The latest GDP figures confirm that the UK economy has essentially been flat-lining for the five years since the financial crisis began. The UK’s inability to achieve sustainable growth is rooted in longer-term problems arising from a failure to invest, notably in skills, infrastructure and innovation. Timothy Besley and John Van Reenen, co-chairs of the London School of Economics Growth Commission, which publishes its final report today, propose an integrated set of solutions.
The outlook for the UK economy looks bleak even for a British winter with output depressed for a longer period than even during the Great Depression. The institutions of UK economic policy-making seem unable to steer the economy out of nearly five years of stagnation and into a sustainable recovery. While the specific issues vary country-by-country, this theme resonates across the advanced world with output below potential and unemployment generally high. The spectre of Japan’s two ‘lost decades’ following an asset crash casts a shadow over much policy debate.
The LSE Growth Commission, which we have co-chaired, is a collaborative effort drawing on academic, business and policy-making expertise. Its aim has been to develop an evidence-based approach to policy over the long term. And the perspective also takes politics seriously, focusing on the structures that are needed to support growth policy beyond the next budget cycle, the next spending review and the next parliament.
The UK’s economic story
It is sometimes remarked that the British are the only people who indulge in Schadenfreude about themselves, revelling in stories of national decline. This is perhaps the inevitable legacy of being the first industrial nation. Although the UK has enjoyed significant improvements in material wellbeing for well over two centuries, UK GDP per capita was in relative decline compared with other leading countries, such as France, Germany and the US, from around 1870.
At first, the UK’s relative decline reflected an almost inevitable catch-up of other countries whose institutions created the right kind of investment climate. But by the late 1970s, as the UK had been comprehensively overtaken: US GDP per capita was about 40% higher than the UK’s and the major continental European countries were 10-15% ahead. The subsequent three decades, in contrast, saw the UK’s relative performance improve substantially so that by the eve of the crisis in 2007, UK GDP per capita had overtaken both France and Germany and reduced significantly the gap with the US. Figure 1 shows trends in UK GDP per capita since 1950. After falling behind for most of the post-war period, the UK had a better performance compared with other leading countries after the 1970s.
Figure 1: GDP per capita 1950-2011 (1980=100)

Source: Conference Board data, LSE Growth Commission
A range of important policy changes underpinned these economic gains (see, for example, Corry, Valero and Van Reenen, 2011; Card, Blundell and Freeman, 2004; OECD, 2012). These include increases in product market competition through the withdrawal of industrial subsidies, a movement to effective competition in many privatised sectors with independent regulators, a strengthening of competition policy and our membership of the European Union’s internal market.
There were also increases in labour market flexibility through improving job search for those on benefits, reducing replacement rates, increasing in-work benefits and restricting union power. The UK was open to foreign business and global talent: restrictions on foreign direct investment were eased in the 1980s and restrictions on immigration relaxed in the late 1990s. And there was a sustained expansion of the higher education system: the share of working age adults with a university degree rose from 5% in 1980 to 14% in 1996 and 31% in 2011, a faster increase than in France, Germany or the US.
In some policy areas, the UK has also led the way in seeking innovative institutional solutions, such as independent regulators, for designing and implementing policy more effectively. This created a better balance between political discretion, technocratic input and predictable rules. Strategic choices, rules and high-level objectives are set by government while independent bodies make decisions based on the criteria laid down by politicians and are held to account by parliament. This has mitigated the problems of political indecision and unpredictability that are important impediments to investment and growth.
In spite of these policy successes, a number of long-term investment failures have not been tackled. The most important of these are a failure to invest in mid-level skills, a failure to build adequate infrastructure – particularly in transport and energy – and a failure to provide a supportive environment for private investment and innovation. These problems have persisted due to the absence of a stable policy framework backed by a cross-party consensus in these areas.
Policy reforms for growth
The reforms that we propose are aimed at tackling these problems. First, for human capital, where the UK suffers from a stronger link between parental income and pupil performance than other countries, we propose:
- Improving teacher quality through expanding the intake of teachers and engaging in more rigorous selection. This is because ex ante evaluation of teacher quality is hard, but ex post evaluation easier.
- Creating a ‘flexible ecology’ by which we mean more autonomous primary and secondary schools, greater parental choice and easier growth for successful schools and their sponsors (for example, universities or educational networks).
- Linking targets, inspections and rewards more effectively to hold schools to account for the outcomes of disadvantaged pupils.
We propose developing a new institutional architecture to address the poor quality of our national infrastructure. This would dramatically reduce the policy instability that arises from frequent changes in political personnel and priorities, particularly in transport and energy:
- An Infrastructure Strategy Board to provide independent expert advice to parliament to guide strategic priorities.
- An Infrastructure Planning Commission to support the implementation of those priorities with more powers to share the gains from infrastructure investment by more generously compensating those who stand to lose from new developments.
- An Infrastructure Bank to facilitate the provision of finance, to bring in expertise and to work with the private sector to share, reduce and manage risk.
We propose improving the provision of finance for private investment and innovation through:
- Increasing competition in retail banking.
- Having the proposed Business Bank make young and innovative firms its top priority.
- Encouraging a long-term investment perspective through regulatory changes (for example, over equity voting rights) and tax reforms (for example, reducing the bias towards debt finance through an ‘allowance for corporate equity’).
Prosperity is strengthened when everyone has the capacity to participate effectively in the economy and the benefits of growth are widely shared. We propose reforming the way we measure and monitor changes in material wellbeing and its distribution, including regularly publishing median household income alongside the latest data on GDP.
Our core proposals can provide the stable policy framework that has long been lacking in the UK, one that will encourage long-term investment. By ensuring that difficult and contentious long-term decisions are based on the best available independent expertise, they would help to break the damaging cycle of institutional churn, political procrastination and policy instability.
The principle that policy should be evidence-based is now widely accepted, but often more in word than deed. Many of the areas where there are potential benefits to growth are largely untested. The benefits to long-term growth from properly conducted policy experiments in some areas could be significant while the costs of experimentation are modest. We therefore recommend creating an independent National Growth Council to review relevant evidence and to recommend growth-enhancing policy reforms that could be subject to rigorous evaluation.
Whether the LSE Growth Commission is successful in influencing the direction of policy remains to be seen. But we believe it offers a template for the engagement of academics in these important policy debates. The engagement with policy will not end with the report – the aim now is to try to build the consensus around a manifesto for growth. The challenge has never been greater given the pressures that mature economies are facing from international competition and a myriad of changes in the world.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
Timothy Besley is Professor of Economics and Political Science at the London School of Economics.
John Van Reenen is Director of the Centre for Economic Performance and a Professor at the London School of Economics
‘We propose improving the provision of finance for private investment and innovation through increasing competition in retail banking.’
300 years of banking history is evidence enough (to any interested observer) that the banks are incapable of regulating themselves and that the state can never pay any regulator enough to police them. Nor is it willing to protect and/or reward any of the several ‘whistleblowers‘ who have brought banks and rich individuals alleged wrongdoing to their attention over the years (as have the police).
Competition for the first time in three centuries would be a novelty for the banks and only a state supported (but not run) retail bank can provide that essential function for the financial sector in a capitalist mixed market economy.
The fact that there is no national retail bank system backed by the tax payer means that the nation is held to ransom by private banks, the financial class controlling the political landscape (it does not matter that the Bank of England was nationalized in 1946 it is hobbled by being tied to an overwhelmingly private finance sector which actually creates (through fractional banking) most of the money in a system that investor ’confidence’ dominates).
Rothschild informed us as to the object of private finance “Give me control of a nation’s money supply [salaries, savings and debt]. I care not who makes the laws“. His contemporaries and his successors benefited from successive governments acquiescence in the primacy of privately owned financial organizations as the overwhelming form of financial institution available for the citizen to save in, invest in or borrow from. Citizens’ remunerations are paid directly into privately controlled coffers, with no secure alternative. They have a choice, to keep their savings ‘under the mattress’ or place it in one private financial institution or another (to try and maintain its value in an inflationary financial environment).
To maintain a capitalist mixed economy the national retail bank cannot compete on rates. It would be the safest home for a citizen’s money, but not the most profitable home for a deposit nor the cheapest source of credit, the spread between savers rates and lending rates would be a fixed % greater than the average private bank rate spread (So the private bank can appeal to the more adventurous saver, investor and borrower who is after better, though more problematic, returns). The nationalized central bank, Bank of England in the UK, could alter the magnitude of the difference between the public and private saving and loan rates (but not be able to remove it – so a window of opportunity was always available for private banking) and the base lending rate in order to encourage or discourage credit in the market as it presently does and so try to control the debt levels in the economy.
The national retail bank would automatically reinforce the central banks actions because it would be an increasingly attractive safe home for savers and investors as base rates rose and eroded the proportionate difference between private and State bank savings rates. That would put pressure on private banks and restrict their issue of loans (cash could now move out of the private bank system as depositors, savers and investors worried about the security of their money) and so diminish the need for the central bank to intervene further in the market. Also loans would become more readily available from the national bank because of the influx of funds. Alternatively savers and investors having confidence in PLC banks and looking for better returns would move their money out of the national retail bank.
All citizens could automatically be given an account for life (utilizing a national insurance number) in a taxpayer guaranteed national retail bank. Through the national retail bank the citizen’s savings would assist private wealth creation of both individuals and businesses (by offering savings, investments and loans) and finance for public works. The tax payer would no longer subsidize corporate wealth creation by not guaranteeing deposits in private banks nor investing in them. The Bank of England’s power to influence bank behaviour would be enhanced. If they were ineptly managed, or engaged in unethical sales of financial products, individual banks could go bankrupt or have their banking permit revoked without threatening the national financial system’s viability.
All local authorities would be able to support (but not run) a credit union that would offer savings and current accounts (accessible by debit card) and small loans and into which all payments to its employees would be made (to transfer if they wish). National regional retail banks would be able to issue bonds, provide savings and current accounts (accessible by debit card), make loans and support local authority credit unions. The wages of all employees of the state would be paid into their national bank account (to transfer it if they wish). The taxpayer, via the nationalized central bank would be the lender of last resort for the public and private banking systems.
Governments have handed power to shape their nation’s future to a class whose aim was to maximize individual and business debt (more income for the bank) with as little interference by the state as possible (a philosophy most governments subscribe to). Supine governments were left with the responsibility of ineffectively controlling (through the central banks) the resulting booms and busts that were the inevitable result of finance houses generating more money (debt) than there were assets of matching value. Governments get blamed for allowing it to happen, which they deserve, but not for the right reason, they refuse to believe it is their responsibility to create and oversee the nation’s money system, not greedy bankers, for that stance they deserve all the vituperation they get.
It has always been an option to create a national retail bank as a place of safety for citizens money and a vehicle for a streamlined system of universal benefit and state pension disbursement beside a source of funds for enhanced pension saving, education loans, public works and private businesses but the provision of a safe home for citizens’ and businesses’ money has taken second place in politicians minds to giving financiers the latitude of ‘light touch’ regulation to access investment and sell financial products at home and abroad, a privilege they used over several decades to fleece the public and institutions to the tune of billions. A large number of the investments and products were totally unsuited to their financially illiterate customers, which included every strata of society and private and public institutions at home and abroad. Many of these deals are subject to worldwide multi-million dollar/pound claw-back litigation by individuals and organizations (public and private) who can afford the great expense of court proceedings that the average investor cannot.
Financial organizations are composed of inanimate systems whose integrity is completely dependent on the quality of the personnel who inhabit them (like any human construct) particularly those who occupy the key positions of authority. Their fitness should be judged by the results of their period of custody, not their reward (in their present incarnation most are protected from liability for reparation).