The Irish border issue has proven to be one of the most difficult problems to solve in the Brexit negotiations so far. Katy Hayward responds to recent proposals by Shanker Singham on how to address the issue, arguing that the proposals not only overlook the complex realities of Northern Ireland/Ireland connections, but also ignore the enormity of what has been accomplished in the past 20 years.
The EU Council agreed that the best way to deal with Northern Ireland/Ireland in the negotiations was to kick the can down the road once more. This issue appears to outweigh all others in its sheer intractability.
Into this vexed atmosphere bounces Shanker Singham’s recent article in CapX, with a most appealing title: ‘How to fix the Irish border problem’. Somewhat disappointingly, Singham’s claim to ‘fix’ the problem centres largely on downplaying its existence. He does this on two grounds. First, he emphasises that the Irish border is already an international border and that its openness is exaggerated. He outlines here the type of controls that international borders already have to enforce (rules of origin, VAT payments, veterinary checks etc.). Unfortunately for him, none of these are currently enforced through controls at the Irish land border, which somewhat undermines the force of his argument.
His second claim is that trade across the Irish border is of ‘relatively limited economic significance’. Here he uses figures (I cannot properly call them statistics given that no source or attribution is provided here) to illustrate that sales to Great Britain from Northern Ireland are more important than sales to the Republic of Ireland (four times so, in actual fact).
Can we imagine such a similar point being made of Northumbria or Cornwall? Of course, domestic sales are more important than exports – it would be quite odd if they weren’t. In stressing the importance of Great Britain compared to Ireland, though, Singham ignores several key facts that help explain why customs controls on cross-border trade would be so detrimental.
Northern Ireland’s sales to the Republic of Ireland are worth 14% of its external sales in goods and 39% of its external sales in services – it is by far the most important trading partner for Northern Ireland. And we are not just talking about import/export here; supply chains across the border are highly integrated. How will putting barriers to trade with its nearest neighbour – and effectively enforcing greater dependence on the domestic market (or, to be more precise, the Treasury) – benefit Northern Ireland, even as it tags along in Global Britain’s independent trade policy?
Despite the lack of evidence for all of Singham’s claims, there are a few unexpectedly frank admissions. ‘For there to be no change at all at the Irish border would require the entire UK to be in the Customs Union and Single Market’, being one of them. Another is that, after Brexit, there will be ‘necessary customs and related controls’ across the Irish border. Singham’s ‘fix’, it becomes apparent, in no way addresses the requirement for these controls in the first place – and it is on that requirement that the EU seeks serious proposals.
He offers a bundle of ideas here. He suggests that cross-border traders should be placed into one of two categories: small or large. For the small ones, the idea would be to basically turn a blind eye (which is, in effect, a decision to not enforce a customs border). For the larger ones, there is quite a bit of a burden to be shouldered:
In exporting to the other side of the land border, they would complete all necessary paperwork in their home jurisdiction, submit it to authorities on both sides through a joint platform certifying their goods were safe to be released, rules of origin requirements had been met (or if not, the amount of duty that would be due), and so on, and stating the destination of the goods (for example, the importer’s premises). The consignment would then be sealed to cross the border…Any necessary payments of VAT and import or excise duties would be made afterwards.
This sounds like a border that is far from ‘frictionless’. But perhaps the biggest point that Singham misses is the reason why the Irish border has been prioritised by the EU. It has been prioritised because the Irish border was a ‘problem’ long before the UK decided to withdraw from the EU.
Copyright David Dixon and licensed for reuse under this Creative Commons Licence.
Singham mentions the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement but fails to appreciate the full implications of this international treaty. The 1998 Agreement went hand in hand with fundamental change to the constitution of the United Kingdom as well as to the Republic of Ireland. The UK became an internally-differentiated state. The power-sharing Executive and devolved Assembly in Northern Ireland operate interdependently with unique cross-border institutions, both north/south on the island and British/Irish.
Within this framework, north-south cooperation isn’t primarily about trade but about things that matter to people in real terms: road safety, flood risk management, specialised health services, mobile phone roaming. Such practical matters – many of which make sense purely given the geography of the place, with no implications for constitutional sovereignty or identity – are behind the EU’s proposal for a common regulatory area between north and south in a limited number of specific areas.
Singham’s headline claim that ‘there is no inherent reason why physical controls at the Irish border are needed after Brexit’ is essentially the expression of intention to enforce controls ‘behind the border’. Such controls – entailing monitoring, surveillance, on-spot inspections – are ones that would be resented in any part of the United Kingdom. This proposal not only overlooks the complex realities of Northern Ireland/Ireland connections, it ignores the enormity of what has been accomplished in the past 20 years since the 1998 Agreement. His fix, in other words, fixes nothing much at all.
This article first appeared at UK in a Changing Europe & EUROPP. It gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE Brexit or the London School of Economics.
Katy Hayward is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Queen’s University Belfast. She has written a more detailed 8,000-word paper in response to the points Shanker Singham raised, which you can read here.
This is a vitally important point, and something that ‘armchair’ economists such as Singham miss; perhaps unsurprisingly, for I see he is at the Institute of Economic Affairs, a ‘right-wing neoliberal’ and Hayekian think tank.
Singham really should look at the history and geography of the border. For many years during the ‘Troubles’ it was heavily militarised; watchtowers and squaddies with SLRs stopping cars and asking what the purpose of travel was. Crossing between Newry and Dundalk was very unpleasant and threatening. Minor roads, the ones that would have been called ‘unapproved’, were blocked. If you take the road from Clones, in the south, to Cavan which is also in the south, you cross the border four times in about six miles. When the trains ran between the two towns, their line crossed the border six times; and there were customs checks at every crossing. Unsurprisingly, this line didn’t last long after partition.
Look at the geography. Concession road between Clones and Cavan goes through Coleman’s Island, the Drummully Polyp or Salient. This area is a pene-enclave, a contiguous part of the south which can only be reached by land by going through the north; the narrow connection at the base of the polyp is a river. And, there is a much smaller pene-enclave of the north just beside it; this can only be reached by going through the south.
Suppose on your journey from Dundalk to Newry you wish to stop for refreshments at the Carrickdale Hotel (which is in the south). As you leave the dual carriageway, which is in the south, the slip road suddenly passes into the north. At the T-junction you turn to the right, and within a few yards you are back in the south. But if you were to turn left towards Jonesborough the border is down the centre of the road, as it is further along.
Follow the border on a map; it ends at Lough Foyle at the northern extremity, and at Carlingford Lough at the eastern limit. What you won’t see is where the border is in either lough; it has never been formally agreed. The Good Friday Agreement had a clause which would set up the Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission to grapple with this. The significance is for fishing; whose fish are you catching?
Irish and EU officials have at least gone to the border to see for themselves; British officials haven’t. Only by understanding the history and geography are you able to understand the complexity, and to see how it relates to people in their daily lives.
Singham is a notorious Brexit Ultra, who has somehow worked himself into a position of advising our government on Brexit issues. Before recently arriving at the IEA, a ‘right-wing neoliberal’ and Hayekian think tank, he was Director of Economic and Prosperity Studies at the Legatum Institute, an even more right wing neo-liberal think tank than the IEA.
Basically, he either has a very tenuous grasp of the issues involved, or more likely, he has a neo-liberal agenda for his preferred outcome which destroys any objectivity he is trying to project His advice on the Irish border, as the article above clearly shows is either conscious misrepresentation or a complete lack of any kind of research.
To find out even more about this man’s ideologically driven economic opinion, google Singham eureferendum.com which brings up a number of very interesting blogs about how Singham and Legatum have been positioning themselves to drive through a very hard Brexit without any worries about the consequences.
Is it not good policy for the Government to take advise from both notorious Brexit Ultra’s (tour term) and notorious EU Ultra’s.
Do they not then get both sides of the story to make their decision?
As I understand it Mr Shanker is not making the decisions.
advice not advise, of course I should have written.
I think you misunderstand a number of fundamentals. Government policy should be decided by evidence. Getting in a couple of ideologues from opposing sides to give advice does not constitute evidence. The government is trying to decide a post EU position for the UK. Their main objective should be the freedom and prosperity of the population of the UK. If it is not, they are failing in their constitutional duty.
Mr Signham has been advising the Ultra Brexit wing of the Tory Party (the ERG in particular). His brief is to influence government policy. Of course, he is not making the decisions but he is not an expert as this article clearly shows and yet he been shown to have extraordinary influence. This is anti-democratic, as is any privately paid lobbyist who has such close ties to government.
Here’s a radical solution to the Gordian Knot of the Irish problem. Why not cut NI loose and let them go rejoin the Irish Republic or declare independence themselves? The British presence in NI has been largely resented historically, and whilst the Unionists would make a lot of noises about NI potentially leaving the Union and reunifying the Irish Island the question begs to be asked: why can’t they just move over to the British Mainland then if they love the UK so much?
Hard choices will have to be made. Reunification is something that will pop up on the horizon sooner or later, not least because of demographical change in NI. Brexit merely bring this farce of pretending there’s some kind of compromise solution to the Irish question to the fore. I have never supported the GFA; it was a shit deal that papered over cracks and dirty deeds on all sides with no accountability or redress for the victims of the Troubles, and kicked the can down the road regarding Irish unity or partition for demographics to sort out.
Does London really care about the Irish border? Or is David Davis just piqued that little Ireland, of all things, is impeding Britain’s negotiations with the EU? I sense an underlying contempt wafting westward over the Irish Sea.