Does the West hold some responsibility for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? Pierre Haroche examines the claim that NATO expansion into Russia’s sphere of influence provoked the conflict.
Much has already been said about John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s claims that, according to the realist approach to international relations, the West is to be blamed for the Russia-Ukraine war. Their main argument is that NATO and the EU have recklessly interfered with the Russian traditional sphere of influence by expanding to the East first, and then by cooperating with Ukraine, which caused Moscow to react to protect its turf.
Many counterarguments have highlighted the limitations of structural realism itself. I argue here that the West’s Ukrainian policy is much more in line with realist logic than what prominent realist authors have indicated. The reality behind the notions of ‘sphere of influence’ or ‘backyard’ are in fact much more dynamic than is often assumed.
Realism and the Russia-Ukraine war
First, there is a methodological caveat. Theories such as balance of power focus on only one level of analysis – in this case, the international system – and, as such, cannot account for all dimensions of a particular historical event. As Kenneth Waltz puts it, the balance of power theory helps us understand ‘the pressures states are subject to,’ but it ‘does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday.’ Even if we assume that balance of power is an important factor in the Russia-Ukraine war, this does not imply that Putin is a rational security seeker, as opposed to a paranoid imperialist. Structural considerations cannot arbitrate unit-level questions about the origins of the war.
Second, there is a theoretical problem. Even if we assume that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is essentially an attempt to balance NATO’s expansion, does this necessarily mean that the West is to be blamed? The fact that Russia feels threatened by the power of the West does not mean that the West should back down. Seeking peace through voluntary power restraint could make sense in a liberal paradigm, not in a realist one.
In a realist framework, the biggest mistake a leader can make is to base their decisions on an erroneous assessment of the distribution of power and resolve. Wars are not so much the result of the competitors’ ambitions but of their inability to agree on their respective chances of victory. In this sense, a consistent realist observer could perfectly argue that Putin is the one to be blamed because he has overestimated Russia’s power vis-à-vis both Ukraine and the West. For their part, the EU and NATO, by extending their influence, would only be drawing on the logical consequences of Russia’s relative weakness.
This is even more evident if we adopt the framework of ‘offensive realism’ promoted by Mearsheimer. Following this logic, states are incentivised ‘to maximise their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximise their security’ (p. 21). Therefore, an offensive realist might consider that, if NATO had shown more restraint in the 1990s by refusing to expand into Eastern Europe, this would not have necessarily led Russia to be less ambitious. Today, the confrontation between the West and Russia might not take place in Ukraine, but in Poland, under much more unfavourable conditions for NATO. Some theorists have even suggested that NATO should actually be blamed for not having expanded fast enough to Ukraine to prevent Russia’s aggression.
Balance of stakes
How can we arbitrate this debate? Implicit in these arguments are different assessments not so much of balance of power but of balance of stakes. According to Mearsheimer et al., Ukraine is an existential stake for Russia but a non-essential one for the West. For them, Russia’s Ukrainian policy is equivalent to the Monroe Doctrine in the Americas.
Conversely, as Mearsheimer puts it, ‘The United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest’. According to this assumption, the West would have underestimated the value of what is at stake for Russia and thus the Russian resolve to defend its area of influence. However, it could be argued that an independent Ukraine is also essential to NATO security. For European states in particular, Ukraine is not a distant issue. Western efforts to keep Ukraine out of Russian domination are no less rational than Russian efforts to keep Ukraine out of NATO.
Balance of stakes is as crucial as balance of power when we want to understand the fate of a particular war. For example, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (p. 60), Mearsheimer writes, ‘Few would deny that the United States was a vastly more powerful state than North Vietnam, yet the weaker state was able to defeat the stronger in the Vietnam War (1965–72) because non-material factors trumped the balance of power.’ Actually, what trumped balance of power was a largely material factor – balance of stakes. Vietnam’s territory had much more value and utility for North Vietnamese than for Americans, which largely explains why the former were prepared to make much greater sacrifices than the latter to achieve victory.
While it is difficult to assess the value of Ukraine for Russia and that for the West, we can make an important observation: the balance of stakes is rapidly shifting in the West’s direction. As the war stimulates Ukraine’s resistance and anti-Russian sentiment, the value for Russia of a potentially Moscow-ruled Ukraine (or part of it) tends to decrease.
Just as European colonial powers realised during the decolonisation movement, a hostile and mobilised society can be very expensive to occupy in the long run and tends to become more a burden than an asset. This explains why possessions initially considered essential to the maintenance of British or French power and prestige, such as India or Algeria, were eventually abandoned, even though the colonisers had not suffered any decisive military defeat on the ground. The prize was simply no longer worth it.
Conversely, the Russia-Ukraine war has dramatically increased the value of Ukraine for the West. Within a few months, Ukraine has proven to be a highly effective bulwark against Russia’s expansionism and the de facto spearhead of Europe’s defence. Ukraine’s ability to immobilise the Russian army, greatly reducing its capabilities and exposing its weaknesses, contributes much more to NATO’s security than most NATO member states do. Even in the longer term, having the military skills, unique experience and moral strength of the Ukrainian people on NATO’s side would be an invaluable asset.
Whose backyard?
In summary, a victorious Russia would gain a ruinous colony; a victorious West would gain a precious ally. In the battle for Ukraine, Russia has less and less to gain, while the West has more and more to gain, which might eventually influence their respective incentives to invest in the conflict. This dynamic helps us to understand, for example, why EU and NATO enlargements to Ukraine might have seemed unnecessary risks a short time ago but now seem increasingly reasonable investments. The stakes have grown.
In his seminal piece, Mearsheimer writes, ‘The West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests.’ If we define a great power’s ‘backyard’ as a geographically close area in which it holds both political influence and special interests, we can conclude that this relationship tends to be reversed today. By attacking Ukraine, Russia has recklessly threatened the West’s strategic interests and is now suffering consequences. Ukraine is now the EU’s and NATO’s ‘backyard.’
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: kremlin.ru
Finland was neutral and not invaded by either side for at least seven decades as both “sides” respected its neutral stance, including Finland. The deduction I take from your argument is that the idea of a neutral buffer state cannot be rationalized.
Yes, I think your realism is more current and in-touch with modern realities; and maybe when realism is real, it’s so obvious that you don’t have to put it in a box and label it as such; it’s just understood as the reality of the situation (that Putin chose to invade Ukraine, mostly unprovoked, and that some of the soviet era anachronisms of Mearsheimer no longer apply; although the threat of nukes and power struggle and Nato expansion all does still apply). In short, I think you make especially good points about how the nature and context of the situation itself is a dynamic thing; not just momentum, but the nature of the conflict and interests itself change. For example, in response to Michael’s comment above: yeah, it’s great to be neutral, until you get attacked by Russia… at which point you might not feel like being neutral anymore.
Mearsheimer’s views on this war have become dated due to new facts as enunciated here and elsewhere. His detractors, however, have been too quick to denounce his clear analysis covering the lead-up to this invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Where Mearsheimer staked his claims too far is his conclusion derived from his analysis, i.e., the justification of the decision on the part of Moscow to have Russia invade Ukraine. Russia was not going to be invaded militarily by Ukraine, the EU or the US, severally or in any combination, now or in any foreseeable future. Apart from geopolitical machinations by all involved which are not made public except by the leaking of deniable aspects of deliberations, it beggars belief that Russia would threaten the West, or even just Europe, by initiating an offensive military conflict, except perhaps when its leadership were sufficiently provoked. Barring convincing revelations to the contrary, we may assume that Moscow considered it essential for its then current, continuous and near-future interests to take the course of action it did. Although many Russians have proven to be good chess players, in this instance of geopolitical chess it is difficult to see a positive outcome for the Russian regime currently in power.
Finally, for now, the notion that according to offensive realism, or any theory, a state has to maximise its relative power in order to optimally maximise its security can be carried too far. There is the simple law of reduced gains due to increasing over-investment or input of relevant applications, be they diplomatic, trade related or geopolitical machinations, which can lead to a rapid diminishing of gains resulting in the real or perceived need for offensive expeditionary actions which, though justified by whatever is the excuse of the day, can easily come to haunt the aggressor and reduce that state’s security rather than enhance it.
As I understand from my undergraduate studies in History At the University of Toronto ( 1978 – 1982 ), the Realist view of a complete victory in the case of a conflict between two potential nuclear combatants is not achievable nor is its pursuit desirable given the potential for a catastrophic ending. The only Realist arguments that I have read regarding the present conflict in Ukraine, including John Mearsheimers, go to great lengths not to reduce the conflict to what can be justified by one side only. We all know or should know from past experience that the first casualty of war is the truth and the less objective we becomes as adjudicators the greater the potential for the war to spread and escalate behind unquestioning public support. It is, in my experience, the grounding in objectivity that provides the guide rails for the Realist Theory. The present criticisms levelled at the politics of the crisis by the Realist academics concerns the absence of historical record in the current narrative, as though out of a vacuum Russia Attacked Ukraine for no reason other than Putins imperial ambitions. Anyone who reads books, magazines, papers or indulges in electronic media understands the origins of the conflict go back a long time before the invasion of Feb 24 /22. Anyone versed in the origins of the conflict finds the ruse of imperial ambition hard to abide. In Fact this same ruse found utility in the First World War against the Germans who were then dehumanized as Huns. At the very least we know that the outbreak of hostilities began in Feb 2014 with a coup that resulted in the installation of a pro western leader the consequence of which was Putins invasion of Crimea. At that time there was no indication it was done for imperial ambitions. To underscore the veracity of that statement I would refer you to American ambassador to Russia ( 2012 – 2014 ) Michael McFauls’ comments after the annexation. ” Putin’s seizure of Crimea was not planned before the crisis but was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraines pro Russian leader.” For most, it seemed like a no brainer. Crimea was mostly occupied by ethnic Russians. It was home to Russias most strategic naval base and ports which provided vital year round access to the worlds seas and oceans for their international trade and commerce. They were not going to suffer the potential consequences of allowing a pro western government in Kyiv, already invited to join Nato and entertaining the idea of joining the E U, to interfere with or gain control of such an important strategic asset nor will they in the future without using everything at their disposal to prevent it. That includes insuring there is a zone of Russian occupied territory as a security buffer between Ukraine and Crimea. Of course under the present circumstances of preserving democratic rights the Nato allies will not countenance any of this. In the Liberal world order democratic rights have somehow managed to trump human life for more than 30 years now.
The “realist” view ignores the obvious slippery slope, that a country’s “backyard” is not fixed if they’re expansionist. If we should let Russia invade Ukraine because it’s Russia’s backyard, and Russia wins, Moldova and Poland suddenly become Russia’s backyard.
If Russia wins there, Romania and Germany become Russia’s backyard. It’s not too long then until the English Channel becomes Russia’s backyard. And no responsible government could simply cross its fingers and hope that Russia loses on the way – the duty of any government is to protect its people and take threats seriously.
The actually realistic view is that since Chamberlain, nobody will again believe an empty promise that a country which claims a neighbour as part of its own will stop there. They will expand until they get to you. “realists” are like those at the back of the Titanic celebrating that their side of the ship is high above the water!