In this article, Sanaa Hardadou explores the history of military coups and insurgencies in Burkina Faso. Hardadou finds that despite their initial promises, the coups often eventually further destabilized the country and subjected it to international and internal conflicts. This in turn served to divide the country and Africa.
Introduction
The recent Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg brought to the spotlight Burkina Faso’s president, Ibrahim Traoré – the world’s youngest leader at age 35. Compelling in rhetoric, charismatic in tone and intriguing in appearance, many have likened him to the revolutionary Thomas Sankara, but behind his youth, speeches and military persona, lies a harsh reality – that of deep-seated political volatility. Traoré’s assumption of power occurred in September 2022 after overthrowing Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, the same man that he helped install 8 months prior, in a coup against President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. All this puts into light the history of Burkina Faso: a country now demanding the end of what they consider French exploitation and pursuing a closer alliance with Russia. The September coup has had incredible support, especially amongst the rallied youth, impassioned by Traorés pan-African speeches and invigorated by their frustrations at a long history of injustices. In this article, I posit that the reality of military insurgencies is far less romantic and grows increasingly dangerous in a region where ethnic division, religious fundamentalism, political instability and food insecurity have been rife. Rather, Burkina Faso’s past insurgencies, despite appearing to have been a fresh change, massively destabilised the nation and impeded development and stability.
A history of insurgencies
Burkina Faso was a French colony for 64 years after the Scramble for Africa, as propelled by the Berlin Conference of 1884.[1] Exploited, terrorised and stripped bare of its resources by the European power, France’s legacy in Burkina Faso is, indelibly, one of mass exploitation and violence. Since its independence in 1960, Burkina Faso has experienced 8 coup d’états and several suspensions of constitutions and the legislature. What has remained firm in Burkina Faso is the presence of France – its former coloniser. In fact, colonial rule still maintains its grip throughout the entire African continent whether through direct control of uranium mines in Niger by French state-owned companies, the establishment of military bases or the domination of the French language and its exacerbation of social hierarchies – all part of France’s neo-colonial Franco-African policy. As direct colonisation is no longer in fashion, this policy continues to allow the European power to extract the same economic gains whilst strengthening its diplomatic power through more indistinct efforts.[2]
Military coups have, undoubtedly, caused deep-rooted political instability which has hindered long-term domestic growth and impacted the development of basic infrastructure. Perhaps the most notable coup is the 1983 insurgency which put Thomas Sankara in power. Dubbed by many historians as the ‘African Che Guevara’, Sankara is generally well-known for his successful domestic campaigns increasing literacy rates, reducing infant mortality rates and championing women’s rights.[3]
However, a closer inspection of his presidency demonstrates that his coup perpetuated political instability and economic insecurity. Under his leadership, Burkina Faso was largely isolated internationally and for a country attempting to build up from subsistence level, the creation of enemies did Sankara no good. Domestically, his deliberate disregard for the deeply entrenched power structures in a culturally-driven society meant that many Burkinabés felt alienated by the inherently highly centralised government.[4] With a Marxist ideology that took precedence over pragmatism, the Burkinabé state was effectively marginalised, foreign aid packages rejected and alliances ruptured amongst fellow African nations.[5]
These foreign and domestic factors failures mounted to give way to the 1987 coup led by Sankara’s former right-hand man Captain Blaise Compaoré who remained president for the next 27 years until a popular uprising in 2014 saw him out. Ultimately, Sankara’s failure to implement solid, stable long–term political institutions to establish a foundation for the state as well as his international isolation, meant that Burkina Faso remained a fragile state and subject to insurgencies. Evidently, the very nature of military juntas apply another layer of instability and insecurity which prevent long-term developments, as displayed by the fact that in spite of Sankara’s social efforts, his autarkic economic developments were not maintained.[6]
The recent coups of Burkina Faso in 2022 served as a reminder of the frail foundations of the state. President Kaboré was deposed because of his inability to tackle the jihadist threat. Newly-installed President Damiba promised the prioritisation of national security, but in an unfortunate yet unsurprising turn of events, September saw another coup led by Ibrahim Traoré, the very man who formed part of the January insurgency. Traore’s centralisation of power in the military junta, suspension of the constitution and dissolution of the legislature severely undermined and continues to undermine the foundations of the state. He also claims to prioritise security threats before allowing elections in 2024, yet his forceful assumption of power has no clear direction.[7] Ironically, 2022 was the worst year for Sahel instability in a decade, according to ACLED.[8]
Conclusion
One of Burkina Faso’s main challenges is the growth of terrorism within its borders. Religious fundamentalism has plagued the Sahel region for decades. The region has now become a hub for terrorism and in recent years Burkina Faso has become the focal point.[9] The military juntas of January and September 2022 had cited this threat as the primary reasons for their undertakings. In fact, by September 2022, non-state armed groups controlled 40% of Burkina Faso. The notion set by insurgents in Burkina Faso since its independence that crises can be tackled by a forceful removal of the governing party has undermined the very concept of governance. Despite some of the positive changes that have come from certain coups such as Sankara’s social campaigns, their very nature has caused incredible damage and gave way to even more depositions. In recent years, this fragility has been compounded by the rise of terrorism in the Sahel.
Now, the waving of Russian flags in Ouagadougou presents a bleak image of submission to a new foreign power. Africa is a battleground for superpower rivalries with the West seeking to maintain its colonial grip, Russia playing on frustrations to their advantage and China entrenching itself through debt diplomacy traps. The solution is not a clear, nor simple one, but for progress, African nations must first view themselves as principal actors and not as clients of superpowers. The decision to wholly ally oneself with either East or West has always been a primary cause of Burkinabé insurgencies. However, coups have only created further conflicts, as good relations between Burkina Faso and neighbouring states have depended on the governing power. This has resulted in a divided Africa – a division that deepens with every inter-continental conflict on territory, ethnic divisions, religious persecution, famine, and coup. All this innately prevents the future achievement of a unified Africa.
Featured Image: A demonstration commemorating the departure of the French Ambassador in Burkina Faso. Courtesy of Le Parisien.
[1] “The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa”, The American Economic Review, vol.106.7 (2016), 1802, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43861113?seq=1.
[2] “France in Africa: A New Chapter?”, Current History, vol.112.754, 168, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45319215?seq=6.
[3] “‘Africa’s Che Guevara’: Thomas Sankara’s legacy”, BBC News, 30 April 2014, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-27219307.
[4] “Sankara and the Burkinabe Revolution: Charisma and Power, Local and External Dimensions”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.26.3 (1988), 442, https://www.jstor.org/stable/160892?seq=6.
[5] “Ideology and Praxis in Thomas Sankara’s Populist Revolution of 4 August 1983 in Burkina Faso”, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, vol.15, 1987, 86, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/thomas-sankaras-lost-legacy.
[6] “Thomas Sankara’s Lost Legacy”, Wilson Center, December 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/thomas-sankaras-lost-legacy.
[7] “Understanding Burkina Faso’s Latest Coup”, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, October 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/.
[8] “The Sahel Mid-Year Update”, ACLED, 2022, https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/sahel/mid-year-update/.
[9] “Burkina Faso: Second Coup of 2022”, House of Commons Library, October 2022, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9633/.
