Rishi Sunak recently argued that Britain was facing “some of the most dangerous” years in its history. Richard Mottram argues that if that were true the government’s response seems rather feeble, and points out a number of other threats, including climate change, seem to be off the Government’s radar.

The Prime Minister’s recent wide-ranging speech was widely seen as seeking to put security at the heart of the Conservative party’s general election campaign. Rishi Sunak argued that “the next few years will be some of the most dangerous yet the most transformational that our country has ever known” and (in political content omitted from the official transcript) contrasted the government’s commitment to defence with that of the Opposition:

“The highest priority of a Conservative government is to keep our country safe. We have proudly taken the generational decision to increase defence spending to a new baseline of 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2030. Yet Labour has refused to match our pledge. “

But the Government’s pledge to increase defence spending is not new, dating back to 2023, and if the country was really facing the most dangerous years it has ever known, such an increase wouldn’t be a significant enough response. In fact, the Prime Minister’s speech ignored some of the biggest risks facing the UK in the coming years.

Same strategy, heightened rhetoric

Just over a year ago the government published an updated national security strategy (Integrated Review Refresh 2023) that sought to take account of the pace of geopolitical change and its impact on the UK. It highlighted amongst other developments Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and China’s more aggressive stance and the risk of a an international order more favourable to authoritarianism. The government’s response included “moving away from the baseline commitment of spending at least 2 per cent of GDP on defence to a new aspiration to reach 2.5 per cent”. Since this Review was published the main international developments have been the Hamas attack on 7 October and its aftermath in Gaza and more widely and the recent progress of Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine, neither of which shift the Review’s fundamental analysis.

If the geopolitical environment is continuing to deteriorate in such threatening ways, the Government’s response seems rather feeble.

While unsurprisingly the Integrated Review framework underpins the Prime Minister’s speech, what appears to have changed is the language in which the threats and risks are expressed. For example, “we now face an axis (my italics) of authoritarian states like Russia, Iran, North Korea and China “working together to undermine us and our values”, language which may be a rhetorical reflection of the hardening of the UK’s position particularly in relation to China. The speech suggests “Putin’s recklessness has taken us closer to a dangerous nuclear escalation than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis.” But those of us involved in nuclear matters can think of other scary times, including in the early 1980s with acute Soviet concern about the risks of nuclear war with the United States. Calibrating comparative security dangers over time is a difficult business, but are we really in acute danger comparable to past threats to our existence as a nation?

It may be countered that a speech needs to catch the attention of the audience in a way in which published national security reviews –never the most exciting of documents- are not intended to do. But, if the geopolitical environment is continuing to deteriorate in such threatening ways, the Government’s response seems rather feeble- essentially it has moved from an aspiration to spend 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence to a commitment to do so by 2030. It invites the question: if the highest priority is to keep our country safe, is this the best they can do?

Missing pieces in the argument

If in the speech some risks are heightened, others are perhaps downplayed. First, the Integrated Review drew attention to climate change and biodiversity loss as “important multipliers of other global threats.” In the speech climate change as an existential risk is not mentioned, though there are references to progress in decarbonisation. Net Zero is mentioned in the context of adopting a pragmatic approach and thereby weaponised as a means of seeking to attack the opposition.

A much sharper focus is needed on what the massive sums devoted to defence within NATO are buying.

Secondly, the UK is engaged together with our allies in a fraught confrontation with Russia and China. While this is not an issue that can readily be tackled publicly, we have to worry about the actions and inactions of our own side as well as our authoritarian competitors. To take one example, Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself has been weakened in recent months by political manoeuvring in Washington, hindering the delivery of military support. In any internal assessment of risks to the international order, the outcome of the US presidential election would, to put it mildly, feature prominently.

Regardless of the outcome of that election, burden sharing within NATO will be a continuing issue and pledges to commit a specific percentage of GDP to defence spending are attractive in that context. But they tell us nothing about what capabilities will be provided and whether they are optimally matched to the threats and risks the country faces, operating as part of an integrated alliance. A much sharper focus is needed on what the massive sums devoted to defence within NATO are buying.

The government claims to be willing to make big sacrifices elsewhere to fund its pledge, though it has muddled what the pledge means in terms of extra funds for defence.

Empty promises about defence spending?

Such arguments are, of course, complex. Pledges of money can be more easily presented, particularly when cast in the future with the consequences for other expenditure priorities left unclear. The Government claims to be willing to make big sacrifices elsewhere to fund its pledge, though it has muddled what the pledge means in terms of extra funds for defence and therefore consequences elsewhere, as the Institute for Fiscal Studies has pointed out. Labour is more cautious about future expenditure pledges. In practice there is a huge overlap between the defence policies of the main parties.

Is defence policy a vote winner?

For those fashioning Conservative electoral tactics, playing the defence card has a long history. Polling by Ipsos following the speech showed 42 per cent supporting the Conservative policy of 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2030, while 22 per cent oppose it. But there are doubts among those polled about whether more spending will make the UK safer, the value for money of extra spending, and whether the money can be found without raising taxes or cutting spending on other services. Intriguingly a clear majority do not trust the Conservatives to have the right policies on defence, with opinion more divided on Labour. The public would appear to have a more nuanced understanding of the issues than given credit for by those framing them electorally.

All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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