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Monsters in the Mist: The Elusive Quest for Financial Security in Scotland post-Brexit

By Faye Donnelly and William Vlcek

 

Image credit: First Minister of Scotland (CC-BY-SA-2.0)
Image credit: First Minister of Scotland (CC-BY-SA-2.0)

It is easy to become disillusioned, confused and even fanciful when trying to envision Scotland’s financial security in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. With a leap of imagination it is possible to conceive that there is now a higher probability of seeing the Loch Ness monster than there is of seeing any constructive resolution to the decisive vote emerging on the horizon. At first glance this assertion sounds like a fictitious rumination. Yet analysing the different stories that have surfaced about where Brexit leaves Scotland one quickly finds that they are rife with mystery. This blog argues that the complex discursive performances enacted since 23 June 2016 take on a particularly elusive quest when it comes to what financial security means for Scotland going forward. Akin to the Loch Ness monster, different actors have reported sightings. These vary from plots of the SNP canvassing for a second independence referendum to audacious acclaims of Scotland fighting to retain their membership in the European Union (EU). Let’s take a closer look at the ability of Scotland to synchronise these competing agendas.

With Scotland voting 62-38% to remain in the EU, the resurrection of independence as a political agenda certainly appears to have taken on a new lease of life with calls for ‘indyref2’. Speaking on 27 June 2016, First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, emphasised, “a second independence referendum is clearly an option that requires to be on the table and is very much on the table.” Stepping up efforts to ensure that Scotland’s interests are defended amidst post-Brexit negotiations the SNP party leader characterised Theresa May’s assurance that “Brexit means Brexit” as “a soundbite that masks a lack of any clear sense of direction”. At the same time, Sturgeon has indicated a willingness to participate in ‘engaged talks’ with the new elected UK Prime Minister. An easy explanation behind this discursive oscillation is that Scotland will need permission from Westminster to hold another referendum. What is also plain is that there must be public confidence in the prospect of an independent Scotland being financially secure, something that the latest YouGov polls figures have called into question. Elsewhere opponents to ‘indyref2’ are highlighting that the economic goals for an independent Scotland that appeared possible in 2014 (with oil at $100/barrel) have vanished (with oil hovering just below $50/barrel). Consequently, the projected political economy for an independent Scotland today forecasts either tax rises in order to maintain current public services or a reduction in the provision of those services. Faced with this reality Sturgeon has stopped short of demanding another independence referendum, in part because it is not clear that financial security lays at the end of that path.

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(Mis)understanding the public? An independent Scotland and the EU

By Jan Eichhorn and Daniel Kenealy

Scotland’s debate on its constitutional future has frequently focused on its future role within the EU. Despite uncertainty about the precise terms of an independent Scotland’s EU membership we show that the issue is not one that divides ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ voters. Furthermore, recent years have shown a marked rise in sceptical attitudes toward the EU in Scotland.

The issue of an independent Scotland’s relationship with the European Union (EU) has intermittently animated the referendum debate. Most recently, the BBC’s Andrew Marr found himself in hot water after appearing to express a personal opinion on the difficulties that an independent Scotland might face in seeking to join the EU. Marr’s comment built on a statement, delivered on the same BBC programme, a month earlier by European Commission president José Manuel Barroso. “I believe it’s going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible,” remarked Barroso, for a new state emerging from an existing EU Member State to be admitted to the club.

Scottish independence would present the EU with an unprecedented situation. Never before has part of an existing Member State gained independence whilst seeking to remain within the EU. There is no EU Treaty article dealing with the scenario and there is no relevant EU case law.

The European Commission’s official position is that Scotland would have to reapply for membership and complete the standard accession process as Croatia did most recently. The Scottish Government has countered that, because Scotland has been part of the EU since 1973, it cannot be expelled. Instead of the standard application process followed by states such as Croatia, the Scottish Government argues that the EU Treaties ought simply to be amended and that Scotland should enjoy so-called ‘continuity of effect’, guaranteeing it the same opt-outs and special provisions that the UK currently enjoys.

Whether through a formal accession process or an amendment to the existing Treaties, it is clear that each EU Member State would hold a veto in the process (although no Member State has yet to suggest they would exercise it). It is also clear that the 18-months between ‘Referendum Day’ and ‘Independence Day’ represents a tight, but not completely unrealistic, timeframe in which to agree and ratify a deal. Finally, it is also clear that to trigger a scenario in which Scotland would find itself outside of the EU would be deeply imprudent. It would cause significant turmoil by creating a hole in the single market and altering the legal status of every non-Scottish EU citizen living, studying, or working in Scotland.

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Catalan Separatism, a European Problem

By Marcus Pučnik Both Catalonia and Scotland are looking towards a referendum on independence later this year, Scotland on September 18 and Catalonia on November 9.  If independent, they both would like to join the European Union, yet the official EU stance is that Catalonia and Scotland would be “third countries” in regard to the EU and thus have to go through the full process of accession.

A demonstration for Catalan independence

This is where the similarities between Scotland and Catalonia end. While the Scottish referendum is agreed upon with London, the Catalan one is being blocked as unconstitutional by Madrid. Moreover, the Spanish government is also likely to veto Catalonia’s EU-accession in the case of a unilateral declaration of independence. “We cannot be punished,” Catalonia’s president Artur Mas said in an interview with Corriere della Sera. Some very competent European experts share this point of view and call a potential Spanish veto of Catalonia a punitive measure that would represent “an abuse of [EU] law”. These experts expect both Catalonia and Scotland to fulfill all the necessary membership requirements, so that their applications could be fast-tracked. “A simplified procedure” should be put in place for countries that have “applied the EU’s policies and legislation for 40 years”, or 28 years in the case of Spain/Catalonia. But would punishing those pesky Catalans really be Madrid’s motivation? Is Catalonia really fulfilling all EU criteria, and would it thus be that special case for which Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) cannot be interpreted literally? A closer look at the conditions on the ground gives some reason for doubt. Unlike Scotland, Catalonia does have a language conflict. It is a complex issue, one part of which is a general defense of the Catalan language. The other part is inside Catalonia itself, where the regional government refuses to heed court sentences that over the past years have consistently demanded that Spanish not be excluded as language of instruction in Catalan public schools. Treating Spanish as if it were a foreign language is not in the spirit nor the wording of TEU Article 2, to which Article 49 explicitly refers. Both Spanish and Catalan are official languages in Catalonia. Over half the Catalan population has Spanish as mother tongue. Skewing public education in favour of Catalan has been necessary to repair past injustices, something that also the courts have recognised, but the exclusion of Spanish is a clear discrimination. Furthermore, based on the present situation we can expect a Catalan state to declare Catalan as the preferred or national language, turning the Spanish speakers into a functional minority. Equality, non-discrimination and minority protection are all values mentioned in Article 2. Continue reading “Catalan Separatism, a European Problem”