Peter Pellegrini was elected as the new President of Slovakia in the second round of the country’s presidential election on 6 April. Erik Lastic and Tim Haughton identify four factors that explain Pellegrini’s victory and assess what the result could mean for Slovak democracy.

Elections can signal a change of direction or the continuation of a course. Peter Pellegrini’s victory in Slovakia’s presidential election on Saturday looks set to confirm the continuation of the country’s journey along an illiberal path.

Although the formal powers of the Slovak presidency are limited, the incumbent can act as an obstruction by vetoing legislation and has the exclusive authority to appoint key posts such as the Attorney General and members of the constitutional court. Moreover, the presidency has symbolic power in representing the state, and on formal set-piece occasions, the President can laud or lambast the government in power.

Pellegrini’s long-term popularity

Four factors help explain Pellegrini’s 53% to 47% victory over Ivan Korčok in the second round. First, Pellegrini’s popularity meant the election was always his to lose. As soon as speculation began about who might run in the elections, Pellegrini’s name topped the polls. The speaker of parliament and leader of Hlas (“Voice”) – the second largest party in the government coalition – had long been one of Slovakia’s most popular politicians. Although clearly associated with the Marmite figure of Slovak politics, Prime Minister Robert Fico, Pellegrini crafted a more moderate image palatable to a wider electorate.

In a political system where levels of trust for all politicians are admittedly quite low, Pellegrini was often regarded as the most trustworthy. Perhaps the only other politician who was capable of appealing to a wider electorate was the incumbent, the liberal and progressive President Zuzana Čaputová. But Čaputová chose not to seek re-election, pointing to poisonous personal barbs from her opponents and the harassment her family endured during her five-year term.

A rematch in a polarised environment

The presidential election followed hard on the heels of September’s parliamentary elections, when three-time Prime Minister Fico returned to power at the helm of a three-party coalition. Fico is a polarising figure in Slovak politics. He is seen by supporters as a defender of Slovakia’s national interests and the poorer sections of society. But opponents see his government as motivated by corrupt self-interest and guilty of taking Slovakia down an illiberal path away from the European mainstream.

Concern over Slovakia’s illiberal slide had led to widespread demonstrations across the country and led many opposition forces to flock behind the candidacy of Ivan Korčok. A career diplomat, Korčok sought to mobilise voters with a promise to act as a check on the Fico government and to resist moves towards a more pro-Russian foreign policy.

Mobilising turnout

Campaigns matter and can persuade voters to turn out to vote and/or change their preferences at the ballot box. Pellegrini increased his vote tally from 834,718 in the first round to 1,409,255 in the second round and saw his share of the vote jump from 37% to 53%. This indicates both mobilisation and conversion played a role in his electoral success.

Central to the overall increase in turnout from 51% to 61% was the polarised nature of the election. Pellegrini’s main message was a promise to bring calm to Slovak politics. Designed to mobilise voters of the governing coalition partners, Pellegrini sought to contrast his offer to the prospect of a Korčok presidency. A victory for his rival, Pellegrini claimed, would mean the presidential palace would become a nest for the opposition and would herald an era of chaos.

Pellegrini and his supporters pointed to the experience of the anti-Fico government forged after the 2020 parliamentary elections and conjured up the fear that a victory for Korčok would lead to a return to instability. The fact that Korčok had served as Foreign Minister in that government and his campaign’s clarion call to “Zastavme ich” (“let’s stop them”) only added grist to the mill.

Switching to Pellegrini

The second major source of Pellegrini’s support was voters who had cast their ballots for other candidates in the first round. Two specific messages in particular had resonance with certain voters.

First, criticisms of engagement in the war in Ukraine played well with nationalist voters. Since taking power, Robert Fico had not only delivered on his promise to halt military support for Ukraine but had intensified his rhetoric, depicting the conflict as a proxy war. During the campaign Pellegrini declared he would be a president for peace, expressing his willingness to stick to the position even if he faced criticism from the West.

Moreover, leaping on Emmanuel Macron’s mention of the possibility of western military deployments and Korčok’s strong commitment to defend Ukraine, Fico and his allies evoked the fear that Slovakia would be sucked into a military conflict. Even though the presidency does not have the power to deploy troops, social media, in particular, was awash with emotive messages encouraging voters to turn out to ensure that Slovak sons and grandsons would not be sent to die in the war.

Second, Pellegrini and his allies courted the votes of ethnic Hungarian voters, who make up 8% of the electorate. The government not only held a cabinet meeting in a town with a large ethnic Hungarian population but also announced funding that would benefit the regions where that ethnic minority live.

But Pellegrini also benefited from the Hungarian media heavily promoting him, including a high profile interview on Hungarian state TV M1 the week before polling day that was repeated on several occasions and shared on social media. Furthermore, although it is hard to discern the impact of cues from politicians, the endorsement on the eve of the second round from the leader of the ethnic Hungarian party, Aliancia, is likely to have shifted some votes.

A Pellegrini presidency and the future of Slovak democracy

Pellegrini’s opponents sought to depict him as Fico’s bag carrier or as an “obedient dog” who will do whatever his master wants. Clearly, a Pellegrini presidency will be less obstructive for Fico, indicating that he may indeed be able to bring the calm he promised.

But Pellegrini’s elevation to the presidency may create the conditions for turbulence. Following the usual practice, the new President will step down as a party leader, creating not just a vacancy but existential questions about the future of Hlas. Moreover, opponents of Fico have declared their commitment to continuing the demonstrations and resisting the illiberal turn. The course for Slovak democracy may be set for the near future, but it is not cast in stone.

Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: photocosmos1 / Shutterstock.com