The politics of public discourse in Europe
This event explored the endogenous historical factors and contemporary dynamics that have led to unprecedented political polarisation and social fragmentation within Catalonia around the issues of secession, ethnic identity and language. The event took place on Faw 2.04, Fawcett House, on Tuesday 3 Decemeber 2019.
Continue reading “Debate: Social Fragmentation in Catalonia: a civil conflict?”
By Javier Padilla and Sergio Olalla
On February 22, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) hosted the fourth and last debate of a series ‘What is Next for Spain and Catalonia?’. Moderated by Julio Crespo MacLennan, professors Montserrat Guibernau, Manuel Arias Maldonado and Fernando Vallespín spoke on normative and political issues around the right to self-determination in democracies. This post summarises the main points that were developed in the debate which are closely related with the current situation in Catalonia.
The right to self-determination in the international context
Guibernau started by recognising that the right to self-determination may not be applicable in plural democracies that respect minorities. However, she did not consider the Spanish case as an example of a plural democracy that respects minorities. According to Guibernau, the Catalans are a minority ignored in Spain and the behaviour of the central government towards the Catalan minority – with measures such as the application of article 155 and the imprisonment of some pro-independence politicians – would justify that the right of self-determination can be applied to the Catalan case. Therefore, she considered legitimate the aspiration to independence and believed it justified that this right does apply to Catalonia.
Vallespín explained that international law recognises two principles that are contradictory: the principle of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. The conflict between the two has been traditionally solved in two complementary ways. On the one hand, the principle of self-determination has been applied in cases of former colonies or overt injustices against minorities. On the other hand, the principle of territorial integrity has been applied to the rest of the cases that do not fall under these categories. According to Vallespín, in cases such as Kosovo, it is fair to speak of an oppressed minority that would have the right to self-determination; however, Catalonia would not meet these conditions and it would fail to achieve international recognition. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to what the internal law says. The Spanish Constitution is similar to the rest of European constitutions in the way that it proclaims that sovereignty resides in the totality of the political nation. Vallespín gave the example of Canada, where the Supreme Court declared that the Quebec region could not unilaterally decide to become independent from the rest of the country. Therefore, there is not a Catalan demos and the actions of the Catalan government broke the Spanish and Catalan law. Vallespín differentiated between the right to self-govern, that Catalonia would enjoy, and the right to secession, which is not contemplated in the Spanish legislation.
By Javier Carbonell and Luis Cornago Bonal
This post summarises the second debate of the conference cycle about the crisis in Catalonia, titled Spain and Catalonia: Is There a Way Out of the Impasse?, 
took place on February 8 at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). This debate analysed the political causes of the conflict, the current crisis, and the possible means of resolution. Jonathan Hopkin, Sandra León and Toni Rodon, three academics whose research has addressed the Spanish political system from different perspectives, were the speakers responsible for discussing these issues. In this post we collect the main ideas that emerged throughout the conference.
The causes of the conflict: How much does the economic crisis explain?
The moderator of the session, Antonio Barroso, opened the debate by asking Hopkin to what extent the Catalan case is unique in Europe or if it is comparable with that of other regions. In addition to referring to the dynamics of party competition in Catalonia -particularly the struggle for hegemony between the independence parties- the English political scientist defended the need to place Catalonia in the context of comparative politics. For him, the secessionist movement must be framed within the many anti-establishment movements that have emerged in recent years in many advanced democracies, such as Brexit, Trump’s victory, or the triumph of Syriza. All these phenomena share the fact that they emerged after the Great Recession that began in 2008. According to Hopkin, high levels of unemployment and the increase in inequality tend to provoke the radicalisation of political positions. In addition, in adverse economic circumstances identity politics prove to be an especially powerful weapon. Therefore, even if each of these anti-establishment movements is presented as unique, in reality, all originate in the important deterioration of the economic situation.
Continue reading “The crisis in Catalonia: How did we get here and how do we get out?”
With Jose Javier Olivas, Mireia Borrell and Michael Cottakis
In this Talking Europe Podcast by the 1989 Generation Initiative our Editor Jose Javier Olivas Osuna discusses the Catalan crisis with Mireia Borrell, in a conversation moderated by Michael Cottakis. They set out the historical background to Catalonia’s independence movement and the Spanish Constitution, before delving into the question why things were 
allowed to escalate so profoundly. What role did Mariano Rajoy and Carles Puigdemont play in the unfolding crisis? With the upcoming election, they offer valuable insight into what may happen next, how the crisis can be deescalated, and what role, if any, the EU can play. Both agree that the Spanish government misunderstood and miscalculated the severity of the conflict. While Mireia Cottakis puts forward the case for Catalan independence, Jose Olivas Osuna argues that the case for independence is not as strong as it is often made out to be, and that independence is desirable neither for Spain nor Catalonia.
Note: This podcast gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog nor of the London School of Economics.
Related articles on LSE Euro Crisis in the Press:
Four graphs about Catalonia and citizens’ attitudes towards the EU
An Explanation of the Current Political Situation in Catalonia
Does the Catalan Independence Movement Really ‘Love Democracy’?
“Is this the Europe that you invite us to build, with a government in prison? How long are you, Europe, going to look away from this coup, from the abuse of our colleagues, who are elected representatives, in prison?” This is how Carles Puigdemont, former president of Catalonia, addressed Presidents Juncker and Tajani on Twitter, openly complaining about the position that the EU has taken on the Catalan crisis.
The (lack of) support coming from the EU has been a key component in framing the political positions of both independentists and unionists during the events of the last months in Catalonia. For the Spanish government, EU support has been fundamental in legitimizing its actions. On the secessionist side, efforts have been made to generate favourable involvement of EU institutions, with demands ranging from mediation requests to the active involvement of the EU to protect fundamental rights. The clearest example of this pattern is the move of the former Catalan government to Brussels with the aim of internationalizing the situation from the European capital.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the continuous demands coming from the independentists, the EU has firmly backed the Spanish government, not showing any of support to the secessionist cause. In such context, we could ask ourselves whether this situation is affecting the attitudes of Catalan citizens on the EU. In other words: could this lack of European support undermine citizens’ perceptions of the EU? In this article, I will try to find a preliminary answer to this question, by analysing survey data coming from the last Public Opinion Barometer from the Catalan Opinion Studies Centre (CEO).
The situation in Catalonia and citizens trust in the EU
One approach is to analyse the evolution of Catalan citizens’ trust in the EU, breaking it down by citizens’ territorial preferences. This is shown in the following graph:
The first years of the series do not show a clear pattern in the relationship between trust and territorial preferences. In 2015, all groups show a similar level of trust, but the lines start to diverge from each other in 2016, a tendency that is accentuated in 2017. The 1st of October events, located between the two 2017 surveys (the first one from July and the second one from late October) appear to show an important gap in trust opening up among the independentists.
Continue reading “Four graphs about Catalonia and citizens’ attitudes towards the EU”
Despite growing patriotism in Italian politics, on the 22th of October the regions of Lombardy and Veneto are going to hold two referenda to demand greater autonomy from Rome. This is the first time this has happened. However, these are not binding referenda. For this reason, they attracted little attention from the media and the rest of Italy. But the recent Catalan crisis has changed everything. The Italian referenda are very different from the one held in Catalonia. Lombardy and Veneto, which represent the richest area of the country, are not pursuing an independentist goal. Instead, their local governments are asking citizens for a strong mandate to open negotiations with the national government in order to extract the most exclusive powers. This is a possibility already envisaged by the constitution, therefore it does not undermine institutional stability from a strictly legal perspective. Nevertheless, the Catalan crisis has increased the focus on the referenda and forced all political parties to take a stand. Continue reading “Northern Italy’s ‘Catalan Temptation’?”
By Javier Padilla and Luis Cornago Bonal
However, we argue that the actual situation is substantially different. The nationalistic parliamentary majority of the Catalan Parliament, which represents just 47% of the Catalan voters also holds an uncommon mix of ideologies that goes from anti-establishment far-left parties to centre-right liberal parties, and is trying to force an illegal referendum on the unilateral independence of Catalonia. Even though this referendum is sold internationally as a mere democratic exercise, it is an attempt to create a State which would leave at least half of the Catalan people as foreigners in their own country. As the writer Daniel Gascón has pointed out in the magazine Letras Libres “Secessionism fights against an imaginary enemy: an authoritarian, undemocratic Spain. This imaginary Spain is a country where Catalonia does not have a high level of autonomy, a Spain that is not an advanced democracy, comparable to the countries around it.” Having said that, there are also good reasons to think that the central government could have better managed the political demands of the nationalist movement. Continue reading “An Explanation of the Current Political Situation in Catalonia”
On 9 June 2017, the Catalan government announced a self-determination referendum to be held on 1 October 2017. Two days later, next to a big banner with the slogan ‘Love Democracy’ and in front of 40,000 people, Manchester City’s manager Josep Guardiola read the official pro-independence manifesto urging the international community to defend
‘the rights that are under threat today in Catalonia, such as freedom of political expression and the right to vote. To face up the abuses of an authoritarian state.’
A victimisation narrative
The hyperbolic message, the unusual speaker and the choice of the dates for the announcements, coinciding with the aftermath of the UK election and the first round of French legislative elections, demonstrate the weakness and sense of urgency of the pro-independence camp. They have realised that the window of opportunity for the independence of Catalonia is closing. Since July 2016 the percentage of Catalans against independence has steadily grown (48.5% vs 44.3% in favour), popular mobilisation is decreasing, corruption scandals linked to the previous nationalist government continue to emerge, the Spanish economy is starting to improve, and they have failed in all their attempts to gain the endorsement of any relevant international actor. Continue reading “Does the Catalan Independence Movement Really ‘Love Democracy’?”
This time the polls got it right. The nationalist pro-independence coalition Junts pel Sí (‘Together for Yes’) won the elections. But arguably this has been a bitter victory. Their 62 seats are insufficient to rule the Generalitat and less than the sum of the seats obtained by CiU (50) and ERC (21) in 2012. Junts pel Sí needs the support of the other secessionist party, CUP (‘Popular Unity Candidacy’), to form a government. However, CUP’s leader, Antonio Baños, has already stated that they won’t vote Artur Mas for President. CUP will also likely request from Junts pel Sí to ignore Spanish and European law and make at some point a unilateral declaration of independence if a referendum is not agreed or organised soon. These two conditions will make the negotiations for the next government difficult. New anticipated Catalan regional elections are the likely scenario after the Spanish national elections.
Secondly, the pro-independence parties claimed that these elections were a ‘de facto referendum’ on the independence of Catalonia. They have demonstrated great strength but have fell short of the majority of the votes. Together, Junts pel Sí and CUP, have obtained more than 1.9 million votes but ‘only’ 47.9% of the total votes (37% of the electoral census). These results should push the Spanish government to address seriously the ‘Catalan problem’, but at the same time clearly delegitimize a potential unilateral declaration of independence.
Continue reading “A bitter victory for Catalan pro-independence nationalists”
All eyes are on Scotland as the referendum nears. Governments, the media, financial institutions and hosts of groups and individuals are glued to the debate and wondering how it will end. Amidst concern there is fascination in an event that seems so unprecedented with an outcome that is so unclear. Among those fortunate enough to be visiting or living in Scotland at this time, there is exhilaration at the sight of democracy working at full tilt.
The international attention is very recent. There was hardly a flutter when the Scottish government announced in 2011 that it would hold a referendum. The Edinburgh Agreement of October 2012 between the Scottish and UK Government was a wake-up call, especially because it coincided with a nationalist upsurge in Catalonia that sparked a Spanish response (including a threat to block a future Scottish application to join the EU), 
and with the Scottish National Party’s adoption of a pro-NATO policy despite pledges to remove Trident from the bases in Scotland.
After a brief surge of interest, foreign governments went back to sleep and remained asleep throughout 2013. The referendum was still far ahead, and the general assumption – encouraged by London and the metropolitan media – was that the independence movement would be heavily defeated. Developments in Scotland were mainly followed, if at all, from capitals or from embassies in London. Some Consuls General in Edinburgh warned that another outcome was possible, to which their masters should pay greater heed, but they were largely ignored.
In January 2014, opinion polls unexpectedly showed a marked shift in support for the yes campaign, unexpectedly because it was believed – abroad as in London – that Scottish voters would ‘come to their senses’ when the downside of independence was fully revealed to them by the analysis pouring out of Whitehall and Westminster. At the same time, the UK government’s emphasis on provoking fear among Scotland’s voters, rather than offering a positive vision of the Union’s future, began to attract criticism in the press and among foreign observers. Contrast was also being drawn between the increasingly vibrant grass-roots campaign for independence and its lacklustre unionist counterpart. Momentum seemed to be shifting in the nationalist direction, giving rise to warnings that opinion polls could narrow further.
Encouraged by London, several governments began to debate the pros and cons of issuing statements favouring the UK’s survival. Besides Spain, they had hitherto remained silent, wary of intervention and happy to regard the referendum as a domestic British affair. President Obama’s carefully chosen words at a press conference on the 5th of June, expressing the United States’ hope that the UK would remain ‘a strong, robust, united and effective partner’, broke the ice. A number of political leaders followed his lead. The Australian Prime Minister apart, they adopted his cautious tone, declaring their respect for Scotland’s democratic right to decide on its future whilst making clear their preference for the status quo. Although the majority, including the UK’s closest neighbours Ireland, France, Holland and Norway, have so far chosen to keep quiet, they would not disagree. Only a handful – Argentina and Russia come to mind – might relish the UK’s demise. Even they have kept quiet.
Continue reading “Foreign Reactions to the referendum in Scotland”