The cleavages created by Labour’s 2017 electoral performance and by Brexit have made the political landscape more challenging for the SNP. But if the party are able to tack successfully into the new political winds, these challenges can be met, writes Sean Swan, making the forthcoming conference decisive for the party’s future.
The SNP annual conference will be held on 8-10 October in Glasgow. It comes as Alex Rowley, Scottish Labour’s acting leader, claims that Scotland is past ‘peak SNP’. Support in the latest opinion polls has the party on 41% support in a future Westminster election, and 38% for a Holyrood election. Meanwhile, support for independence languishes at 43%, which is 2% lower than the Indyref result. These figures are hardly disastrous: the SNP share of the vote in the 2017 Westminster election was 36.9%, and the party took 41.7% in the 2016 Holyrood vote. But there is a tendency to judge the SNP’s performance against the 2015 Westminster general election when it took almost 50% of the vote.
The 2015 victory was the product of disappointed Yes voters, who effectively decided on a long march through the institutions, joining the SNP en masse in the wake of the 2014 independence referendum defeat. The 2015 victory was as close to total as it could realistically be, but failed to deliver much tangible progress towards independence. Had 2015 resulted in a hung parliament and a Labour government supported by the SNP, things might have been different. But it did not.
While 2015 was an outlier, the fact still remains that the SNP has not performed as well in recent elections as 2015 might have led people to anticipate. What has changed is that the SNP faces two issues which were not a factor in 2015: Brexit and Jeremy Corbyn.
Supporters of independence, the SNP’s broad voter base, can be broken in to three rough categories:
- Those who wish to see Scotland independent ‘within Europe’;
- Those who want an independent Scotland outside the EU;
- Those who see independence as the only alternative to neoliberal Tory or ‘Tory lite’ Blairite government from London.
Brexit has opened up a new political cleavage, not only within wider Scottish politics but also within the independence movement – including the SNP. The SNP was traditionally opposed to membership of the EU, and campaigned for a ‘No’ vote in the 1975 EEC referendum. It was not until 1983, due in part to Jim Sillars, SNP veteran and one time deputy leader, that the SNP changed its stance to one of ‘independence within Europe’.
But by the time of the Brexit referendum, Sillars had changed his mind. In fact, Sillars has stated that he would refuse to vote for independence in a second referendum if it meant re-joining the EU. And Sillars is far from alone. A poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft immediately after the 2016 referendum showed that 36% of SNP voters had voted Leave. In a similar vein, another SNP veteran and former minister in the Scottish government, Alex Neil claimed that ‘five or six’ SNP MSPs – himself included – had voted Leave. The British Election Study has shown that 9 out of 10 SNP voters who voted Yes to independence in 2014 and Remain in the 2016 Brexit referendum, stuck with the SNP in 2017. But the story was different amongst those who supported independence and then voted Leave. In 2017, four out of ten of them deserted the SNP for another party, having been ‘driven away by the party’s strong pro-remain stance’.
This is the first new cleavage: the split between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ nationalists on the EU question. The SNP needs somehow to decouple the independence question from the EU question. One possible solution would be for them to adopt a policy that any future referendum on independence should be a double ballot, like the 1997 referendum on creating a Scottish parliament. In 1997, voters were asked two questions – 1. should there be a Scottish parliament, and 2. should a Scottish parliament have tax-varying powers. A future independence referendum might similarly ask two questions: 1. should Scotland be an independent country? and 2. should an independent Scotland be a member of the European Union? The two issues would thus be disentangled.
The second problem the SNP faces is Jeremy Corbyn. Not only are many SNP voters former Labour voters, but modern Scottish nationalism grew under, and in reaction to, Thatcherism and New Labour. They came to support independence due to despairing of the possibility of a more social democratic government. The UK seemed irredeemably addicted to neoliberalism and increasingly dominated politically by the City. For left-wingers who came to see the UK state as essentially irreformable, independence thus became the only viable route to reform. Corbyn represents the end of ‘New Labour’ liberalism and the return of a more social democratic Labour party. In the 2017 UK general election, Labour increased its vote by 38% across Great Britain; however, in Scotland, the vote only increased by 1%. That the ‘Corbyn bounce’ has so far been limited is likely related to the Blairite nature of the leadership of Scottish Labour. Left-wing elements within Scottish Labour have made exactly this point, arguing that the Scottish Labour leadership had damaged Labour’s chances of winning a majority.
But the general election changed everything. Corbyn’s credibility as a future prime minister – and thus his hand – was enhanced. Corbyn undertook a five day long tour of Scottish marginals at the end of August. Whether connected or not, Scottish Labour leader, Kezia Dugdale, quit shortly afterwards. Dugdale had opposed Corbyn during last year’s leadership contest and backed his rival, Owen Smith.
The leadership contest resulting from Dugdale’s resignation has been controversial – especially for the one time front-runner, Anas Sarwar, who also opposed Corbyn. There are increasing signs of Scottish Labour potentially descending into civil war on Blairite/Corbynista lines. It is still too early to say what form Scottish Labour will take after the dust settles. If it descends into factionalism, or if another anti-Corbyn candidate such as Sarwar, becomes leader, the ‘Corbyn bounce’ will have only limited hop in Scotland. On the other hand, if a pro-Corbyn candidate such as Richard Leonard wins, it may present a problem for the SNP.
Iain Macwhirter makes an astute observation when he compares Momentum, the backbone of Corbyn’s Labour party, to the Yes campaign in the 2014 indyref. Both manifest the same energy, enthusiasm, and belief in the possibility of change. More fundamentally, both the Yes campaign and Corbyn’s Labour contain the hope of potential reform of the believed-to-be irreformable. The potential attraction for ‘left-wing’ SNP supporters is not hard to see.
There is a world of difference in the SNP contesting Holyrood elections and contesting Westminster elections. In Holyrood, the SNP is contesting to form the Scottish government. Given that the SNP does not contest elections outside of Scotland, it can never form the British government. (Nor, of course, does it wish to.) In a Westminster election, what is at issue is whether Labour or the Tories govern the UK. If a Labour government under Corbyn seems a real possibility, many former Labour voters who voted SNP in recent elections will be tempted to return to Labour. It might be wise for the SNP to make explicit what is already fairly implicit – given that the only choice for UK government is Tory or Labour, they should declare that they would support a Labour UK government. A vote for the SNP in a Westminster general election is not incompatible with a vote for Corbyn as PM. It is not an either/or choice between voting SNP or helping elect a Corbyn government. It is possible to do both – or ought to be.
Given that the only choice in Westminster is between a Conservative or Labour UK government, the SNP could adopt a policy similar to Irish parties in the past, such as the Irish Parliamentary Party’s support for the Liberals or the Ulster Unionist Party’s for the Tories. On his grand tour, Corbyn declared that “Scotland holds the keys to delivering a Labour government for the whole United Kingdom.”. That key could be delivered as easily by SNP MPs as by Scottish Labour ones. Naturally, Labour would swear up and down (at least in public) that they would never accept SNP support. That is politics. Equally certainly, they would accept it in the event of a hung parliament – that’s politics too.
The political landscape has been transformed by Brexit and Corbyn. New political cleavages, more complex than the simple Yes/No binary of the Indyref, have emerged. The terrain is now more challenging for the SNP. But if they are able to tack successfully into the new political winds, these challenges can be met. These are some of the issues that the forthcoming SNP conference will need to address. If addressed successfully, the real SNP ‘peak’ is yet to come.
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About the Author
Sean Swan is a Lecturer in Political Science at Gonzaga University.
All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Featured image credit: Pixabay/Public Domain.
I agree absolutely with a central assumption of the article that :- “Supporters of independence, the SNP’s broad voter base, can be broken in to three rough categories:
Those who wish to see Scotland independent ‘within Europe’;
Those who want an independent Scotland outside the EU;
Those who see independence as the only alternative to neoliberal Tory or ‘Tory lite’ Blairite government from London.”
The third group though are mostly split between the first two.
Furthermore, in my experience, many in the second group are happy to submerge their interest in exiting EU in order to achieve an exiting of UK using #ScotRef.
I agree with a central assumption of the article that :- “Supporters of independence, the SNP’s broad voter base, can be broken in to three rough categories:
Those who wish to see Scotland independent ‘within Europe’;
Those who want an independent Scotland outside the EU;
Those who see independence as the only alternative to neoliberal Tory or ‘Tory lite’ Blairite government from London.”
The third group though are mostly split between the first two.
Furthermore, in my experience, many in the second group are happy to submerge their interest in exiting EU in order to achieve exiting UK.
The SNP conference is reportedly dealing with these two issues by not putting them on the agenda.
Whether that will satisfy the core indepedence support – or the pro-EU support – remains to be seen.
It may be that indy2 becomes a kind of Clause 4 relic. A reason to vote for members loyal to that vision, but not.one that the party leadership feels obliged to deliver.
I think Nicola Sturgeon’s instinctive caution means that it will take a new generation of SNP leaders to reactivate it. Not unlike Corbyn.
The Party Conferences are stage managed affairs. If it indeed turns out that neither issue is on the agenda then its because the managers don’t want to show any rift in the party. Independence is within our grasp, divisions are ruthlessly exploited by the media – in particular the State broadcaster.
Nothing is really decided on at conference anyway, and no division will be on public display.
Incidentally, Mr Corbyn still does not have the support of his parliamentary party. I am surprised that is not newsworthy. Maybe if the bigger corporations think he is in with a chance of winning then that – and the 1970’s experience – will be all the papers want to pontificate upon.
Let me address this Ashcroft 36% of SNP voters voted Brexit,in my branch alone I know of 5 people that indeed vote Brexit ,however they are avowed Pro Remain .
Their reason for support a Brexit Vote was to get us to exactly where we are today.
Scotland voted Remain U, Brexit ,Indy Ref2 on the table.
Now I appreciate that does not sit well with the “experts” narrative .
However it is the reality and that is only ones I know of mahatma pattern will have been repeated up and down the country.
My advice for what it is worth do not base your assumptions on so many SNP voters being anti EU.
That said after the EUs shameful behaviour over Catalonia many hundred of thousands of democrats myself included will be reassessing their views on EU
@ Rod Robertson you wrote “in my branch [of the SNP] alone I know of 5 people that indeed vote Brexit , however they are avowed Pro Remain .
Their reason for support a Brexit Vote was to get us to exactly where we are today.
Scotland voted Remain EU, Brexit ,Indy Ref2 on the table”.
No, I don’t understand that. I understand the idea of getting a Remain vote in Scotland and a Leave vote in England and using that difference over Brexit to get Indyref2. But how does members of your branch voting Leave help that? Their voting Leave only helped reduce the difference between England and Scotland on this issue. Do you see what I mean?
Wee Ginger Dug had a strategy for Indy supporters to vote Remain – unless they happened to live in England or Wales, then they should vote Leave. The idea was to maximise the Leave vote in England and the Remain vote in Scotland. That made tactical sense. SNP members voting Remain in Scotland does make much sense if the intent is to maximise Scottish/English differences on the Brexit issue…
So one strategy said Indy supporters should vote Leave, the other that they should vote Remain. They probably cancelled each other out – and I wonder what percentage of the Scottish electorate in general were influenced by this one way or another, or even knew about it.
Thank you all for some very interesting comments.
@ Caroline perhaps what is ‘pragmatic’ varies depending on the political and economic context. The political centre is a bit like the old grey mare – it aint what it used to be. Surely the SNP should take a position on the only real issue at stake in a Westminster election – whether the UK ends up with a Labour or Tory government? And it is, or should be, fairly clear that the SNP is highly unlikely to support the Conservative and Unionist austerity party (under normal circumstances).
@ Kieran Wright you are absolutely right. I admit that a two question referendum is, to a degree, an attempt to solve political issues mechanically. On the other hand, it goes some way towards shaking out the two separate issues – there are four different positions, and such a referendum question gives them all expression: “Are you ‘Yes/Yes’, ‘Yes/No’, ‘No/Yes’ or ‘No/No’?”.
@ Lynda ‘There are other reasons that the SNP vote has held fairly steady. Policies. Policies which have created a buffer against the worst of austerity’. Agree fully, but was focussing in this article on the ‘big’ constitutional questions. BTW such anti-austerity policies are also what helps keep the broadly social democratic vote on side, and it is this vote which is most vulnerable to defection to Corbyn’s Labour – assuming Slab doesn’t remain Blairite or fall into factionalism.
@ yesindyref2 ‘That means those who voted NO but wanted more powers could and did also vote for the SNP for that reason’. Agree fully, but the overwhelming bulk of the 2015 SNP vote came from Yes voters – see the surge in membership over the weekend after the Indyref. Part of me wonders if the SNP would not actually do better to put indy front and centre and take a solid stand on that. I suppose the question is whether to put the emphasis on the main goal – Indy, or on the SNP winning elections and making maximum use of the devolved parliament to ward off austerity and incrementally increase the parliament’s powers where possible. In the bigger picture, much may depend (rightly or wrongly) on how the situation in Catalonia turns out…
Thanks for the reply and please do keep writing articles. During Indy Ref 1 some, perhaps most, of the sensible balanced articles about Independence were from or via LSE, plus a couple from Man U (uni not football!).
Secessionist parties like the SNP tend to want to compete mostly on the centre-periphery axis of competition (in the Scottish context that’s Westminster v Holyrood). The article rightly points out that one of the major issues currently facing the SNP is the fact that Brexit has made more relevant their position on another centre-periphery axis (EU v UK), the problem being that how the Scottish electorate sits on one axis doesn’t mirror the other.
I don’t see how the proposed solution of a two question referendum solves this problem. In reality the two issues can’t be “disentangled”. How the electorate decided to vote on the independence question would be heavily influenced by polling indicating how the vote on the EU question was likely to go. If the polls showed (as they probably would) strong support for Scotland being a member of the EU then the SNP would still face the difficulty of motivating pro-independence voters who are no more enthusiastic about Scotland being in the EU than they are about it being in the UK.
On the other hand if the polls showed that Scots were likely to vote against EU membership the overwhelmingly pro-EU SNP would be faced with the task of putting forward a viable prospectus for independence outside the EU. It would also face the problem of motivating pro-independence voters for whom EU membership is a crucial part of their vision of an independent Scotland.
Brexit has made it far more difficult for the SNP to assemble the broad coalition necessary for a majority vote for independence. A two question referendum would not make that task any easier.
All things heard before that could just as well be a copy and paste of various blogs that I tend to disagree with. The hard left is not attractive to Scots and the polls and elections prove it.
Scots are moderate people because they’re pragmatic. SNP understands this. The politics of left and right are defunct right across Europe. People want progressive pragmatism, intelligence, efficiency and honesty. SNP has this and should bow to extremism and slogan chanting.
What SNP should get right at the conference is EFTA or EEA membership and put ScotRef firmly back on the table.
What they got wrong in 2015 was letting unionists dominate the independence discourse.
“What SNP should get right at the conference is EFTA or EEA membership…”.
That strategy runs the risk of hardly satisfying anyone. Both pro and anti-EU supporters of independence might well see EFTA/EEA as the worst of both worlds. Pro-independence voters for whom EU membership represents an important part of their vision of an independent Scotland might not be happy with an option they would doubtless see as second best. On the other hand the traditional nationalists who dislike Scotland being in the EU as much as they dislike it being in the UK might see EEA/EFTA as merely a continuation of rule from Brussels by another name.
There are other reasons that the SNP vote has held fairly steady. Policies. Policies which have created a buffer against the worst of austerity. Policies which the Scottish Labour Party attempt to own (to wry smiles from most). Policies which the UK Labour Party has been quickly adopting. Policies which traditional Labour voters agree with. Added to this there has been a vacuum of policy from both Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish Conservative Party.
Indeed, during the 2017 general election the main policy from both of these parties was no to a 2nd independence referendum. They had very little else to say with the Scottish Labour Party tacitly lending support to the Scottish Conservatives by very lacklustre campaigning where they thought the Conservatives could oust an SNP candidate.
Scots are also aware that a Labour government will drag their heels on issues that matter to them. So Brexit is likely to be the catalyst for change. This means that the make up of a future yes campaign and support for SNP and IndyRef 2 is likely to be different to that of 2014.
A YES2 campaign may well lose some traditional independence support, but the big question is will it gain a bigger replacement from those 2014 No voters when we see the damage and lack of future opportunity of the Brexit decision.
“The 2015 victory was the product of disappointed Yes voters”
Not entirely, though substantially. The SNP manifesto for the election did not contain Independence. Apart from anti-austerity, it was about “holding Westminster’s feet to the fire” to quote Salmond, about pushing through the Smith Commission recommendations and making sure (as possible) they were implemented, plus “The Vow”. That means those who voted NO but wanted more powers could and did also vote for the SNP for that reason.