One surprise from the referendum result was the way in which areas of high public spending showed no gratitude for the largesse. The traditional approach to social division, focused on income inequality, will not heal a divided nation, argues Tony Hockley. Social identity is at least as important to uniting the country as social cash.
The contenders to succeed David Cameron have concentrated their plans to heal social division on traditional social policies: the promotion of “equal opportunities” and more targeted fiscal policies. One of the changes that the Cameron governments have brought about has been the development of behavioural science within policy decision-making. Behavioural analysis should also inform the response to the social division so brutally exposed by the Brexit vote. People need to be treated as humans, not “econs”.
During the referendum campaign the Leave campaign rhetoric of “taking back control” tapped into a very real and widespread sentiment. Concerns about “immigration and border control”, and about “control our own laws” appear to have been by far the most important factors behind Leave votes. Years of state investment appear to have only reinforced many communities’ sense of helplessness. It is questionable whether the current strategy of devolution will be sufficient to correct this.
Analysis of the referendum results reveals a strong correlation between socio-economic status and referendum votes. Those who voted Remain were concentrated within the highest status households. Those who voted Leave were least likely to have a passport. Therein lies a clue. On the surface it might appear that this is just about economic inequality, yet there were plenty of Leave votes in the green shires and county towns of England. When people are less mobile, they will be more sensitive to local changes over which they have no control. If the World they inhabit suddenly changes they feel powerless and threatened. They find themselves with little voice over the changes that affect them, and no realistic exit option. Protecting their social identity takes on great importance.
Group identities are forged over generations, from coal mining to farming. Economic and social changes since the 1970s, and rapid EU migration over the past decade have challenged their survival. In their work on “identity economics” the Nobel-winning economist George Akerlof and his co-author Rachel Kranton argue that policies need to address identity-related norms and ideals if social division is to be reduced. Their book uses fascinating case studies on the social context of gender and racial division. They reveal the role played by people’s pursuit of “identity utility” and the way in which social norms of behaviour assist them in this pursuit.
People abide by social norms appropriate to the social categories to which they identify, which have positive or negative spillovers on other groups. The natural tendency of opposing groups is to highlight the differences that define them, rather than focus on common behaviours. People cling to norms when they face disadvantageous situations. They provide psychological comfort, through their role in maintaining a sense of belonging.
The social context of a global city with a very mobile population such as London is very different to that of a suburban council estate or a rural village. It is far easier to judge a new situation to be disadvantageous or unfair within an otherwise stable environment than in one that is constantly changing. This judgement of whether change is good or bad is hugely dependent upon the social context. Hence the stark division of views on immigration.
In 2008 the Labour Government introduced a £35m Migration Impact Fund alongside a Cohesion Delivery Framework. This was scrapped in 2010, but a similar fund was reintroduced last year. These initiatives were based upon a belief that any problems were small and localised, and could be solved largely by targeted investment and by cultural support work within the immigrant population. It is now evident that policy needs to shift to address the identity issues of the resident population in areas affected by rapid social and economic change. This requires a new direction if a “One Nation” outcome is really the goal.
Approaches based on traditional economics, which do not account for identity, will not work. Thus the same old tactics of skewed resource allocation in state grants and heavy-handed intervention will not improve the feelings of inadequate self-determination and threatened social identities. The language of politics, rooted in traditional economics is too often perjorative. The assumption is that everyone should aspire to “better themselves”. The implied assumption is that poor communities are something that every rational person desires to escape from, if only they have the opportunity to do so. The lazy language of “broken Britain” and “sink estates” reinforces the sense that politics is inherently prejudiced against those who identify as working class or who would never contemplate moving home. For all the current interest in concepts of “well-being” and “happiness”, the presumption remains that the accumulation of status and wealth is the only rational goal.
The irony is that successive Governments have stepped in to suppress house prices in order to protect local identities in some of the country’s most attractive areas. Second homes and buy-to-let purchases have been put at a significant fiscal disadvantage to first homes. The most lucrative areas to be a landlord must now be where homes are cheapest. These communities face exactly the same identity threat as the Southern seaside towns, and the maintenance of a cohesive, community is arguably much more important.
Anyone in doubt about this should read Lisa McKenzie’s detailed account of life on Nottingham’s St Anns estate. McKenzie argues forcefully for recognition of the cultural dimension of inequality, alongside its economic aspects. The angry responses to the referendum outcome, and calls for it to be ignored, have reinforced the impression that cosmopolitan communities and politicians still stigmatise the poor as being ignorant and racist. No amount of social spending can improve this. Empathy takes consideration, not cash. Too often grants become just another form of control rather than a source of improved autonomy and self-esteem, regardless of whether they come from Brussels or Westminster. As Elinar Ostrom demonstrated in her Nobel-winning research, communities themselves are often the best architects of systems to protect common resources. Social identities are a common pool resource, as threatened by free riders as any other.
Whilst the political focus in the Conservative leadership election is on the negotiation of the UK’s exit from the EU, the real differentiating factor amongst the candidates for Prime Minister will be the way they respond to the popular cry for control. The referendum finally gave voice to people in “safe” Parliamentary seats, who either lack or reject the option of “exit” from their community.
The UK cannot prosper as an open, global economy if its social policies sustain deep divisions and hostility at home. Understanding and responding to identity will be at the heart of an effective strategy for One Nation conservatism. The restoration of some sense of national self-determination by leaving the European Union, and a constraint on EU free movement, will not address the real issue of control unless it is seen to permeate throughout Britain. Social identity is at least as important to uniting the country as social cash.
Tony Hockley was a Special Adviser in the Government led by John Major. Until the 1992 General Election he worked as policy adviser to the Leader of the Social Democratic Party, David Owen. He is now a Visiting Senior Fellow at the LSE, where he teaches Behavioural Public Policy.
I went to Summer school at LSE in 2013 and followed the 3-week course entitled, An Introduction to English Law. I had no law background and so just listened with rapt attention to all that was being said.
Looking back, it is interesting for me to remember that every lecturer on the course repeatedly stated that the U.K would and could never leave the EU because its legislation was so intricately bound up with EU law. I also noted that there was quite an anti-EU sentiment among the British students and possibly lecturers, on the course.
Today, all that has been overturned: the eminent lecturers so well-versed in U.K. and E.U. law have been proved wrong and young Brits are apparently crying over the loss of their E.U. membership!
To me, it just goes to show that none of us, no matter how bright or knowledgeable is able to go it alone – two heads are better than one (i.e. the U.K. was better off with the EU), we all have blind spots and biases that prevent us from being as big and mighty as we think we are and we all need each other, We all have something to contribute to the common good and unity is better than standing alone.
There has been ignorance on all sides.
Thanks Michele. What has happened challenges many long-held assumptions. Science develops with observations that don’t fit the theory, and we forget this too often. We’ve had a reminder!
I had a similar experince, Michèle, arriving at Oxford in 1971, anxious to learn at the feet of masters who represented a tradition I thought fixed & immutable & infinitely-wise — I’d studied it from afar, against the background of my own “derivative” version — only to discover that everyone at Oxford who knew that system busily and anxiously was learning about my own! And since then they’ve changed theirs, nearly completely: Brexit is a coup de grâce to far more than just the UK’s formal relations with the EU — Britain has been changed, changed utterly, since 1971. Echoing Tony’s reply to you, it is why Isaac Asimov said the most famous words of science are not, “Eureka, I have found it”, but, “Gee, that’s funny…” — in economics and particularly in politics we see the future, “as through a glass, darkly” — stay flexible.
@Tony Language is merely a symbol, Tony — if it doesn’t reflect an underlying reality it blows away in the wind, like advertising copy — one trouble with language analysis, content analysis, linguistic philosophy & policy of any sort, is that it is angels on the heads of pins unless there is meaning to accompany it, and meaning is a difficult thing. So if there is, say, inequality based on race in Manchester, simply banishing the term “inequality” there, or stretching the term “equality” to cover relative gradations making it meaningless — more-equality & less-equality rather than in-equality, for instance — the social and political problems will be multiplied rather than reduced by the NewSpeak or CorrectSpeak. viz. 1984… Certainly I would restore language civility — remove Trump from political discourse over here, clean up brutalisms and dissembling in UK politics — but beyond that I think real reforms must precede language reform, otherwise you will get cynicism and that is the worst and most dangerous thing. The French try the language-first route, all the time — outlawing “email”, demanding that an “airbag” be a “coussin gonflable de protection” — it never works. The UK & US both must tackle the many problems pointed out by Piketty, not simply call them something different.
Agree. Policy-makers needed to question seriously the language they use, and why they use it, rather than just amend it.
Agree that the Leave vote seems a reaction against being powerless and wanting to ‘take back control’. However, I think the focus is less about area and more about the powerlessness of individuals and the households. And recent reports by BSAS on social attitudes and immigration suggests that the powerlessness is primarily amongst the poor and worklessness (Ashcroft poll suggested most people in any form of work voted remain) and/or those who are dependent on public services.
And the failure of public services – not being able to get a doctor when you are ill, your kids cannot get on the social housing waiting list and once on have no chance getting a place even when on the list, wait for an hour to get – seems from the BSAS results to be the main concern about immigration (rather than the economy or culture).
I response to this I would relaunch the Citizen’s Charter so the state sets out what people can expect from public services and when. There has been a shift away from this customer service focus to a greater reliance on on ‘experts’ who decide what is best for each individual rather than public servants serving the public. [I consider some of this in this blog https://www.thersa.org/discover/publications-and-articles/rsa-comment/2016/02/from-call-the-midwife-poplar-to-the-citizens-charter. This would require a much greater focus on delivery and, for example, targets such as speed and accuracy for benefit payment – in order to offset the need for Food Banks because of delays in getting their benefit money.
On the question of immigration, given that I think it is primarily a social issue associated with people’s belief that public services are being damaged because there are too many immigrants. Therefore, in terms of the negotiations I would distinguish between access to all aspects of the welfare state from controls on migrant numbers. Then I would focus negotiations on access to welfare state – which is necessary anyway as outside the EU EU citizens will not have the right to get the same access as UK citizens. Establishing a new access system for the welfare state it may be that the push should be to introduce the same rules as for non-EU migrants – essentially ‘no recourse to public funds’ for 4 years. Given the removal of welfare state access for new migrants it may be necessary to establish a social insurance system – perhaps an extension and expansion of travel insurance.
There would probably be some need for migration controls as well but again there are some things that have to change and it might be worth building on this. There will need to be some form of common travel area that needs to be applied to Northern Ireland and Gibraltar – perhaps it can be expanded to Scotland as well. On top of that a 4 year social insurance system then the entry points to that system might be at the start (a bit like the Workers Registration System) and/or after 4 years to see whether they essentially become a UK resident.
In measuring these effects given the focus is on the welfare state rules I would measure admin data much more (and also focus on net migration rather than immigration as now) – perhaps by making NINOs smarter – they expire after 4 years & so employer knows, unless their stay is legally extended so employers know they are ‘illegal overstayers’ perhaps combined with the electoral register. Then you could have concentric circles
Non-UK citizens with access to welfare state and without access to welfare state – by duration in country & whether in work or not
Non-UK citizens with access to welfare state – by duration in country & whether in work or not
and also Non-UK citizens who are overstaying by whether in work or not.
And I would also increase the active management of these registers eg regular contact to keep in touch with nos and also to remind people of their responsibility.
I would welcome your comments on this. Sorry it is so long.
@Bill One significant omission in your excellent list is that in both cases, UK and US, the Middle Class needs to be re-instituted, and carefully re-inserted, between the 2-Classes now pitted against one another, the result of 50+ years of Neocon thinking in both our countries, That is the key to social-mobility, the key itself to social harmony instead of the conflicts we now are busily developing: the Underclass needs hope — the Neocons took that away, it is very frustrating to be poor and poverty is a relative thing. 2-Class societies such as Maggie and Reagan engineered do not work.
I still have great affection for the Citizens Charter. It was well-meaning as a serious attempt to shift power to individuals, but ahead of its time in terms of public service providers’ capacity to respond to user voice: Hence the fiasco of the Cones Hotline.
I looked at migration data for the Southampton council ward of my childhood, and what was shocking was the pace of population change over just a few years. In absolute terms the level of householders born overseas was not exceptional by UK standards. As you say, migration can have a significant impact on the public services that local people use on a daily basis. I suspect that the speed of change is the most significant factor; areas of high but stable immigration appear not to suffer the same levels of concern as those with lower but rapid change. As i say in the blog, steps have been taken to control (mostly within-UK) migration in desirable areas for second-homes and holiday lets, because local people perceived their impact as being “unfair”, as you highlight. There must be steps that can be taken to manage migration flows better and support community adaptation to social and economic change.
I never saw Citizen’s Charter as a reflection of user voice but rather a statement by the Government – as representatives of the people – of what each individual was entitled to. And the ‘price’ in terms of behaviour that they have to pay for it.
The Citizen’s Charter approach with a universal individual customer service requirements was always more prevalent in some parts of the public service – benefit payment & welfare – than others. Stop & search, kettling seem to me to be anti-Citizen’s Charter as the appalling customer services in the legal system eg time it takes to get to court because the public have to do what suits the legal profession.
But, over time, instead of spreading the approach more widely it has gone in the opposite direction – Tax Credits were given to HMRC; Citizen’s Charter type approaches – YT Guarantee, literacy hours were quietly dropped by public servants by informing ministers that they could do better in terms of outcomes without specifying the costs in terms of customer service. The Citizen’s Charter targets decayed and dies and SLA for providers did not receive as much attention. Next Step Agencies began to be incorporated into policy making and producer discretion (eg Work Programme) was extended.
This shift away from the Citizen’s Charter type towards producers who know what is good the individual and tell them what to do is, I believe, important in the context of the rapid growth in population associated with net migration. It would have been difficult to deal with the pressure on public services anyway. But the movement away from the Citizen’s Charter approach made it worse. And, not only that, the shift towards producers’ determining the level of public service seems to have led not only to a worse level of service for the people most dependent on public services but also the allocation looked to be ‘unfair’ to them. So, for example, looking at the Tower Hamlets housing waiting list the average wait on the list is around 5 years. But the average wait of those who get a house is much less – poor public services with a hint of queue jumping. It is not surprising, therefore, that immigration is seen as the source of the pressure on public services. Similar examples can be found for people who can’t get a good school place because the rich have moved into the area to get a place in the ‘better’ schools.
The shift from face to face contacts – where the queue and the order in the queue is obvious – by phone and computer contacts – where the producer determines where in the queue people are (doctor appointments, Tax Credits, benefits). Essentially the risk of poor delivery in terms of speed and accuracy is passed from the producer to the consumer and there are no Citizen Charter targets to hold them to account.
Against this background I am not surprised that people most dependent on public services are worried & fed up about the quality of public services. And they voted for their Government to take control of public services. However, unless they also take control of the public servants in delivering universal customer service the people may be disappointed.
Apologies for being pedantic but if ‘Ashcroft poll suggested most people in any form of work voted remain’ and given the current unemployment rate in the UK is about 5.4% and yet 17.4 mln voted for leaving, it doesn’t make much sense.
Vita. Good point. People in any form of work appeared to be more likely to vote Remain than those not working. Unemployment data do not include large sections of the adult population, particularly those beyond retirement age. I hope this makes more sense. Tony
Good sense rears its head through the mass of ugly & ill-informed & simplistic political analysis… Yes but of course, communities are more complex than political elites perceive — leaders who themselves never have been off the ranch, or off their several ranches, including one in Oxfordshire and another in Knightsbridge for example — make very poor judges of the priorities, and sheer tenacity, of folks in Bermondsey or Tyneside. How would they know? Bending a single campaign-beer in the local does not provide in-depth knowledge, either: you have to live the local anxieties & enormous local pride yourself. “The presumption remains that the accumulation of status and wealth is the only rational goal”: the blind bias of the perceiver, in this particular political inquiry — more the values of Oxfordshire & Knightsbridge than Bermondsey & Tyneside — the Referendum shows clearly the 2-Class Society that Maggie’s era wrought, in Britain, the one does not understand the other, time to start healing that breach or it will widen further & cause even worse problems than Brexit. Kudos to the writer here for a well-informed & well-expressed article.
Many thanks Jack. The challenge is to develop practical policies that do begin to heal the breach. A first step, however, must be to change some of the language of political discourse to begin to respect community identities.