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Ribale Sleiman-Haidar

December 9th, 2014

Elite Fragmentation and Securitization in Bahrain

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Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

Ribale Sleiman-Haidar

December 9th, 2014

Elite Fragmentation and Securitization in Bahrain

0 comments

Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

by Toby Matthiesen, University of Cambridge 

This memo was prepared for The Arab Thermidor: The Resurgence of the Security State’ workshop held at LSE on 10 October  2014 in collaboration with POMEPS.  


Protests in Bahrain, March 2011, copyright Al Jazeera English, source: flickr.com
Protests in Bahrain, March 2011, copyright Al Jazeera English, source: flickr.com

In February 2011, Bahrain probably had the highest ratio of protesters as part of the citizen population of any of the Arab countries. In the preceding decade, its security establishment, while never totally absent from politics, had become less visible. In mid-March 2011, however, the security forces were able to instigate a broad clampdown against the mobilized public and ensure the survival of the regime within a matter of days. How can this be explained? And what are the enduring consequences of the resurgence of Bahrain’s security state?

The general phenomenon of popular challenge and regime crackdown in Bahrain is not new, of course. Bahrain has experienced mass movements for democratic reform throughout much of its modern history. In most cases, harsh repression and the awarding of extraordinary powers to the security forces effectively ended those cycles of protest. In 1956, the leaders of a cross-sectarian reform movement, the High Executive Committee, were arrested and exiled, and many others were imprisoned at home. In 1965, a broad-based workers’ uprising that paralyzed key parts of the economy was suppressed. Thereafter, the British government installed Ian Henderson, a colonial police officer who had participated in the suppression of the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya in the 1950s, as head of security in Bahrain. He would oversee the creation of a special investigations unit to track domestic opponents. This unit was also key in protecting the regime after the ruler Sheikh Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa aborted the parliamentary experiment from 1973-75 and abolished parliament.

>> read the full memo on the Monkey Cage Blog


Other available memos

‘The Authoritarian Impulse vs. the Democratic Imperative: Political Learning as a Precondition for Sustainable Development in the Maghreb’, John P. Entelis, Fordham University

‘Militaries, Civilians and the Crisis of the Arab State’, by Yezid Sayigh, Carnegie Middle East Center

‘Arab Transitions and the Old Elite’, by Ellis Goldberg, University of Washington

‘Explaining Democratic Divergence: Why Tunisia has Succeeded and Egypt has Failed’, Eva Bellin, Brandeis University

‘Is Libya a Proxy War?’Frederic Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

‘Fiscal Politics of Enduring Authoritarianism’, Pete W. Moore, Case Western Reserve University

‘The Role of Militaries in the Arab Thermidor’, Robert Springborg, Sciences Po

‘Mass Politics and the Future of Authoritarian Governance in the Arab World’, Steven Heydemann, United States Institute of Peace

‘Security Dilemmas and the ‘Security State’ Question in Jordan’Curtis R. Ryan, Appalachian State University

‘Authoritarian Populism and the Rise of the Security State in Iran’, Ali Ansari, University of St Andrews

‘A Historical Sociology Approach to Authoritarian Resilience in Post-Arab Uprising MENA’, Raymond Hinnebusch, University of St Andrews

‘The Arab Thermidor’, Marc Lynch, George Washington University

 

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