independence thus became the only viable route to reform. Corbyn represents the end of ‘New Labour’ liberalism and the return of a more social democratic Labour party. In the 2017 UK general election, Labour increased its vote by 38% across Great Britain; however, in Scotland, the vote only increased by 1%. That the ‘Corbyn bounce’ has so far been limited is likely related to the Blairite nature of the leadership of Scottish Labour. Left-wing elements within Scottish Labour have made exactly this point, arguing that the Scottish Labour leadership had damaged Labour’s chances of winning a majority.
But the general election changed everything. Corbyn’s credibility as a future prime minister – and thus his hand – was enhanced. Corbyn undertook a five day long tour of Scottish marginals at the end of August. Whether connected or not, Scottish Labour leader, Kezia Dugdale, quit shortly afterwards. Dugdale had opposed Corbyn during last year’s leadership contest and backed his rival, Owen Smith.
The leadership contest resulting from Dugdale’s resignation has been controversial – especially for the one time front-runner, Anas Sarwar, who also opposed Corbyn. There are increasing signs of Scottish Labour potentially descending into civil war on Blairite/Corbynista lines. It is still too early to say what form Scottish Labour will take after the dust settles. If it descends into factionalism, or if another anti-Corbyn candidate such as Sarwar, becomes leader, the ‘Corbyn bounce’ will have only limited hop in Scotland. On the other hand, if a pro-Corbyn candidate such as Richard Leonard wins, it may present a problem for the SNP.
Iain Macwhirter makes an astute observation when he compares Momentum, the backbone of Corbyn’s Labour party, to the Yes campaign in the 2014 indyref. Both manifest the same energy, enthusiasm, and belief in the possibility of change. More fundamentally, both the Yes campaign and Corbyn’s Labour contain the hope of potential reform of the believed-to-be irreformable. The potential attraction for ‘left-wing’ SNP supporters is not hard to see.
There is a world of difference in the SNP contesting Holyrood elections and contesting Westminster elections. In Holyrood, the SNP is contesting to form the Scottish government. Given that the SNP does not contest elections outside of Scotland, it can never form the British government. (Nor, of course, does it wish to.) In a Westminster election, what is at issue is whether Labour or the Tories govern the UK. If a Labour government under Corbyn seems a real possibility, many former Labour voters who voted SNP in recent elections will be tempted to return to Labour. It might be wise for the SNP to make explicit what is already fairly implicit – given that the only choice for UK government is Tory or Labour, they should declare that they would support a Labour UK government. A vote for the SNP in a Westminster general election is not incompatible with a vote for Corbyn as PM. It is not an either/or choice between voting SNP or helping elect a Corbyn government. It is possible to do both – or ought to be.
Given that the only choice in Westminster is between a Conservative or Labour UK government, the SNP could adopt a policy similar to Irish parties in the past, such as the Irish Parliamentary Party’s support for the Liberals or the Ulster Unionist Party’s for the Tories. On his grand tour, Corbyn declared that “Scotland holds the keys to delivering a Labour government for the whole United Kingdom.”. That key could be delivered as easily by SNP MPs as by Scottish Labour ones. Naturally, Labour would swear up and down (at least in public) that they would never accept SNP support. That is politics. Equally certainly, they would accept it in the event of a hung parliament – that’s politics too.
The political landscape has been transformed by Brexit and Corbyn. New political cleavages, more complex than the simple Yes/No binary of the Indyref, have emerged. The terrain is now more challenging for the SNP. But if they are able to tack successfully into the new political winds, these challenges can be met. These are some of the issues that the forthcoming SNP conference will need to address. If addressed successfully, the real SNP ‘peak’ is yet to come.
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Note: This article originally appeared at our sister site, British Politics and Policy. It gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics.
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About the author
Sean Swan – Gonzaga University
Sean Swan is a Lecturer in Political Science at Gonzaga University.
I have to disagree about decoupling Independence from a preference for EU membership. Your analysis does not take into account the opinion polls(Panelbase) which indicated that roughly:
33% of the Scottish electorate prefer an independent Scotland in the EU
28% prefer Scotland in the EU and UK
23% prefer Scotland in the UK and out of the EU
11% prefer Scotland out of both
5% don’t know
Look at that. Indy vs UK adds up to 44-51. Pro-Eu vs anti-EU adds up to 61-34. If those numbers look a bit familiar, there are very good reasons for that. I believe the conclusion is that the SNP cannot afford to vacillate on the Europe issue – not only do they jeopardise the plurality, it can only ever add roughly 11% of the vote. They simply have to go all-in, make the best argument possible to persuade as many of the 28% favouring both unions that the European one is simply better than the British one and hope that the 11% won’t take the huff and stay home.
You also fail to consider the logistical issues of campaigning for two questions simultaneously. This could result in a confusing hodgepode of Yes/Yes, Yes/No, No/No and even a No/Yes(prefer to stay in UK, but unwilling to leave the EU as well) campaigns. And what if, when the votes are all counted, there are majorities for staying in both unions when this is impossible? Disentangled – is that right, aye?!
In any case, Scotland will not be automatically readmitted into the EU. The Commission has been clear on that – newly sovereign states must apply for admission and run through the process. Whilst it’ll be mostly a box-ticking formality, we do need to get unanimous agreement from all full EU members at the time(plus, the currency question is vital). My point is, the process can take some time and therefore if there are to be two questions, the second one should be kicked off into the distance.
I was going to say essentially the same, but you’ve given us the figures to back it up – thank you. I’ll just add that no-one in their right mind would currently reckon that Scotland, or Catalonia, I suspect, if independent of both the EU and the UK / Spain, would have a long-term future that would be acceptable to any significant proportion of their populations. The most any responsible politician should be suggesting is that Scotland leaves the UK while staying in (or re-joining, if need be) the EU or the EEA/EFTA – and of course many won’t think that right either.
So, much will depend on what sort of Brexit, if any, the UK chooses to have. Given current attitudes, my guess is that no option would be supported by a majority in the opinion polls, but that an EEA/EFTA outcome would be backed by the largest minority. However, after a short while in the, no doubt agreeable, company of Norway, many would be wondering whether the upheaval was worth it, and want to go back to where they started..
The SNP were open to supporting Labour at Westminster two elections ago.
Ed Milliband said he would rather have a Tory government than accept their support.
The SNP were open to supporting Labour at Westminster at the last election.
Corbyn said he would be open to SNP support.
However, given he and his party seem to have accepted the alternate reality that they won that election –
they didn’t
It’s unclear whether he is still so open to such support or messianically thinks he will not need it.
Meanwhile the SNP can proceed calmly onwards.
The opinion polls since you wrote this are even better news.
As for complicating the independence referendum.
No need.
Independence first.
The rest is Scottish politics decided by the people who live there.
Interesting and helpful article thank you =)
Corbyn’s ambiguity over Trident muddies the waters. Also, he has saddly come across as anti Scottish, referring to Scotland as a region of England. A Freudian slip perhaps.
Jeremy Corrbyn certainly seems pretty ignorant about Scotland which is astounding if he thinks Scottish votes are so important for Labour’s chances at the next General Election. In fairness, all votes for all parties are important.
Mr Corbyn has adopted many SNP policies as if by marvelous revelation. Policies that the SNP have long since and successfuly implemented in Scotland, most notable – free University education. More may have admired him as a decent statesman if he had given credit where it was due. And that is where the SNP are streets ahead.
Of course for the future of the people of Scotland and the rest of the UK, while we are still within that union,, the SNP will be willing to form a coaltion with Labour while they plan to embrace policies that are actualy aimed at benefiting the population. Whether Mr Corbyn finds his statesman within remains to be seen.
Mike Cassidy, I agree.
Independnce first.
The rest is Scottish poitics decided by the people who live here.
LSE, you are right about one thing, peak SNP is yet to come 🙂
I disagree with ‘… the only choice in Westminster is between a Conservative or Labour UK government,’ because there are coalitions, in theory, if enough people voted for some other party, it would be in power, and the current government is only there because it is propped up by the DUP.
@Alan what your figures demonstrate is that there are 44% who support indy. If you add the condition ‘indy within the EU’, that support drops to 33%. EU membership and Scottish independence are two separate issues, they neither overlap nor interlock. I fully take Richard’s point that Indy outwith the EU might be a foolish idea, but many would say that UK Brexit was a foolish idea – but people voted for it. We all know that there is a majority accross Scotland for EU membership. The likely out come of a referendum on indy that also asked if an Indy Scotland should be in the EU is ‘Yes’ to the EU (many of those who voted ‘No’ to the first question (indy) would vote ‘Yes’ to the second question on EU membership (think Edinburgh). The purpose of having a two question referendum is to allow those opposed to membership of the EU to still vote Yes in the first question on indy. .
There’s nothing either new or confusing about a two question referendum – it’s exactly what happened in 1997 with the Devolution referendum – remember ‘Yes/Yes’ and ‘No/No’?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_devolution_referendum,_1997
@Mike ‘[in 2015] Ed Milliband said he would rather have a Tory government than accept their [SNP] support’. – yes, a phenomenally silly statement. How many seats did Labour lose in Scotland in 2015? 40 out of 41, I believe. BTW, speaking of polls, have you seen what has happened to Corbyn’s popularity in Sotland?
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/corbyn-and-may-a-tale-of-two-approval-ratings-dzvgpqtrt
A ‘Corbyn bounce’ in Scotland is becoming a thing – if Slab don’t mess it up.
What happens with Catalonia and the final form of Brexit will impact future developments – of course. BUT those who think that a ‘hard’ UK Brexit will automatically increase support for Indy may well be mistaken. Why? Because if rUK is outside the EU and iScotland is in it, there would have to be some form of ‘hard’ border between iScotland and rUK, because that border would then be the EU/Single Market border. It is unavoidable – the EU would insist on it. A ‘soft’ Brexit makes a hard border unnecessary – that makes Indy easier, but also makes it less necessary because the UK would still be in the Single Market. A further factor with a ‘hard’ brexit is that there might be a mood that Scotland should not risk further uncertainty and the danger of ending up outside both the UK and the EU. The belief that Brexit = increased support for Indy is simplistic – as recent polls/elections show.