Jun 29 2015

The electoral success of the Danish People’s party: Something rotten in the state of Denmark?

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By Julie Uldam

Recently the Danes voted in a centre-right coalition led by the liberal party Venstre. Opinions polls had indicated a close race, with a slim majority for the centre-right government (52.3 %). And that was indeed how it turned out. Not too many surprises there. What did come as a surprise to the Danes and, not least, the Danish media was the success of the populist Danish People’s party (DPP) who increased their share of the vote to 21%, up from 12% in the previous general election four years ago. With more than one fifth of the vote, this makes them the largest party in the right-wing bloc and the second largest party overall in Parliament. Even the leader of the Danish People’s party Kristian Thulesen Dahl seemed a little stunned by this enormous success.

Kristian Thulesen Dahl, leader of the Danish People’s Party

Founded 20 years ago around an anti-immigrant, anti-multicultural, anti-EU agenda, the DPP has been seen as appealing to the “grey vote”, because they propose to fund improved healthcare provision for elderly people by cutting spending on immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. However, in this general election, the typical DPP voter is not necessarily 60+, but based in a non-urban area. The trend is clear in maps of voter distribution. The DPP was the largest party in three large non-urban regions, with more than 30 per cent of the vote in some areas. In the wake of the election, the Danish media have focused their analyses on this urban – non-urban divide.

The Danes are now – spurred on by the media – asking how such a small population (5.6 m) could come to see viable political solutions so differently. In urban areas people are asking how non-urban voters can be so bigoted, egotistical and narrow-minded. In non-urban areas people are asking how urban voters – and especially Copenhageners – can be so smug, complacent and idealistically politically correct.

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Jun 25 2015

Eurobarometer surveys provide an important insight into the European Commission’s role as an agenda setter

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By Markus HaverlandMinou de Ruiter and Steven Van de Walle

What passes for public opinion and public support in the European Union consists largely of the answers of European Union citizens to questions regularly posed to them in surveys commissioned and controlled by the European Commission. These ‘Eurobarometer’ surveys not only enquire about general problem perceptions and attitudes towards the EU (Standard Eurobarometers); but also include batteries of questions about specific policy topics, ranging from nuclear waste disposal to sex tourism, food safety and child care. These questions are built into comprehensive Eurobarometer ‘waves’, consisting of around 25,000 face-to-face interviews.

The results take the form of comprehensive reports of about 100 pages. There have been more than 400 of these so-called ‘Special Eurobarometers’ so far, and they are the key source of knowing what the ‘European’ public thinks about specific policy issues and the appropriate political level to deal with them. Individual Special Eurobarometers have aroused the interest of scholars working in specific policy areas, but to our knowledge no systematic mapping of these massive investments in gauging citizen opinion has taken place.

This is surprising for a number of reasons. First, from a normative perspective Special Eurobarometers could be perceived as an important link between the Commission and citizens. This link may become more relevant since diffuse support of the EU (the permissive consensus) has been replaced by politicisation and declining trust. Second, other instruments linking citizens and civil society to the EU, such as internet consultations, have received scholarly attention. Third, in strategic terms, the Commission can use public opinion data to build-up input legitimacy for new EU proposals. Yet, as the Commission is in the driving seat when selecting and dis-selecting topics, the Special Eurobarometer might not be the innocent instrument it appears at first glance.

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Jun 21 2015

Populism in Europe: a primer

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By Cas Mudde

Already in 2010, a good five years before a populist coalition government would be formed in Greece, then EU President Herman van Rompuy called populism “the greatest danger for Europe” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 April 2010). Since then, many establishment voices have done the same, from German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the editors of the New York Times. What all warnings have in common is that they (1) come from people in power; (2) are vague on the exact meaning of populism; and (3) claim that populism is (omni)present in European politics.

Historically populism has been a marginal political phenomenon in Europe, unlike in the Americas (North and South). In recent years populist parties of left and right have gained electoral successes throughout Europe, although their effects on European politics have so far remained fairly limited.

What populism is (not)

imagesPopulism is a buzzword in the media around the world. There is virtually not a politician who has not been labeled populist at one time. In fact, accused would be a better term, as most people use populism is a Kampfbegriff to defame a political opponent. Few politicians self-identify as populist. Those who do usually first redefine the term in a way that is closer to the popular
use of democracy than of populism.

In the public debate populism is mostly used to denounce a form of politics that uses (a combination of) demagogy, charismatic leadership, or a Stammtisch (pub) discourse. None of the three are accurate understandings of populism. While some populists might promise everything to everyone (i.e. demagogy) or speak a simple, even vulgar, language (i.e. Stammtisch discourse), many do not. More importantly, many non-populist populists also do this, particularly during election campaigns. Similarly, while some successful populists are charismatic leaders, some are not, and many successful non-populists are also considered charismatic.

Instead, populism is best defined as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people. This means that populism is a particular view on how society is and should be structured, but it addresses only a limited part of the larger political agenda. For example, it says little about the ideal economic or political system that a (populist) state should have. Its essential features are: morality and monism.

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Jun 15 2015

The Politics of the Humanitarian Crisis in Europe

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By Roberto Orsi

One of the greatest moral achievements of the ancient world has been the enshrinement of a solidarity principle for the fellow human in distress, which finds perhaps its highest formulation in the evangelical parable of the “good Samaritan”. It is worth recalling that parable in full:

A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And by chance there came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, and went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee. Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves? (Luke 10:30-36)

The parable offers a clear portrait of what “being a neighbour” should mean, namely coming to the rescue of people in difficult situations and imminent danger, in order to let them recover (if possible), and regain their autonomy.

The parable of the good Samaritan would however look very different if its author had added that a secret deal between the inn-keeper and the robbers was in place, and that to a certain extent even the beaten man was somehow half-aware of the scam in which he plays the admittedly most uncomfortable role (to use an euphemism). It would look even more different if its author added that such a scam was operated on an industrial scale, with the vast complicity of those who were supposed to safeguard the security of that territory, and a plethora of intellectuals and spiritual leaders, who were using the best of their intelligence to envisage narratives providing direct or indirect legitimation for such traffics.

In such a different version of the parable, what would the Samaritan have done? The man was indeed severely beaten and in distress, should he then be rescued?

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Jun 11 2015

Greece’s creditors are paying the price for not relaxing their conditions prior to the 2015 election

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By Stephanie J. Rickard

With no deal reached between Greece and its creditors despite months of negotiations over the release of further financial assistance, the country opted to delay a €300 million debt repayment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that was due on 5 June. The Greek government now intends to bundle together several payments totalling €1.6 billion into a single payment due on 30 June, while fresh proposals have been communicated to creditors in an attempt to secure additional bailout funding.

Credit: IMF

This impasse could have been avoided. The IMF, an institution that for decades has loaned money to countries in distress, successfully sidestepped Greece-like drama in the past. The IMF accomplished this by relaxing the reforms required of borrowers in the run up to elections. In a recent study, I and my co-author Teri Caraway, find the IMF softened mandated labour market reforms in loans negotiated within six months of a pending election. The further away elections were, the more stringent the reforms required in exchange for financing.

The IMF typically softens required reforms prior to elections to avoid precisely the situation now playing out in Greece. Tough reforms give opposition parties ammunition to use against the government and increase the chances that the incumbent parties will lose. In Greece, the painful austerity policies demanded by international lenders resulted in a series of convulsive protests that shook the nation and ultimately led to the election of a new anti-austerity government under Syriza in place of the previous New Democracy-led government fronted by Antonis Samaras.

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Jun 7 2015

Greece – Deal or no deal? Parameters of a decision

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By Max Hänska

It appears to me that much of the ongoing discussion about the Greek debt talks misinterprets the parameters of the challenge, and the resulting (irreconcilable) disagreement. Some economists attribute the standoff to the unwillingness of creditors to accept economic facts (Greece needs debt forgiveness and economic support). Austerians argue that only radical reforms and cutbacks will salvage Greece, and attribute the standoff to Greece’s unwillingness to reform. Though neither assessment is fundamentally wrong, both miss the political nature of the decision creditors faced.

acropolis euroThe current crisis in Greece must be understood as the logical consequence of a flawed currency union. Without a political union, and attendant institutions that can both raise a budget (through taxation) and use that budget to establish permanent fiscal transfers within the currency union, crisese similar to the Greek one will repeat themselves. However, neither debtors nor creditors are willing to move beyond intergovernmentalism and give up (at least some) fiscal sovereignty (to the European parliament or some new institution), which would make the kind of permanent transfers necessary for stabilising the Eurozone possible.

Given the EMU’s structural flaws, inevitable crises will need to be resolved intergovernmentally. Unfortunately, Greece’s creditors have no confidence in Greece delivering on any of its commitments. The creditors view Greek promises as a fig leaf for an arrangement under which Eurozone citizens would indefinitely fund the Greek state —they don’t believe that the Greek government is sincerely willing or capable of delivering reforms. I doubt creditors are uniformly committed to austerity as a panacea. Rather, their insistence on invasive and strict conditionality is better understood as a direct result of lacking confidence. Without invasive conditionality creditors have no leverage over, what they perceive as, unruly Greeks.

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Jun 2 2015

Europe entrapped? An interview with Claus Offe

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By Claus Offe and Daniel Whittall

Europe remains mired in a crisis as much political as it is economic. The crisis has been long in the making and its dynamics stem from the institutional structures that govern European politics. 

In Europe Entrapped Claus Offe, Professor of Political Sociology at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, lays bare the institutional dynamics of the European crisis. He argues that Europe has entrapped itself in a bureaucratic apparatus and economistic rhetoric, both insufficient to the task of crisis resolution. Daniel Whittall spoke with him about his new book, and about where European politics might be heading next. 

Daniel Whittall: Your new book, Europe Entrapped, argues that the status quo for the European Union is ‘plainly unsustainable’. You call for a ‘major institutional overhaul’ of the EU, and suggest that without such reform the very project of European integration will come apart at the seams. To begin with, could you outline how you came to this argument, and what motivated the writing of this book?

Claus Offe: I think this is what social scientists do, or ought to do: Answering in a truthful way and on the basis of compelling evidence questions such as: Where are we? What went wrong? Which are the forces and their resources that can be held responsible for the present mess? Are there forces that have a chance to prevail over them? What are the challenges to be addressed and opportunities to be explored inherent in our condition? And so on.

All of this needs to be focused, as concretely as possible, on a particular set of problems (here: the situation of the EU after the Great Recession, after the adoption – in 19 out of 28 member states – of the Euro, after the deepening divide between countries in terms of indebtedness, growth, and trade performance and after the emergence of bitter political conflicts both within and between member states).

I am deeply convinced (and say so at the outset) that this configuration of challenges and outright crisis tendencies cannot conceivably be mastered and coped with within the framework of given EU institutions, this is why a “major institutional overhaul” of the latter is called for.

DW: Your argument rests on an analysis of political economy across Europe, centred on the transitions of democratic capitalism against the backdrop of European integration. You place particular emphasis on the role of the state in staging and shaping markets, and yet simultaneously on how actors within a market economy – investors and employers –undermine the political framework of democratic stability on which the state rests. What does this dual dynamic tell us about the workings of democracy and capitalism in Europe, and how sustainable do you foresee their continued intersection?

CO: Perhaps I am trying to elaborate the obvious, or an analytical idea that in no way is originally mine, but has been developed by a great intellectual tradition in political theory and political economy. Yet my personal experience from some 50 years of academic work in research and teaching is that one basic insight stemming from this tradition (say from Hilferding to Polanyi to Hirschman) is all too often ignored or forgotten. To put it in a nutshell: The “economy” is nothing that is governed by something that standard textbooks call “the market”.

Markets, together with the institutions in which they are embedded, are rather themselves political creations. Opportunities and constraints that market actors face are institutionalised by forces operating through the political system. Not a single market transaction could take place without the legal and political provision of court services to enforce property rights and contracts or without central banks defining and managing the currency that mediates market transactions. Policies and legislation and constitutions create licenses for market action, subsidise and promote industries, protect and even bail out some of those who lose in (national as well as international) market competition, establish entitlements, regulate production and distribution and provides the physical as well as institutional infrastructure (transportation systems, harbours, research universities, communication media etc.).

Capitalist market economies are neither “natural” nor in any sense uniquely “rational”; they are artefacts of political action and the outcomes of conflict over social and economic power. To provide all these preconditions of a capitalist economy and, not to forget, clean up some of its negative externalities (from unemployment to environmental disruption), fiscal resources are needed of an ever-increasing volume.

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May 28 2015

Greek Media in Disarray

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By Maria Kyriakidou

Image: Mr. Tinou Bao, Courtesy of Flickr, Creative Commons License 2.5

Image: Mr. Tinou Bao, Courtesy of Flickr, Creative Commons License 2.5

There is perhaps no other field that better illustrates how deeply ingrained clientelism is in Greek political culture than the media sector. Politicians, media and business have long been operating as a ‘triangle of power’, where private and political interests are intrinsically intertwined and where the media function as the means through which these interests are played out. It is this bleak media landscape that a newly published report on ‘Media Policy and Independent Journalism in Greece’ paints with much detail. Drawing upon detailed research, including interviews with key actors, authors Petros Iosifidis and Dimitris Boucas describe the challenges the Greek media landscape poses for policymakers and journalists.

The backdrop of the triangle of power dominating the Greek media system is a weak and inconsistent regulatory framework, incapable of monitoring and controlling state and private interests. The market deregulation that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s allowed for the proliferation of private media, but not to the benefit of media pluralism. Instead, it led to an excessively augmented and financially unsustainable media market, with high levels of media concentration in the hands of Greek businessmen with interests in other sectors of the economy, a lot of them dependent on public contracts, such as shipping, telecommunications and refining. In this context, private media have been long used as powerful means of influencing the government and as platforms for indirect profit through the strengthening of relations with politicians and the acquisition of state contracts. Continue reading

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May 22 2015

Are Italian Public Debt Forecasts Too Optimistic?

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By Giuseppe Bianchimani

Italy, a history of large public debt

By Maryb60 [CC BY-SA 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons

By Maryb60 [CC BY-SA 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons

Italy has the third largest stock of public debt in the world, the second in the euro zone next to Greece and the highest debt service ratio in the G7.

The last point is particularly important to understand the difficulties of managing Italian public debt. Japan holds roughly twice of the Italian public debt, but it spends less than one percent of GDP to service its public debt while Italy spends 5.4 percent of GDP.

The burden of interest payments and slow growth have heavily contributed to enhancing the weight of debt, developing a dangerous vicious circle.

However, there are several optimistic forecasts on debt dynamics (IMF, European Commission, OECD). This is the result of the deep efforts which have occurred in recent years, in particular since 2012. Continue reading

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May 18 2015

Eurosceptics at a Junction: Antagonising the EU for the Sake of it is Risky

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By Alessio Colonnelli

By Woodennature (Own work) [CC BY 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons

By Woodennature (Own work) [CC BY 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons

All right-wing parties seem to dabble in anti-EU rhetoric more or less radically: the EU weakens the prerogatives of their nation-states. Germany’s Christian Democratic Union is a conspicuous exception; it sharply antagonises the further-to-the-right Alternative for Germany, an anti-Eurozone outfit enjoying increasing support. Progressive parties are not immune to all this.

EU governance is indeed perceived as intricate, unnecessarily cumbersome and therefore lacking legitimacy. The UK Independence party (UKIP), Marine Le Pen’s National Front, Italy’s Northern League and Five Star Movement, plus several other parties, try their best to turn Europeans’ embitterment even more sour. Continue reading

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