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The International Politics of the Refugee Crisis

By Vassilios Paipais

Refugees roaming Greece's central highways heading for the Greek borders
Refugees roaming Greece’s central highways heading for the Greek borders

Last Wednesday, Vienna hosted a meeting of Balkan countries involving Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia in divisive move that deliberately excluded the Greek government from decisions concerning the tackling of the mounting refugee crisis in Europe’s borders. On Monday, FYROM had already previously decided to deny entry to Afghan migrants and restricted access to Syrians and Iraqis. Greek authorities summoned the Austrian ambassador to protest against the Vienna meeting, which they described as a ‘unilateral move which is not at all friendly toward our country’. The day after the meeting, the Greek Prime Minister proclaimed that Greece will not be turned into a ‘warehouse of souls’ and just today, in an unprecedented move, he recalled the Greek ambassador in Vienna. In the meantime, the situation in Greece is rapidly spiraling out of hand. The images of desperate refugees roaming the Greek highways and heading for Greece’s northern borders are shocking suggesting that the situation might soon become unmanageable.

What Europe has witnessed the past few days on a diplomatic level is simply the first serious shocks of a long-brewing crisis that has its origins in a complicated series of diplomatic failures and mismanagement by some and deliberate war-mongering by others. Europe is paying a hard price for something she didn’t directly cause, yet nevertheless tolerated, as part of a ruthless geopolitical game that has its epicenter in the Syrian crisis and the broader Middle East antagonisms. The civil war in Syria broke out, and was portrayed as such by Western media, as a rebellion against the oppression and brutality of the Assad regime. What of course was never openly admitted (but is nevertheless a common secret) was that this is a war that some of the major players in the region -the US, Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia- not only welcomed but in varying degrees deliberately fomented in an effort to dismantle the Hezbollah-Syria-Iran axis due to which Israel paid a heavy price in the 2006 war in Lebanon. Russia’s active involvement in the conflict last October with the commencement of the bombing campaign was rightly perceived by many as an effort to tilt the balance in favour of the crumbling Assad regime. Yet, apart from restoring the internal dynamics of the conflict, it was also a move that served wider Russian objectives. The continuation of the Syrian civil war causes internal division among EU members as the flow of Syrian refugees wreaks havoc in the European borders and keeps Europe in disarray. EU’s weakening status as a diplomatic power is not a meager gain for Russia as it finds itself less pressured on the Ukrainian front and makes Europeans more pliable to Russian demands.

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Identity politics and kin-state relations from the bottom-up in Crimea and Moldova

By Eleanor Knott

In 1991, Moldova declared itself an independent state as part of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 2014, the recognised Ukrainian territory of Crimea was annexed by Russia. Here, Eleanor Knott discusses identity politics and kin-state relations in Moldova and Crimea, and writes that in order to understand what ethnicity and citizenship mean in the context of people’s everyday lives, bottom–up, people-centred research is crucial, yet underutilized.

I recently contributed to a special issue, “Whither Eastern Europe? Changing Approaches and Perspectives on the Region in Political Science” which explores the disciplinary relationship between political science and Eastern Europe as an area studies region, 25 years after the collapse of Communism. In my article, I argue that political science needs to engage more with an everyday, people-centred bottom-up approach, as opposed to a top-down state-centred and institutional approach. In particular, I argue kin-state relations research, which analyses relations between states and external co-ethnic communities, has predominantly analysed these relations and tensions from the perspective of the states involved. This has overlooked the bottom-up perspective of kin-state relations, in terms of what it means to identify as a member of a kin community, i.e. a community claimed by an external (kin-)state as co-ethnic.

This article was drafted, following the fieldwork I conducted in Crimea and Moldova in 2012 and 2013, in the months preceding the height of the Euromaidan violence in Kyiv when Crimea remained an autonomous region of Ukraine. Since then, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, has unalterably shape post-Soviet politics and relations between post-Soviet states and Russia, and Russia, the EU and US. In this sense, the main argument of the article became the importance of studying bottom-up politics, engaging people who live in these contexts, not just to put people back into political science but also offer a point of reflection in a period of shifting political and geopolitical contexts.

“Moldova is (not) Romania” (Ellie Knott, Chisinau, Moldova, June 2012)

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Is the BRICS Bank an alternative for Greece?

By Konstantinos Myrodias and Panos Chatzinikolaou

This article concerns Greece’s potential accession to the New Development Bank established by the BRICS and examines whether BRICS Bank provides an alternative for Greece to rescue its economy in such a crucial moment of negotiations among Greece, the EU and the IMF.

Is the BRICS Bank an alternative for Greece?

Brics Over the past few weeks speculations have been circulating over Greece’s potential accession to the New Development Bank established by the BRICS-Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Russia’s invitation to Greece to become a member of the BRICS bank comes in a delicate point for the latter, since its new leftist SYRIZA-led government is attempting to strike a deal with its European counterparts in order to avoid a potential bankruptcy that would have tremendous impact on the country and the Eurozone as a whole. Is Russia’s invitation to Greece just a mere coincidence? Have the BRICS decided to save Greece from collapsing, enhancing Eurozone’s sustainability? At a time like this, where West- Russia relations bring back Cold War memories, such an explanation seems to be a truly superficial one.

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Time for a New Western Strategy in Ukraine

By Robert W. Murray

To date, the western strategy towards the ongoing war in Ukraine has been a failure. Not only has there been no cessation of violence, but the violence in certain areas of Eastern Ukraine is actually worsening, and the world is no closer to any diplomatic solution. Rather, it seems Russian policy-makers have continued to escalate, thus placing the future of Ukraine, and all of Eastern Europe, into doubt.

Recent focus has been on whether or not it is time for western states to arm Ukraine. This debate is raging most vociferously in the United States, where opponents of the Obama Administration’s handling of the crisis are calling for a change in tactics. This debate is, however, not isolated to the United States, and it is high time for all western states to question why, not if, their approach to the crisis in Ukraine has been such an abysmal failure.

For starters, it is obvious that Western states misread Putin’s intentions from the start. Such misperception existed long before Russia invaded Ukraine, but the West was content to believe that the end of the Cold War had somehow crippled Russia for good and that the integration of former Soviet satellite states into the west’s sphere of influence would prevent Russia from rising again in a manner that resembled its old Soviet character. The world even went so far as to reward the Putin regime with the Sochi Olympics in the hopes this would prove once and for all Russia had accepted that the liberal world order that emerged in the wake of the Cold War had prevailed.

Now, western states are confronted with the reality that not only did they get it wrong when it came to the annexation of Crimea, but they are continually misperceiving Russia’s next steps and relying on false assumptions about conflict and Russia’s motives to guide policy decisions. Naturally diplomacy would be the ideal outcome, but Putin is not interested in finding a diplomatic solution to a conflict he is winning. Not only is he successfully extending his sphere of influence, he is casting doubt on the effectiveness and closeness of the NATO alliance, and putting increased strain on the Obama Administration, whose reluctance to deal with any foreign policy issue with a firm hand was unfortunately reaffirmed in last week’s national security statement that preached “strategic patience”.

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“We have a long history of getting it wrong on Russia” – Interview with David Crouch

David CrouchEuro Crisis in the Press talks to David Crouch about media coverage of EU-Russia relations and the recent search for Russian submarines off the Swedish coast.

You were covering the recent search for Russian submarines off the Swedish coast. How well do you think the news media in Europe did in their coverage of these (non) events?    

European news media coverage was calm and measured by comparison with some Swedish media, which were – with honourable exceptions – a parody of Cold War hysteria, delivering examples of unfounded speculation and panic-mongering that would have been amusing were relations between east and west Europe not in such a serious state.

Some of the Swedish coverage brings to mind the description of The New York Times newsroom during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq given by the paper’s public editor as part of an apology to readers for its coverage (May 30, 2004): “you could almost sense epaulets sprouting on the shoulders of editors”. In my opinion, the coverage also damaged Russian-Swedish relations.

In the UK, most newspapers gave their coverage a light-hearted tone that played to Hollywood nostalgia for the thrill of the Cold War – “The hunt for reds in October”, “In scenes reminiscent of a Cold War thriller…”, “A mini-submarine hunted by a mini-navy” etc. Only The Telegraph and The Guardian (briefly) sent a correspondent to Stockholm, so coverage relied on official sources, but it was largely balanced and reflected the farcical aspects of some Swedish media coverage. Continue reading ““We have a long history of getting it wrong on Russia” – Interview with David Crouch”

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Who has seized power in Crimea?

By Ellie Knott

According to recent statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov,Russia has claimed to be acting to protect the rights not just of citizens and military personnel, but also compatriots and Russian speakers in Crimea. But how far do Crimeans feel discriminated? Ellie Knott, a PhD student at the London School of Economics, draws on her research to answer this question.

In a previous article for Vostok Cable, I argued that there needed to be a more nuanced understanding of Russian identity in Crimea. Hence I differentiated between ethnic Russians who accept or enjoy living in a Ukrainian state, and Discriminated Russians, who identify not just as ethnically Russian but also as the victims of Ukrainisation.

Sergey Aksyonov is the de facto Prime Minister of the Crimea who lead the country towards annexation to Russia.

It is the latter who have been heavily involved with pro-Russia movements, such as Russkaia Obschina Kryma(Russian Community of Crimea), and the pro-Russia minority party, Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity). There has been a long-standing cynical attitude to these organisation in Crimea: that they are professional Russians. As one respondent described these individuals want “to get money from this” by using their Russian identification as an occupation to profit from the funding for these organisations which comes from Russia.

It is these same Russian cultural and political organisations who have led the renewed separatist movement in Crimea. As soon as Sergei Aksenov, the leader of Russkoe Edinstvo, seized power, he claimed to be representing the interests of all Crimeans. However Russkoe Edinstvo were elected by just 4% of the electorate in the 2010 Crimean parliamentary elections.

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Aksenov was able to seize power as the Prime Minister of Crimea after a forced vote in the Crimean parliament. The identity and origin of the armed group who stormed the Crimean parliament on 27 February, forcing the voter later in the day, remain unknown. However the links between Russkoe Edinstvo and the Russian administration run deep, both at the local level with personal links to the Russian consulate in the peninsula, through the organizational structure of the Compatriot policy, and several individuals from these groups have been awarded cultural and social medals by the Russian Federation for their work. Continue reading “Who has seized power in Crimea?”

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Not all Ethnic Russians in Crimea Have a Political Affinity with Moscow

By Ellie Knott

Throughout the Ukraine crisis, Crimea has been described as a region with strong sympathies toward Russia. Based on her own research in the region, Ellie Knott takes issue with the prevailing view that ethnic Russians in Crimea necessarily have a strong Russian identity. She notes that much of the empirical evidence in this area is outdated, given it derives from 2001 census data. Citing interview responses, she argues that while a significant number of ethnic Russians do exhibit a Russian identity, there is evidence that this is not the case for many younger citizens who grew up after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In a comment article last month I resisted labelling Crimea as “the next South Ossetia”, Ukraine’s “Achilles heel” and “Russia’s next target.” In recent weeks, a connection has been drawn between Crimean violence in the 1990s and its call to secession with the idea that it “has a strong Russian identity”. However, the lack of engagement with people on the ground means many observers miss much of what has happened since 1991. Hence, while Russia might see Crimea as their next South Ossetia, acting to protect their citizens and compatriots, the situation in Crimea is very different.

Ellie Knot in Crimea
The Council of Ministers Building in Simferopol, Crimea. The Ukrainian flag has been replaced by the flag of the Russian Federation following recent events in the region.

The logic that Crimea is comprised of those with a “strong Russian identity” uses the 2001 census as evidence to suggest that the majority of the Crimean population identifying themselves as ethnically Russian (almost 15 years ago) is an indication of the state in which the majority would like to live. This has further entrenched the notion of Crimea as a peninsula of hotbed Russian nationalism waiting to secede. An article in RFE/RL recently tried to suggest that Russian nationalist separatism was increasing in Crimea based on an interview with a long known, and infamous, Russian nationalist Sergei Shuvainikov.

However, as Gwendolyn Sasse and Jim Hughes indicate, the Russian nationalist movements reached a crisis point in 1994 from which they never recovered because of their conflicting aims. They may have been successful in the last week at seizing power, but to have any idea about the depth of this nationalist sentiment it is necessary to talk to those outside of the Russian separatist movements, and in particular with everyday normal people, to see how far this idea resonates.

Interestingly, in around 50 interviews I conducted in Simferopol, the capital of the Autonomous Region of Crimea, in 2012-2013, I discovered that there was a general feeling that the chaos of the Russian nationalist movements had never really subsided. Organisations like Russkaia Obschina Kryma (Russian Community of Crimea) and the Crimean party, Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity), continued to fail as a result of the infighting between their contrasting characters, some wanting to use the movements in support of their personal aims against their rivals, but less against mainstream politics. Local election results support this, with Russkoe Edinstvo consistently winning few seats (and just 4 per cent of the vote in the 2010 Crimean parliamentary elections), placing them far behind the majority Party of Regions, and even the Communist Party.

I also found a plethora of different opinions regarding what it meant to be Russian. Indeed, many young people preferred to identify politically as Ukrainian instead of any ethnic identification. These young individuals described a large shift between themselves and the older generation including their parents, who identified as Russian. In comparison, these young people identified as “more Ukrainian” and “Ukrainian citizens first” because they had been born in Ukraine, so to them Russia was somewhere foreign. They indicated that while at one time those in the peninsula would have identified themselves as being Ukrainian only if they were ethnically Ukrainian, and had probably been born elsewhere in Ukraine; the post-Soviet generation would tend to identify themselves as Ukrainian based on their citizenship and place of birth.

There certainly were a significant number who identified as ethnically Russian, but in my research I split this between two categories: ethnic Russians and discriminated Russians. The discriminated Russians were a small group, mostly aligned with the Russian nationalist organisations discussed above, who identified themselves not just as Russian, but as anti-Ukrainian and as victims of ‘Ukrainisation’ policies. In contrast, there were a far greater number who identified as ethnically Russian but without any sense of discrimination by Ukraine. These individuals were able to reconcile their ethnicity with residing in Ukraine, feeling that they were part of a normative project in which they wanted to be able to speak Ukrainian, as the state language, more proficiently.

Generally, the overwhelming feeling of those outside the discriminated Russians was that the feeling of discrimination in the peninsula and in Ukraine was unjustified given that Russian could be spoken freely. Moreover, there was the feeling that ethnicity and language were not related to quality of life, because in Crimea and Ukraine “everyone lives badly”. Using the 2001 census is therefore tenuous because of the amount of change in the peninsula, in particular among the post-Soviet generation, and because of the fuzziness of identity which does not pair neatly with the hard and mutually exclusive census categories of ethnically Russian and ethnically Ukrainian.

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Cyprus and the Fate of Russian Money

By Maria Brock

Much attention has been paid across Europe in recent weeks to the role of Russian money in the Cypriot economy. Maria Brock explores reactions to the Cypriot crisis in the Russian press.

Since the beginning of the Cyprus crisis almost two weeks ago, much of Europe’s attention has been turned east, to Russia.  According to Moody’s, Russian assets in Cyprus are believed to amount to $31 billion, meaning that the Russian government was always likely to be interested in a solution to the deadlock.

Two motivations could be highlighted here: first, having a say in what happens to financial assets that have evaded taxation in Russia falls in line with Putin’s recent rhetoric. In his state-of-the-nation address in December 2012, he called for more stringent measures in dealing with this prevalent business practice. Capital flight leads to the state losing billions in tax revenue every year (it is estimated that annually up to $80 billion leave the country).

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